Daily Report

East Europe

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CONTENTS

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ALBANIA

Albania: Electoral Commission Statement on Complaints *[ATA]* 1
Albania: Officials Brief Press on Rerun of Elections *[ATA]* 1
Albania: Nano Calls Socialist Withdrawal From Polls 'Hasty' *[ZERI I POPULLIT 9 Jun]* 3
Albania: Police Lay 'Siege' to PS, Center Pole Offices *[KOHA JONE 9 Jun]* 4

BULGARIA

Bulgaria: Assembly Debates No-Confidence Vote in Cabinet *[Sofia Radio]* 6
Bulgaria: Lilov, Kamov Decline To Run for Presidency *[DUMA 11 Jun]* 7
Bulgaria: Purvanov: Resignation of Entire Cabinet Not Requested *[Sofia Radio]* 7
Bulgaria: Marinov Explains Vote Against Cabinet Changes *[24 CHASA 11 Jun]* 7
Bulgaria: SDS Daily Claims Videnov Conducted 'Purge' *[DEMOKRATSIYA 10 Jun]* 8
Bulgaria: Videnov Seen Risking All To Remain Leader *[KONTINENT 10 Jun]* 8
Bulgaria: Videnov Cabinet, BSP Policy Seen as 'Dead' *[KONTINENT 11 Jun]* 9
Bulgaria: Koychev: BSP, Cabinet Differ on Economy *[TRUD 6 Jun]* 9

CZECH REPUBLIC

Czech Republic: Replacements for IFOR Unit Being Trained *[DENNI TELEGRAF 8 Jun]* 11
Czech Republic: Havel Suffering From Viral Infection *[Prague Radio]* 11
Czech Republic: Coalition 'Deadlocked' Over Pact With Zeman *[MLADA FRONTA DNES 8 Jun]* 11
Czech Republic: Daily Calls For 'Bridging Government' *[MLADA FRONTA DNES 8 Jun]* 12
Czech Republic: ODS Threatens Early Elections at 'Tense' Talks *[MLADA FRONTA DNES 8 Jun]* 12
Czech Republic: Klaus: Consensus Must Be Found in Coalition Talks *[Prague Radio]* 13

SLOVAKIA

Slovakia: Deputy PM on Brussels Meeting on EU Integration *[PRAVDA 10 Jun]* 14
Slovakia: SDL Appoints 'Shadow Cabinet,' Issues Statement *[PRAVDA 10 Jun]* 15
Slovakia: Coalition MP Says Some HZDS Policies 'Intolerable' *[PRAVDA 8 Jun]* 16

HUNGARY

Hungary: Kovacs on Euro-Atlantic Integration, NATO Deployment *[MAGYAR HIRLAP 8 Jun]* 18
Hungary: NATO Base at Taszar Allegedly Too Costly *[NEPSZAVA 10 Jun]* 19
Hungary: Finance Minister Medgyessy Views Budget Issues *[NEPSZABADSAG 6 Jun]* 19

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

B-H: Mladic Reportedly 'Fled to Moscow' on Russian Plane *[Ljubljana Radio]* 22
B-H: Mladic Departure Seen as Possible Russia-West 'Deal' *[Tuzla Radio]* 22
B-H: Klickovic, Buha Meet UN Official, Discuss Elections *[SRNA]* 22
B-H: Klickovic Comments on Meeting With EU's Dini, Santer *[Banja Luka TV]* 22
B-H: Plavsic Views Dayton Accord Implementation, Elections *[BETA]* 23
B-H: Koljevic: Serbs Will Never Extradite Karadzic to Tribunal *[FONET]* 23
B-H: Krajisnik Says IFOR Preelection Role 'Very Important' *[SRNA]* 24

B-H: Krajisnik on 'Constructive' Talks With OSCE's Frowick *[SRNA]* 24
B-H: SRS Leader: Karadzic, Mladic Will Never Be Extradited *[SRNA]* 24
B-H: SRS Head Rejects 'Imposed Positions,' Warns of Disunity *[Banja Luka TV]* 25
B-H: SRS Rally in Banja Luka Demands Overthrow of Milosevic *[BETA]* 25
B-H: Serb Intellectuals' Declaration of Support for Karadzic *[SRNA]* 26
B-H: Brcko Official 'Optimistic' About Arbitration Outcome *[Banja Luka Radio]* 27
B-H: 3 Serbian Parties To Participate in Bosnian Elections *[SRNA]* 27
B-H: Banja Luka Party Supports Karadzic Declaration *[BETA]* 27
B-H: 'Witness Q' Takes Stand Against War Crimes Suspect Tadic *[AFP]* 28
B-H: FM Prlic Explains Refusal To Sign Arms Accord *[AFP]* 28
B-H: Serb Assembly Speaker, Zubak Discuss Demarcation Line *[SRNA]* 29
B-H: RS, Federation Agree on Payment Methods, No Single Currency *[SRNA]* 29
B-H: Muratovic Briefs Press on Islamic Bank Aid *[Sarajevo Radio]* 30
B-H: EU Officials, Muratovic Address Journalists in Sarajevo *[Sarajevo Radio]* 30
B-H: Silajdzic on Founding of Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina *[Tuzla Radio]* 31
B-H: Mediator on Failure of Refugee Policy in Bosnian Federation *[SRNA]* 32
B-H: Poll Indicates 'Crisis' in Federation Relations *[DNEVNI AVAZ 1-2 Jun]* 32
B-H: Izetbegovic Urges Mostar Population To Vote in Elections *[BH PRESS]* 33
B-H: Mostar Party Branch Conveys Support for Karadzic *[SRNA]* 33
B-H: SDA Fails To Register for Mostar Elections *[Mostar Radio]* 34
B-H: 5 Parties Establish 'Joint Front' in Mostar Elections *[Sarajevo Radio]* 34
B-H: Chirac: Elections Must Be Held; No Link to Karadzic *[AFP]* 34
B-H: Commentary Sees 'Discrepancy' Over Election Rules *[Hanau NOVA BOSNA 8 Jun]* 34
B-H: UBSN Fears 'Renouncement' of Dayton Accord *[BETA]* 35

CROATIA

Croatia: Main Opposition Party Said To Betray Coalition *[AFP]* 36
Croatia: HDZ's Principles for Party Cooperation Talks *[Zagreb Radio]* 36
Croatia: HSLS Sets Down Conditions for Talks With HD *[VJESNIK 10 Jun]* 38
Croatia: HSLS Demands Seen as Extreme in Talks With HDZ *[VECERNJI LIST 10 Jun]* 40
Croatia: Parties Critical of HDZ-HSDS Rapprochement *[Zagreb TV]* 40
Croatia: Failure To Enter Partnership for Peace Assessed *[NOVI LIST 7 Jun]* 41
Croatia: E. Slavonia 'Over 80 Percent' Demilitarized *[AFP]* 42
Croatia: Government Official Views Transition in Slavonia *[NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA 7 Jun]* 43
Croatia: Commentary Views Draft Law on Information Freedom *[VJESNIK 8 Jun]* 45

THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

FYROM: Implications of Latest Greek 'Threats' Examined *[NOVA MAKEDONIJA 4 Jun]* 47
FYROM: Russian Embassy on UNPREDEP Mandate *[MIC]* 48
FYROM: Russian Diplomat Views NATO Expansion *[NOVA MAKEDONIJA 10 Jun]* 48
FYROM: Skepticism About Benefits of NATO Expressed *[DNEVNIK 8 Jun]* 52
FYROM: Miljovski on Cooperation Agreement With EU *[NOVA MAKEDONIJA 31 May]* 53

POLAND

Poland: Belgian Minister on Poland's NATO, EU Membership *[Brussels LE SOIR 8-9 Jun]* 56
Poland: Gdansk Shipyard Unions Vote for Strike *[Warsaw TV]* 57
Poland: Walesa Wants Shipyard Workers To Have State's Shares *[PAP]* 57
Poland: PM Cited on Enterprise Surveillance Controversy *[Warsaw Radio]* 57
Poland: Minister Defends UOP Head's Surveillance Order *[Warsaw Radio]* 58
Poland: Further on URM Land Deals *[RZECZPOSPOLITA 31 May]* 58
Poland: Oleksy Meets SdRP Activists, Views Economy, Church *[GAZETA WYBORCZA 10 Jun]* 62

ROMANIA

Romania: Roman Suggests Talks With U.S. Republicans on NATO *[AZI 7 Jun]* 63

Romania: Cioflina Displeased With Dole's NATO Proposals *[AZI 8 Jun]* 63
Romania: Prospects for Early NATO Membership Slim *[ADEVARUL 6 Jun]* 63
Romania: Daily Warns Political Class of Electorate's Revenge *[CURIERUL NATIONAL 4 Jun]* 64

YUGOSLAVIA

Federal

FRY: Government Reshuffle Expected in Sep *[SRNA]* 67

Serbia

Serbia: Milosevic on Elections, War Crimes, IFOR *[Madrid EL PAIS 10 Jun]* 67
Serbia: President Milosevic Interviewed *[Hamburg DER SPIEGEL 10 Jun]* 68
Serbia: Seselj Attacks Milosevic Policy on 'Serb Republic' *[SRNA]* 72
Serbia: Reasons Listed for Milosevic Not To Arrest Mladic *[VREME 1 Jun]* 72
Serbia: Serb Unity Leader Calls E. Slavonia Part of Croatia *[AFP]* 74
Serbia: Serbian Unity Condemns Initiative To Divide Kosovo *[SRNA]* 74

Albania: Electoral Commission Statement on Complaints

AU1106092796 Tirana ATA in English 1852 GMT 10 Jun 96

["Statement of Central Electoral Commission"—ATA headline]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 10 (ATA)—According to its legal authority and after announcing on May 29 the results of the May 26 general elections on the basis of the decision of the Constituencies commissions, during this period the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) has examined over 100 demands, appeals and complaints by electoral subjects and candidates against these decisions.

Furthermore, the CEC has repeatedly called on all electoral subjects and all those who claimed or had noted irregularities to send to the commission all the facts and documents they could have.

In order to guarantee full transparency of its work, the Central Electoral Commission decided to put all voting material, ballots, protocols and other documents at the disposal of all those who have complained or their representatives and to confront these materials with the concrete complaints and allegations by electoral subjects. During the past period, electoral subjects did not boycott the elections and candidates for deputies have addressed to this commission 103 testimonies and complaints for irregularities.

The Central Electoral Commission has not received during this period any complaint from electoral subjects which boycotted the elections but this Commission has been sent complaints from four candidates of the PS [Socialist Party] regarding the Constituencies 14, 17, 18 and 19.

The CEC has not had any complaint from citizens or individuals for use of violence, terror or pressure by members of the polling station commissions or by the policemen charged to guard the polling stations.

None of the political forces has sent any request to take part or to send its representative during the process of voting material verification. Such a request has also not been made by foreign observers although the Commission had decided to be open to them.

We, as a commission, asked for the help of an expert and distinguished foreign authority in the field of elections, Prof. Dr. Kalterfleiter, director of the Institute of Political Sciences in the Christian-Albrechts University in Kiel of Germany and director of the Security Studies Institute. We informed Prof. Kalterfleiter of all the polling procedure, the working terms of our Commission and fulfilled all his demands serving his acquaintance with the elections material.

While examining the ballots and the process-verbaux, the Central Electoral Commission observed unacceptable irregularities in the Constituencies 67 and 92 and especially in the protocols of the polling stations which led to suspicion in the election result brought by the constituency commission.

In order to reevaluate the elections results from constituencies commissions, the CEC decided that all the invalid ballots in which all the candidates' names were drawn a line upon but the line on the name of the socialist candidate somewhat changed (in form, thickness or colour) from the lines on the names of other candidates, be considered valid for PS, thus applying the principle "in dubio pro rea".

Based mainly on this criterion, and by scrutinizing the ballots and protocols one by one, the CEC found that its results changed from the results announced by the commissions in 15 constituencies for which the CEC proposed the president of the Republic to decree re-running of elections along with two other constituencies.

The Central Electoral Commission decided that all commission of the electoral zones and polling stations, where elections will be re-run, be changed.

The Central Electoral Commission, according to the Albanian electoral law, starting from June 7, 1997, has no more legal competence on the electoral process which took place before that date. Therefore the CEC invites all the electoral subjects and candidates that do not agree with the decisions of this commission or those of the constituencies commissions, or have eventual facts, complaints and irregularities, to address the Constitutional Court as the supreme institution which has as one of its constitutional duties the granting of legitimacy to the elected deputies and consequently it may annul any electoral decision it considers incorrect.

The Central Electoral Commission assures the political subjects, candidates for deputies and their observers of its full transparency during the examination of the electoral material in 17 constituencies in which, according to President's decree No. 1506, dated June 8,1996, elections will be re-run on June 16, 1996.

Albania: Officials Brief Press on Rerun of Elections

AU1106083996 Tirana ATA in English 1256 GMT 9 Jun 96

[Report by L. Karadaku]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, June 9 (ATA)—The chairman of the Central Electoral Commission, Edmir

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Kapidani, and the expert in elections, Prof. Dr. Werner Kaltefleiter, held a news conference in Tirana on Saturday [8 June].

After press statements, they responded reporters' questions:

BBC: How did you decide to repeat elections in these 13 constituencies?

Kapidani: In order to find out these irregularities, the commission carried out surveys in several constituencies to see what could be real irregularities and what deliberate. The working group set these forth to the central commission and the latter found out which of these irregularities were real and which deliberate. We also defined the reason for a constituency to rerun elections. Before jumping to this conclusion, we asked the opinion of many foreigners who answered: "There is no such precedent in our countries and we cannot voice our view."

Being a very specific case, especially with the withdrawal of several electoral subjects by the end of voting, they wanted us, through this logic, to define the degree of irregularities.

The Central Commission after a full verification of large part of constituencies, over 40, and a partial one in many other constituencies, considered invalid the results of these 13 consistencies.

ASSOCIATED PRESS: Some of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] observers have reported other irregularities during the voting. How much can the central commission be able to ascertain these irregularities and how much of them can be noted during the vote counting?

Kaltefleiter: These have occurred and it would be nonsense to say no. But according to my observation, they certainly have not effected the political result of the elections.

The chairman of the Commission: I would like to add something: I said foreign observers have not filed any kind of complaint at the central commission, but the latter has verified this kind of irregularity by comparing the number of votes with that of the ballot papers found in the ballot-box. And every irregularity has been accounted at the detriment of the winner. This is the how the central commission considers this.

TVA: Mr. Kapidani, there is something unclear. With observers you mean foreign ones? It is them that have not filed any complaints?

Kapidani: Yes. The foreign observers. They have filed neither written nor verbal complaints.

AFP: Normally, should they lodge complaints?

Kapidani: This would help us.

Hamdi Jupe, ZERI I POPULLIT: Three questions to the chairman of the commission:

—What is the legal status of the professor?

—Do you have a decision for the re-run of elections in these 15 constituencies or are you speaking of a possibility?

—You have issued a decision according to which the Democratic Party [PD] has won 95 constituencies and Socialist Party [PS] five. According to the Electoral Law, only the Constitutional Court can oppose this decision. What is your legal basis to assume the powers of the constitutional court?

Kapidani: We have been open to all foreign observers, political subjects and candidates to follow the central electoral commission activity in order to be transparent and convincing in our decisions.

Under the Electoral Law, we asked a consultation after all the other foreigners did not give us this possibility saying only that "there is no such precedent in our countries" or that "we do not pronounce ourselves on such occasion."

It seems in our country there are always forces intending to lead us to unexplored roads. So, we considered this the best way to respond to this precedent.

Last night we reported that the results of these constituencies were annulled. Later we asked the president of the Republic that elections in these constituencies be repeated and the date for their repetition be set.

As regards the third question, first, the earlier decision was not a decision of the central electoral commission. We only issued a report of the constituencies' commissions. We did not issue a decision. Then, based on the complaints and irregularities ascertained by the central commission we decided to declare these results invalid. This was the second step. The third step is that the subjects can address to the constitutional court to declare these results.

Hamdi Jupe to Kaltefleiter: Should we believe that it is you that are coolheaded in your conclusions or the OSCE observers?

—Why should the German ambassador be mentioned here? Are you speaking here on his or on your behalf?

—You said you have come to Albania thrice. There have been four general elections in Albania, two for the parliament, one for the local government and one for the constitution.

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Do you think the then infrastructure was better as there were no such problems?

Kaltefleiter: I appreciate your first question. I mentioned the German ambassador not to say that I spoke with the ambassador but to explain my delay. The meeting with the ambassador was the reason for my delay. Whatever I say is my own view and I do not care what the others think. This is the independence we enjoy in our country.

As regards the second question: The temperature in this hall is high and it is difficult to have a cool head. But I hold that even in this hot room I am able not to let my feelings control my judgment. But this is your judgment.

As regards the third question: Infrastructure has not radically changed. I do not criticise the country and it is quite normal under international competitive terms. And, as far as I know, it has not changed during these elections. The real political questions is why this time there was so much international clamour? I hold you should put this question to the Socialist Party. I respect this withdrawal from elections. This is a decision of a political party and any political party can take such decisions. The only problem I see is why did the electoral commissions' members withdrew, as well. With this they threw doubts on the democratic process. What I have learned these days in Albania is that this decision ought to have been taken at least two days before elections. And you should ask the Socialist Party what was its strategy of doing it.

Sulivan: You said that this withdrawal ought to have been done two days before the elections, didn't you?

Kaltefleiter: It would have been better if the Socialist Party had withdrawn at least two days before the elections.

Sulivan: Are you are pronouncing yourself based on the view of the parties in the commission or also on that of the opposition parties after the withdrawal?

Kaltefleiter: As I said, yesterday morning I had a long discussion with leaders of the opposition parties. And my reasoning is also based on the information I received from them.

Sulivan: As regards foreign observers, are you going to wait for a final statement like that of the OSCE or to voice your own view since now?

Kaltefleiter: Let me explain. I have seen at least 90 per cent of the written reports of observers that might have been here now and this is a very great number. Only few observers have filed complaints and the others said that everything was all okay. And after what I read, saw and heard here, I drew my conclusion.

REUTER: What party did the winners in the constituencies in which elections will be re-run belong to?

Kapidani: The Democratic Party had won in the 13 constituencies in which the elections will be repeated. As regards the results for the proportional share, we must wait for the result of the re-run elections, some possible four round and after this the results for the 25 constituencies of proportional system will be issued.

AFP: Who proposed the reexamination of results in these 13 constituencies?

Kapidani: There have been requests from 11 parties. There are over 100 complaints corresponding to 60 constituencies. Various parties may have asked the reexamination of the same constituency.

AFP: The Socialist Party has asked the re-verification in 107 constituencies.

Kapidani: It is a total request it has made.

Kaltefleiter: They told me they will not take part. Let me provide you a simple argument. If you sit down and make a simple calculation, in order to change the proportional share, the result of repetition in these 17 constituencies should at least change by 10 points more than in the first elections.

REUTER: Not clear.

Kaltefleiter: There will be fresh elections in 17 constituencies, that is, 15 per cent of 115 districts. According to the Electoral Law, there are only 25 parliament members according to the proportional system. If you want to change the contribution to the proportional system, you should hold fresh elections in only 15 per cent of the constituencies. The difference in these constituencies should be at least 10 points to influence the proportionality.

Albania: Nano Calls Socialist Withdrawal From Polls 'Hasty'

AU1106095796

[FBIS Report] Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian on 9 June carries on pages four and five a 3,000-word article by Socialist Party Chairman Fatos Nano entitled "The Great Deception of 26 May—A 'Time Bomb' Not Only for Albania." Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian on 11 June carries on page three an 800-word report by Elio Elini entitled "Nano: 'The Opposition's Withdrawal Was Hasty,'" which includes comments on Nano's views by Socialist Party and Center Pole leaders.

Nano's article in ZERI I POPULLIT states that "The 26 May parliamentary elections in Albania degenerated into an electoral farce involving elements of a coup

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d'etat." The article continues, "Faced with an emergency, the parties of the genuine opposition, representing the entire political spectrum, boycotted the electoral process several hours before the official opening of the ballot boxes, thus encouraging Berisha's scenario of manipulation to run out of control."

Nano's article continues, "The only serious political position that can and must be taken over the great electoral deception of 26 May both in Albania and abroad, whether for pragmatic everyday purposes or for long-term strategic interests, is to repudiate and annul these elections and to guarantee fair and free elections in the most problematic and backward country in the Balkans and the entire former-communist East..."

Nano further writes that, as a result the "extremely unequal conditions" for the opposition parties before the 26 May elections, the opposition went to the polls "crippled." "Under these circumstances, the emergency boycott of the electoral contest took place under duress and was not at all responsible! From the viewpoint of the need to provide evidence and full documentation of all of the irregularities and details of the great electoral deception of 26 May, it was perhaps a hasty act to withdraw the opposition's electoral commission members and observers, even though they were subjected to terror, at a time when they should have stoically held out until the election results were processed, becoming not accomplices but important witnesses to the regime's great crime. Nevertheless, this matter has now been dealt with and the deception is now thoroughly documented."

Writing on the opposition's plans for the future, Nano states: "The main issue the opposition urgently faces, confronted by the dictatorial radicalization of Berisha's regime, is the perfect coordination of the political activities and responses of the opposition front, in which the majority of the deceived electorate of 26 May are ranked in active revolt. The political strength of the opposition, in order to achieve the principled objective of free and fair elections in Albania, lies in not abandoning its disappointed electorate but in maintaining and intensifying daily contact with the people who were deceived on 26 May and those who were barbarically beaten by the police on 28 May, and in actively organizing and directing peaceful processes and a civil boycott of Berisha's regime throughout the country, in order to stabilize the democratic situation in Albania."

Elio Elini, writing about Nano's article in GAZETA SHQIPTARE, states, "The statement by Nano, the leader of the largest opposition force, emerged from Bence prison three days ago. His reproach of the opposition's withdrawal from the election swims in a sea of bitter criticism of 'the Berisha regime.'" Elini's report continues, "Nano's message has caused an 'earthquake' in the opposition headquarters. Socialist Party Deputy Chairman Namik Dokle, after an initial 'no comment,' confined himself to saying briefly that 'Nano, under the difficult circumstances in which the Berisha regime has put him, is again waging an effective political struggle from prison.' However, the leaders of the Center Pole, the Socialist Party's closest allies, went further. Only 48 hours later, Democratic Alliance President Neritan Ceka told GAZETA SHQIPTARE that Nano's statements showed how impossible it is for him to see the reality that has been created beyond the prison bars. 'Nano has not been able to see what has happened in the three years since his imprisonment. He has not seen how a secret service has been created that is stronger and more aggressive than that of the Albanian Workers Party [PPSh], that a police force more aggressive and dogmatic than that of the PPSh has been formed, and that the regime today has become totalitarian."

Albania: Police Lay 'Siege' to PS, Center Pole Offices

AU1006172096 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 9 Jun 96 p 3

[Article by Emin Barci and Enton Abilekaj: "Opposition Demonstrates Under Siege"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The siege of the capital city continues. For the third time, the attempts by the opposition to demonstrate against the rigging of the elections have placed Tirana under a police siege. Whereas the Socialist Party [PS] headquarters was the center of the siege on 28 May and 4 June, the headquarters of the Center Pole became a second focus yesterday. For the last four years, the opposition has been trying to demonstrate in Skenderbeg Square in the center of Tirana. Since the Democratic Party [PD] came to power, this square has seen only PD supporters, people brought compulsorily, and the luxurious cars of those in power arriving for important meetings. Yesterday's police siege began in the morning. The police warned all the owners of cafes in the center of Tirana, especially those surrounding the PS headquarters, to close at 1300 [1100 GMT], or four hours before the start of the announced demonstration. At 1400, the police began to inspect the cafes and to eject customers from those that had still not closed. At 1500, large police forces surrounded the buildings of the PS and the Social-Democratic Party [PSD], preventing the entrance of all persons including Albanian and foreign journalists. Gradually, the encirclement extended to Skenderbeg Square and a radius of one kilometer around

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it. Cars were allowed to proceed to the square, with the purpose of preventing people from gathering. However, pedestrians had fewer rights than cars and were not allowed to go in the direction of the square, even on personal business. Before the encirclement, about 300 people had succeeded in gathering inside Socialist headquarters. Some of them, anticipating the police siege, had brought food with them and had been waiting inside the building since the morning. At 1800, they started shouting against Berisha's regime and calling on the police to lift the siege.

The situation was the same at the headquarters of the Center Pole. About 100 people shouted against the rigging of the elections and asked the police to allow them and other citizens of Tirana to protest in the main square. The many police surrounding the square did not allow anybody to enter and would not allow people to stand in one place, even to watch. Several Italian journalists from RAI were told to move. For the first time, an Albanian Radio-Television camera crew had been sent to the square and to the front of the surrounded party headquarters. Its purpose was not to film the police siege, but to demonstrate on the screen to the people of Albania and the world that people were not supporting the opposition. Fortunately, the cameras of foreign television stations had filmed the countless cordons of policemen and special forces and the sieges of the square and the opposition headquarters.

Inside the PS and PSD headquarters, the besieged leaders discussed how to break through the siege and to head for the square as on 28 May. However, as they looked at their supporters, who were shouting in the courtyards against Berisha and his regime, they felt sorry at the prospect of seeing their backs blackened and bruised by the truncheons that the policemen waved incessantly. Loudspeakers installed above the PS and PSD headquarters broadcast songs and slogans, completing the sonic decor of the city. This time, the loudspeakers spoke not only Albanian but English. Through the medium of English, the opposition parties called on foreign journalists to accurately describe the police and military siege of Tirana and of Albanian democracy.

At 1900, the PS deputy chairmen appeared at the door of their party headquarters. The police raised the alarm and added another cordon of special rapid-deployment forces. Servet Pellumbi was the first to speak, and he reminded Berisha and the leaders of his regime that they had significantly lost credibility at home and abroad. Pellumbi stressed that the opposition will never allow anybody to steal the votes of the people.

The leaders of the Democratic Alliance and the PSD also made attempts to head for the square, which were countered by reinforcements to the police siege.

Later, PS Deputy Chairman Namik Dokle read out a statement of his party. According to him, Berisha does the most tragic things in the most blockheaded way. Dokle exposed Berisha's tactic of deciding on 17 constituencies for repeat elections, stressing that this is against the law. Dokle said that President Berisha, by decreeing a date for new elections in 17 constituencies, had openly ignored Europe and the United States, who had clearly and curtly demanded a review of the elections. "The Albanian head of state, without waiting for the final report of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] and without waiting for the international community's investigation of the serious irregularities in the elections, violated the law and issued his own decree," the PS declaration states.

At about 1930, the Socialists and Center Pole called on their supporters, who greeted them in the courtyards with cheers, to disperse quietly. When people lowered their voices and tried to leave quietly through the gates, the police refused to permit them to do so. The armed policemen were so frightened that, even when the gates were opened, they only allowed people to leave one by one. The slogan "to the square" will frighten the police and all who issue their orders for a long time to come. Servet Pellumbi stressed that when he bade farewell to his supporters, saying, "See you soon at other protests."

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Bulgaria: Assembly Debates No-Confidence Vote in Cabinet

AU1106103996 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 0900 GMT 11 Jun 96

[Report by Zlatina Georgieva]

[FBIS Translated Text] This morning parliament is debating the opposition motion of no confidence in the government, with President Zhelyu Zhelev and the cabinet in attendance. The National Assembly chairman has allocated 225 minutes for the debate, divided among the parliamentary groups.

Yordan Sokolov, leader of the Parliamentary Group of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS], presented the grounds for moving the no-confidence vote. The basic reasons, as stated by him, were the failure of the economic policies of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party], the bankruptcy of the so-called left transition, corruption at high levels in the state administration, and the lack of professionalism of the government's economic team. He pointed out that the government does not have sufficient support for the reform, has lost its authority abroad, and has no program for emerging from the crisis. The private businessman is regarded as a speculator and the three elements of the market reform are stalled, Sokolov said.

Prime Minister Zhan Videnov described these accusations as trumped-up charges and answered them point by point. It is a lie that the government has halted privatization, he said, pointing out that 309 privatization deals were concluded 1995. It is ridiculous to claim that the government is stopping mass privatization, he said. The government has never thought of monopolizing agriculture; the sector is in a serious crisis and such a monopoly is not advantageous, he said. Zhan Videnov also described as a lie the allegation that the government had brought about the banking collapse. He said that the government had provided assistance to the banks without having legal grounds for doing so. It is impossible to speak of a haughty attitude on the part of the cabinet to the international financial institutions, Videnov went on, because two agreements have already been made with the IMF and the World Bank, and he concluded his statement with the following summing up:

[Begin Videnov recording] The government of the Democratic Left is acting without forgetting its commitments. Banks have been closed down, but the deposits in them were legally guaranteed 100 percent by the state. Companies making hopeless losses are being liquidated. Only yesterday a scheme was announced to provide substantial additional aid to employees laid off by these companies. We have to increase the budget revenue substantially, but we will achieve this mainly by strengthening taxation discipline. We are accelerating the privatization, not by squandering state property, but by transferring it into the hands of those who created it—the millions of Bulgarians. These are some of the elements of the program that the opposition claims the government does not have, but which, in the government's view, constitutes its main and very serious commitment. [end recording]

Deputy Prime Minister Rumen Gechev quoted figures on economic growth in 1995, the favorable balance of trade, and the lower level of unemployment.

Deputies from the opposition supported the main grounds for the no-confidence motion. If everything is so rosy, where is Bulgaria's bread? asked Anastasiya Mozer of the People's Union. The changes in the cabinet are insufficient; Zhan Videnov must go to save Bulgaria, she said, adding that if the BSP continues to support him, it will assume responsibility for Bulgaria's ruin.

Filip Dimitrov of the SDS summed up by saying that the general philosophy of the BSP is confused and Zhan Videnov is the party's product, who has to go, together with the outdated ideas. Zhan Videnov intervened to say that he did not accept this analysis.

Kemal Eyup of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms demanded early elections, claiming that the structural reform is marking time. The disaster was not unavoidable, but Zhan Videnov could not prevent it, an independent deputy said, noting that the decline in living standards has affected many people and will continue to do so.

Generally speaking, the speeches made in the debate claimed to provide analyses of the period from 1991 to the present, when a succession of cabinets were in office, and of the performance of the present government of Democratic Left, all made of course through the prism of political bias.

Here is my colleague Silviya Velikova to tell us what President Zhelev said when he left his box:

[Velikova] President Zhelev's comment was laconic, after watching the parliamentary debates on the cabinet no-confidence motion for almost two hours. He said, and I quote his words: It is normal for an opposition to formulate its reasons for moving this kind of vote; it is normal for political arguments and facts to be combined in the debates with emotions. Zhelev added that so far nothing has happened here. Asked by the Bulgarian National Radio correspondent what would happen if the Videnov cabinet falls, the Bulgarian head of state answered: We will not invent the Constitution. The Constitution defines the procedure to be followed

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in the event of a possible government crisis. Asked if he had considered the possibility of forming a caretaker cabinet, the president declined to answer.

Bulgaria: Lilov, Kamov Decline To Run for Presidency

AU1106102596 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 11 Jun 96 p 1

[Article by Tanya Genova: "Sendov Waits Because of Georgi Pirinski"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] DUMA has learned that Aleksandur Lilov and Nikolay Kamov have signed statements that they do not want the BSP Supreme Council to consider their names as presidential candidates. The report of the Supreme Council commission on the candidatures is ready and will be presented by Vasil Kalinov at the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] plenum on 15 June.

Nikolay Kamov, who is the third most popular candidate of the BSP regional organizations, declined to stand on the grounds that "the BSP has stronger candidates than me," while Lilov said that he would present his detailed reasons for refusing at the plenum itself.

Blagovest Sendov told the people delegated by the commission to talk to him that the BSP should decide on its presidential candidate by consensus, not by a ballot. The academician considers that Georgi Pirinski is the candidate most likely to win, while he regards Aleksandur Lilov as certainly the most erudite and authoritative candidate. Sendov reportedly holds the view that his name should be included in the candidates to be discussed at the plenum only if the BSP finds it necessary to choose a candidate different from "its strongest representatives."

DUMA has found out that on 7 June Vasil Kalinov, Filip Bokov, and Dimitur Dimitrov talked to Georgi Pirinski. It was reportedly established at the meeting that before the BSP's undisputed favorite candidate declares his willingness to stand, the commission for assessing compatibility with the requirements of the Constitution chaired by Yanaki Stoilov should give a ruling on the matter of Pirinski's citizenship. For this very reason, many observers at BSP headquarters believe that in certain circumstances Blagovest Sendov may be expected to join the contest. [passage omitted]

Bulgaria: Purvanov: Resignation of Entire Cabinet Not Requested

AU0906162896 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 9 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The joint meeting of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] Supreme Council, the Democratic Left parliamentary faction, and the coalition partners is continuing. Prime Minister Zhan Videnov read an expose in which he analyzed the situation in the executive power. [passage omitted]

In the intermission of the meeting Kiril Zhelev, who was proposed as the new minister of agriculture, said that he is familiar with the problems of agriculture, and that he will await the decision of his colleagues on this matter.

Georgi Purvanov, BSP deputy chairman, said that at least until the meeting's intermission no one had requested the resignation of the entire cabinet.

The meeting resumed a short while ago and is continuing at present. We are waiting for the voting. We have no idea when the plenum of the BSP Supreme Council will begin. As you know, for its part this plenum must adopt changes in the BSP Executive Bureau. The plenum was supposed to begin at 1900 [1600 GMT], but this obviously will not be the case. We will keep you informed.

Bulgaria: Marinov Explains Vote Against Cabinet Changes

AU1106132196 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 11 Jun 96 p 11

[Interview with Aleksandur Marinov, former chairman of the BSP Sofia City Organization, by Iva Petroni; place and date not given: "I Voted Against"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Petroni] Mr. Marinov, did you vote against the changes in the cabinet?

[Marinov] Yes.

[Petroni] Why?

[Marinov] Because the changes are cosmetic and inadequate. They are not the result of a serious analysis of the situation in the country. The prime minister made those changes with the grimace of an adult who has been forced to take into account the whims of children who have no idea what they want. His proposals were unconvincing and unfounded.

[Petroni] Do you know which other deputy of the Democratic Left voted against the changes?

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[Marinov] I have no idea, and I do not want to know. That is why the vote is a secret one. I am saying this because I want to publicly dissociate myself from any guesses.

[Petroni] If the opposition had participated in the vote, could the cabinet have been toppled?

[Marinov] I cannot say, because I do not know how the others would have voted if this had been the case. It would have been better if the opposition had participated. The opposition's intention was clear: It wants to transfer the entire responsibility to the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] and the Democratic Left and depersonify the problem. In such a way, the opposition wants to prove that the problem is not Videnov and the narrow circle around him, who have amassed an abnormal share of power, but the BSP itself, which cannot turn into something different and is totally responsible for the grave crisis, which will deteriorate.

[Petroni] Is your behavior a rebellion?

[Marinov] It is a choice. It is the moral and political duty of everyone to make his choice and declare it. I, and not only I, rebel against an authoritarian style that has been rejected by the times and is incredible today. This is horrible for the BSP itself and the state, because we are still ruling the state. This cabinet cannot cope with the tasks that it undertook. A radical change is needed. It is not convincing to claim that there is no alternative to the policy that we are conducting. I am convinced that a much better cabinet could be formed.

[Petroni] Who should lead this new cabinet?

[Marinov] That is a premature question.

[Petroni] It has been said that your behavior is a result of being insulted because you are no longer chief of the BSP Sofia organization.

[Marinov] Such an interpretation is biased and incorrect.

Bulgaria: SDS Daily Claims Videnov Conducted 'Purge'

AU1006121896 Sofia DEMOKRATSIYA in Bulgarian 10 Jun 96 p 1

[Report by Katya Ivanova: "BSP Leader Conducts Purge in Politburo"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sofia—At the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] plenum, which lasted late into the night of 9-10 June, Zhan Videnov is reported to have prepared a total replacement of the BSP Executive Bureau. According to the list that the leader of the 100-year-old party had prepared, Klara Marinova and Nikolay Kamov are to lose their seats. Videnov is thought to want to dismiss them from all their party posts. Also earmarked for expulsion from the Socialist leadership were Nikolay Dobrev, Kiril Zhelev, Yuriy Borisov, Vladimir Topencharov, Anton Grigorov, and Miroslav Popov. The party leader is reported to have proposed replacing them with the labor collective farm ideologist Zlatimir Orsov; Iskra Baeva, editor of the NOVO VREME journal; National Assembly Deputies Filip Bokov, Vasil Kalinov, Lilyan Sirakov; Valentin Vatsev from the Alternative Socialist Association faction; and someone called Ivan Ivanov. The only members to retain their positions are the BSP chairman's four deputies—Konakchiev, Premyanov, Purvanov, and Stoilov, as well as Nikola Koychev, leader of the BSP Sofia organization. On 15 June, another BSP plenum will determine who is to be the BSP presidential candidate.

Bulgaria: Videnov Seen Risking All To Remain Leader

AU1006122096 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 10 Jun 96 p 4

[Unattributed commentary: "Does Videnov Want Elections?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] It is clear that Videnov regards his struggle with the enemy within as more important than the fate of the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] and Bulgaria. He proposed cabinet changes that cannot fail to intensify the conflict within the party, which has indeed been the case.

Evidently Videnov is assuming the risk of receiving a vote of censure from his own parliamentary group. This means creating an even greater risk of early elections, in which the BSP will have no chance.

The other day Valentin Vatsev, Videnov's personal ideologist, said on the radio that many mistakes were made when the lists of candidates were drawn up. He added that now these mistakes are in parliament and casting their votes in the wrong way.

At the next elections, these wrong choices will be eliminated, following which Videnov will return as a much stronger and prouder leader of a much smaller party, one that has small likelihood of ever returning to power.

Unless, of course, the Socialists summon the strength to kick him out themselves.

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Bulgaria: Videnov Cabinet, BSP Policy Seen as 'Dead'

AU1106123796 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 11 Jun 96 p 4

[Article by Rumen Strumski: "BSP Plenum Embarks Upon Road of Mass Suicide"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Bulgarian Socialist Party's [BSP] 9 June plenum again postponed issuing the death certificate for a certain policy, but that does not make the policy any less dead. Hamlet's father is more alive than Videnov's policy.

Meanwhile, society wonders how is it possible that its fate is still in the hands of a dead man. Now the BSP plenum has placed us in a Scythian graveyard. The tribal chieftain is in the middle. Around him are banks, enterprises, newspapers, and the beloved dog—stuffed, of course—all killed for him. A morbid circle of friends.

Now the circle is asking us to line up to get stuffed. First the BSP will turn into a mummy, because it continues to support suicidal self-sacrifice in the name of life in the hereafter, in the name of the people, of course.

The IMF has been designated as our grave digger. This is because our government does not have its own program. Neither Videnov nor the center have any idea what is to be done. Belcho Belchev sometimes acts as an advisor, and sometimes not.

Thus the BSP has parted with anything real and is already walking through walls. The real policy of the left is somewhere in the bottom of a deep hole.

The unconvincing ministerial changes also show that the BSP does not have cadres. Since it doesn't even want to promote its own capable people, you can forget about appointing capable people from other political colors.

And if the existing ministers do find rational solutions, will they be able to apply them? No! That is because our economy is not led by them but by the advisers, who continue to be knee-deep in ashes.

You have the same chance of getting a good solution from the friends-advisers circle around Videnov as you have of getting a letter from a dead man. Videnov continues to entrench himself among his friendly circle in the graveyard.

Some place their hope in today's no-confidence vote. Forget it. Most of the discontented red deputies prefer a reserved place in the graveyard to struggling in real life. The friends circle is blackmailing the deputies by hinting that if early elections are provoked, the people of either Aleksandur Lilov or Andrey Lukanov will have no place on the ballots. Tomorrow, however, they will not be on the ballots one way or another. If they want to be a part of the common agony, they are welcome.

True, the Union of Democratic Forces, the People's Union, the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, the Business Bloc, and the independent deputies need only six votes to topple Videnov. In addition, as Valentin Vatsev pointed out, the Democratic Left parliamentary faction is almost split, and 15 deputies are signaling that they are not inclined to obey the party discipline. If the rival camps in the BSP are heading toward a decisive battle, and the statements of Lilov and Lukanov at the plenum signaled this, the cabinet could fall today through the no-confidence vote.

However, this does not suit the BSP's traditions. It is more likely that the deputies will be used for a propaganda campaign, while the clash between the groups of Videnov, Lilov, and Lukanov will take place behind the scene and in a senseless manner.

So, welcome to our graveyard. Even if one is living well now, in the end he will fall prey to the vultures.

Bulgaria: Koychev: BSP, Cabinet Differ on Economy

AU0706143396 Sofia TRUD in Bulgarian 6 Jun 96 p 9

[Interview with Nikola Koychev, National Assembly deputy of the Bulgarian Socialist Party and leader of the BSP Sofia organization, by Sonya Gulubarova; place and date not given: "BSP and Government Now Are in Disagreement on Economic Policy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Gulubarova] Mr. Koychev, shortly before the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] assumed power, you predicted that our economy had already reached bottom and henceforth the way would lead upwards. Why are we still on the downward path?

[Koychev] At that time, I was quite convinced that the most difficult times had passed and, irrespective of which party will rule Bulgaria and regardless of the composition of the government, things would start improving. This was confirmed in the 1995 economic year. Now, I have no explanation for the furious decline in production and in the economy during the first part of 1996.

[Gulubarova] How come that you have no explanation?

[Koychev] I have been carefully following the macroeconomic situation, money supply, and the markets, and none of them gave any indication of the present collapse.

[Gulubarova] In that case, the reasons must lie somewhere here. Do you feel comfortable as a member of

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the economic teams of parliament and the BSP Supreme Council?

[Koychev] I would like to differentiate between the two. For the first time, I allow myself to declare that differences now exist between the BSP's economic policy and the administration of the economy by the BSP government.

[Gulubarova] However, the government's economic policy is guaranteed by the legislative work of parliament, in which your party holds the majority.

[Koychev] So far, this activity was adequate for our declared policies, except for the decisions that we have to make in the coming weeks. We have declared that we will not raise taxes or customs duties, yet now we will adopt legislative decisions that contravene our political declaration. As for the question of comfort, I do not feel comfortable. I am one of those who determined the BSP's economic policy, and I do not believe it is wrong. My divided feelings arise from the mistakes made in implementing the policy and from wondering whether I should be sympathetic toward others' mistakes and toward the delay in taking practical action to implement the reform.

[Gulubarova] Despite this, do you want to give this government one more chance?

[Koychev] Yes. The government can stay on if it reduces to the minimum the liberalism with which it has administered the Bulgarian economy until now. Since the most dissatisfaction is felt with the cabinet's economic team, I am of the opinion that it should not be replaced before we sign the agreements with the international financial institutions that are beyond our strength. Let this team apply its philosophy and finish off what it has started. In this situation, new people will find themselves in a tricky position. They will either have to profess their own economic and administrative philosophy or adjust to the accords that they have inherited by compromising their professional beliefs. Why should we destroy them?

[Gulubarova] Does this mean that the cabinet's present economic team should stay on until it signs its own political abdication?

[Koychev] I do not think it will abdicate voluntarily; it is more likely that it will be forced to by others. It has demonstrated its inability to cope with the economic situation in Bulgaria. Way back in 1994, I was convinced that some persons in this team would be a great disappointment for Bulgaria.

[Gulubarova] Who will you replace them with?

[Koychev] Do not look at me. If I join the government, I will come with my own concepts and views regarding administering the economy. I am past serving in this Ministry of Economic Development, because I closed down its predecessor, and contracted diabetes from doing so. I know what it means to hand out redundancy notices to 600 people. Many of your colleagues are now attacking Vuchev, but if he had been left in peace to settle the relationships between the banks and the companies, the situation would not have been as bad as it is now. He had the idea of founding an industrial bank, but they did not let him do it.

[Gulubarova] Who did not?

[Koychev] Who? The government.

[Gulubarova] While you look for people to blame for the BSP's failed policy, the decline continues.

[Koychev] It will continue, due to the failures of the companies that are economically moribund. The number of such companies is likely to run into three figures. We also have to fulfill the impossible conditions set by the IMF. With the rise in the cost of electric power, many of the Bulgarian plants engaged in exports will lose their competitiveness, which will lead to new cuts in production and new unemployment. The third blow will come from the high dollar rate. The belief is spreading that this favors exporting companies, but no one remembers that these firms are using imported energy sources. Expensive electricity will increase the production costs of their goods and deprive them of their most important advantage in the world market. The rise in import duties will also increase the prices of products and make them harder to sell.

[Gulubarova] So will the ordinary Bulgarian have to grin and bear all this?

[Koychev] Our calculations are aimed at preventing any fall in the real value of pensions. Firms that operate efficiently will be able to increase wages or at least retain their present value. The employees of the organizations financed out of the budget will suffer the greatest impoverishment, of the order of 10-15 percent. We expect inflation of 100 percent at the end of the year, compared with 1995. All this means that real incomes will suffer a further decline, we will limit our consumption, so that production will decrease, providing a further factor that depresses the national economy. Accordingly, the people's dissatisfaction is logical, but I ask myself what good street protests will achieve. These are the resources that we have available, these are the possibilities open to us.

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Czech Republic: Replacements for IFOR Unit Being Trained

AU1006174796 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 8 Jun 96 p 2

[Report by "(fp)": "Another 271 Men Are Being Prepared for Service in the IFOR Unit"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Roughly one-third of the men will be replaced in the scheduled "rotation" of the members of the Czech IFOR [Implementation Force] unit in Bosnia-Herzegovina. At the moment, the 271 troops who will replace their colleagues in the 6th Mechanized Battalion in the former Yugoslavia in two waves are undergoing basic, specialist, and field training.

The intensive training at the peacekeeping forces' training base in Cesky Krumlov and in the Boletice military exercise area commenced on 3 June. It will last until the middle of July and, during it, the troops will also go through special psychological training and will learn how to interpret the Dayton agreements and martial law. They will become acquainted with the tasks of the Czech battalion in the military and nonmilitary spheres and will also undergo the most demanding part of their physical preparation in field conditions. They will be transported by air on 25 and 31 July. The first Czech military chaplain, the Catholic priest Tomas Holub, is also due to fly out to the Czech battalion with the first wave of troops. He underwent demanding psychological tests and a test of his physical prowess in March and is currently undergoing tough field training in Cesky Krumlov. His main task will be to help psychologically, within the framework of the humanitarian service, soldiers in difficult personal situations. The units of all of the participating countries except the Czech Republic have their own clergy with them in the former Yugoslavia. Our General Staff, however, has still not confirmed officially the participation of Father Holub. Another delivery of supplies was made to the battalion's logistics base in Bosanska Krupa in the past few days. Ten all-terrain Land Rovers with grips for machine guns and two Volvo trucks for transporting containers were conveyed here by rail. Instruments for night vision, refrigerating trailers, containers, and spare parts for the military hardware were also in the delivery. A snooker table was also delivered to our troops.

Czech Republic: Havel Suffering From Viral Infection

LD1006165296 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1500 GMT 10 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Presidential spokesman Ladislav Spacek announced today that President Vaclav Havel was suffering from a slight viral infection.

Spacek said that, provided there were no further complications, Havel should be better in a week. He did not give any further details.

Czech Republic: Coalition 'Deadlocked' Over Pact With Zeman

AU1006134096 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 8 Jun 96 p 1

[Report by "(rep)": "The Coalition Has Not Agreed on Concluding a Pact With Zeman"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—The talks on forming a minority government from the parties of the current coalition were deadlocked yesterday. The Civic Democratic Party [ODS], the Civic Democratic Alliance [ODA], and the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party are unable to agree among themselves on the course of action for obtaining the necessary support from the Social Democrats for the government made up of the current coalition.

That is, Milos Zeman's opposition party has announced that a written agreement must be concluded between it and the coalition before it supports the government. According to Zeman, this agreement should contain the conditions that the coalition must adhere to during its term of office. I consider a written agreement to be absolutely a matter of course. The Social Democrats can in no way issue the minority government a blank check," he declared.

The ODS, of course, is categorically refusing to sign such an agreement. ODA would like merely a unilateral declaration from Zeman's party. Only the People's Party would agree with the demands of the Social Democrats being itemized in a mutual agreement between the coalition and the Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD].

"A written agreement between the coalition and the CSSD seems most acceptable to us. Of course, we are also allowing for the possibility of a unilateral document from the Social Democrats. Indeed, it is vital that the support of the CSSD be declared transparently, visibly, and controllably and that it not be some kind of lobby agreement," said People's Party Chairman Josef Lux.

On the other hand, ODA leader Kalvoda made it clear yesterday that he would be satisfied with a unilateral

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document. "If this government were to have no clearly formulated conditions from the opposition at all—and it has only 99 mandates—it would have to run to the CSSD's party headquarters with each individual decision and have it signed," said Kalvoda.

The notion that the current coalition parties should continue their talks on the government's formation and policy statement is far more agreeable to the ODS. The coalition should compare only the outcome of these talks with the demands of the Social Democrats and simply not put into the policy statement those points on which it disagrees with the Social Democrats. According to ODS Deputy Chairman Ivan Pilip, the main discussion on the form in which a law will be submitted should take place only after the government drafts the law.

Czech Republic: Daily Calls For 'Bridging Government'

AU1006153596 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 8 Jun 96 p 12

[Commentary by Jiri Leschtina: "We Need a Bridging Government"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The task of forming a minority right-wing government that could obtain the confidence of parliament will be the hardest nut for Vaclav Klaus to crack since the time of the breakup of the Federation. The situation does not have to be hopeless, however, as long as the main players realize that they are forming not a stable government for four years but a kind of bridging government with the task of leading society into the period in which it will be possible to call extraordinary elections.

Certainly, a couple of extra votes may be added to the new coalition in the course of time; for instance, one of the clubs could collapse. Nevertheless, it is impossible to approach the formation of a government with the vision of trafficking in votes.

The cabinet, which will only be held together thanks to the tolerance of the Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD], faces, above all, a responsible task: maintaining the stability of society until the Senate is filled because only then can the president dissolve the blocked parliament.

The coalition must not withdraw from its program of intensifying reforms. The voters will understand if the law on education fees or on individual accounts in health care do not squeeze past the bulwark of left-wing votes. It would be hard to forgive the coalition, however, if it were to go weak at the knees in front of Zeman and place the transformation laws on ice.

Zeman is threatening not to support the government if it has in its program, for example, education fees or continuing privatization. This is, however, just a bombastic show. It is being asked of the CSSD that, in the name of stability, it hold the government together for a while, in return for which the coalition will pay it in power-wielding posts. Another means of payment, including ideational concessions, is not being taken into consideration. Zeman will either agree to the deal, or he will not express his trust in the government and thus assume the responsibility for future development.

From this point of view, Zeman's demand for a written agreement outlining the conditions under which the CSSD will support the government is also absurd. Such a document would be a scrap of paper because it could be hard to commit all of the CSSD or Civic Democratic Party deputies not to vote in parliament in accordance with their consciences.

If the coalition parties and the CSSD understand that in a stalemate, which, at the moment, has no constitutional solution, it is necessary to cooperate, no paper promises are necessary. If a party breaks this fragile partnership without good reason, then let it explain this to the voters.

Czech Republic: ODS Threatens Early Elections at 'Tense' Talks

AU1006142696 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 8 Jun 96 p 2

[Article by "(ina, km)": "The ODS Issued a Threat of Early Elections at the Castle Talks"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—Czech Social Democratic Party [CSSD] Chairman Milos Zeman said that a party in the governing coalition issued a threat of early elections at Thursday's [6 June] talks involving the CSSD, the coalition trio, and the president. Zeman refused, however, to say which of the parties has the threat on its conscience. "We were not the ones who slammed doors at the meeting, wanted to walk out of the talks, and threatened extraordinary elections," said Zeman.

Another of the participants in the 3 + 1 talks at the Castle said that the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] had made the threat of extraordinary elections after one of Zeman's witticisms. "Zeman said something—I do not remember exactly what—and this provoked Klaus so much that he started to talk about extraordinary elections and wanted to leave the Castle," said one of the coalition politicians who was present at the meeting with the president.

At the same time, he added that, in comparison with the reactions of the other parties at the meeting, this course

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of action by the ODS was in no way exceptional because the atmosphere at the Castle had been very tense and nervous. The representatives of the coalition parties have not commented officially on Zeman's claim about extraordinary elections. They refer to the agreement with the president according to which they will not make anything public.

They view Zeman's statement in the light of this agreement. The Social Democrats are of the opinion that only they have adhered to it. "Zeman was probably offended when he read in the newspapers that the coalition parties had described unofficially the atmosphere at the Castle, including how Zeman had behaved there. He probably felt the need to add something to this," said another of the participants in the meeting at the Castle.

Czech Republic: Klaus: Consensus Must Be Found in Coalition Talks

LD1106113496 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1000 GMT 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Vaclav Klaus, chairman of the Civic Democratic Party [ODS], has confirmed that Jiri Honajzer, Jiri Vlas, and Jan Strasky will represent the party at today's coalition talks with the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party and with the Civic Democratic Alliance. Speaking to Czech radio, Klaus said:

[Begin Klaus recording] I believe that all three coalition parties will approach the negotiations fully aware of their responsibility for the developments in this country. In other words, that they will approach the negotiations in a spirit of constructive statesmanship and in the knowledge that some sort of consensus must be found. By consensus I mean that at the negotiations no party can take all. I can say that this will certainly be our approach and that the signals I am getting from the other participants indicate that it will be theirs, too.

I am going to the negotiations with a written document that clearly lays down our views regarding these issues, and I hope the ideas put forward in this document will not be unacceptable to the other coalition parties. [end recording]

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Slovakia: Deputy PM on Brussels Meeting on EU Integration

AU1106110196 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 10 Jun 96 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Slovak Deputy Prime Minister Jozef Kalman by Jan Skoda; place and date not given: "We Should Apologize to Sweden"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Skoda] Before the session in Brussels of the joint parliamentary committee of the Slovak Republic and the EU, Max van den Broek, member of the European Commission, said that the EU had an expert report made on the European penal codes and that it did not confirm the arguments used by the Slovak Government that norms similar to those in the draft amendment to the Penal Code exist in other European states....

[Kalman] I do not recall hearing this from Mr. van den Broek, but I am not claiming that he did not say it. Because some deputies asked me various questions, it could have happened.... The interpretation equipment also failed several times during his address. If he did not say it there, it is possible that he met with the deputies once again, when I was not present....

[Skoda] That certainly is not so important. What is important is that concerns over the Penal Code amendment, which remains an open issue, were voiced again. How did you react?

[Kalman] Van den Broek had two opportunities to hear the stand of the Slovak Government, which I presented. On both occasions, the commissioner began with a favorable assessment of the Slovak Republic, particularly from the point of view of economic development and further implementation of the association agreement. He highly valued the progress of the structured dialogue. According to him, Slovakia has the potential to be among the first countries to be admitted to the EU....

[Skoda] But he did not say that we are among them, or did he?

[Kalman] No, he did not say that we are among the first, but, in my opinion, he could not have said this because it will be decided by the European Commission after the assessment that is currently taking place. I clearly felt from the talks with him and with Jean-Claude Juncker, prime minister of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, that no ranking list exists so far. If it did, the filling out of the questionnaire would not be necessary, nor would the intergovernment conference to deal with the problem of the future expansion of the Union.

[Skoda] But the questionnaire is filled out today, based on the current situation....

[Kalman] All of the 12 associated countries fill out the form based on the current state of the implementation of the association agreement and the set criteria from Maastricht and Copenhagen. From this point of view, the talks were very favorable and optimistic. I will now return to the topic we discussed at the beginning: Van den Broek told me that they are not impressed with the development in the sphere of democracy because relations between the prime minister and the president are rather atypical. Mr. Juncker told me literally that the disputes between the prime minister and the president were impossible to comprehend and that he simply could not imagine how such disputes could come about. I responded to this as follows: Yes, it is a complicated situation, but such a problem is not a Slovak speciality. It also exists in other transforming countries.

[Skoda] How about the expert report on the Slovak Penal Code amendment?

[Kalman] The claim by Mr. van den Broek that they had an analysis made of the penal legislation and that we have deviated from the EU legislation may be justified. If so, it is no problem for the expert commission to meet again and discuss the differences.

[Skoda] The passing of the law on minority languages was also discussed in Brussels. The EU concerns focus on the promises by several government officials—not you personally—that this law would be passed in Slovakia, and September dates have even been mentioned in this context. Nevertheless, these promises have not been fulfilled.

[Kalman] I will correct your statement slightly: I am one of the officials who promised that the law would be passed. I did not say that it would go through by September, but within a year after the law was passed on the state language. Van den Broek and Juncker asked me this question. I answered in the same way to both of them: When discussing the law on the state language, Slovak officials said that within a year or during the year a legal norm would be adopted that would regulate the use of the minority languages. The bill is in the works, and there is a reason to believe that it will be discussed both in the Cabinet and in parliament before the year is over.

[Skoda] During the talks at the European Commission's headquarters, you suggested the establishment of a subcommittee for problems of common interest. Do you believe the EU will accept this proposal, despite the association committee of the Slovak Republic and the EU, Slovakia having diplomatic representation in Brussels and the EU in Bratislava, and other already existing forms of communication?

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[Kalman] The association agreement indicates that either party can propose any bodies that could help the process of our integration. Because we hold different views on the development in Slovakia, which is otherwise natural, we have been proposing the establishment for six months of a subcommittee composed of experts, who would explain these differences. I am not saying that the EU does not have information about us. They have plenty, but the question is whether it is up to date and whether they have the important information.

[Skoda] You have said that high-ranking EU officials avoid Slovakia. Could you give us a specific example because van den Broek denied this in Brussels?

[Kalman] He disagreed with what I said in the sense that the dialogue between the Slovak Republic and the European Commission is well developed, but I claimed that it is so at the level of experts. I was referring to the level of the top officials, about a meeting between the prime minister and Commission Chairman Santer. We know that he visited the Czech Republic and Hungary. I was also hoping that the individual European commissioners would come to Bratislava. I was in Brussels a year ago and personally invited all four officials, but none of them has come so far.

[Skoda] According to van den Broek, the fundamental problem of Slovakia is the proper implementation of the privatization process. How did you understand this statement of his?

[Kalman] I do not know how he meant it because he did not go any further at our meeting. I told him that we intended to complete privatization this year and that we had failed in the original goal of completing it by the middle of the year. We know that the EU has incessantly endeavored to invest in Slovakia. We are not blocking such trends. We have always been open to them. At the same time, I said that, if there were comparable offers from domestic sources, then, having learned a lesson from the small-scale privatization and the first wave of the large-scale privatization, we gave priority to our people. The tobacco enterprise in Banska Stiavnica, for instance, was bought by foreign investors, and they closed it down and made it into warehouses. Nevertheless, foreign investment is growing. A total of 22 billion korunas has been invested in Slovakia to date.

[Skoda] You will be presenting a report on the results of your trip to Brussels at the government session. What will be the main recommendations you will be including?

[Kalman] I have found again that, although they observe us abroad, they do not have detailed or precise information. Hence, I will again be recommending an improvement to the information flow to our embassies, to the embassies of the countries represented in Slovakia, and to the European Commission. Second, I will be recommending that personal contacts between our representatives and their partners from the EU be intensified. Another recommendation that I will be making is to compare more and in detail the Slovak legal norms with the EU legislation, so that the situation that arose because of the Penal Code amendment is not repeated, when we referred in the documentation to the legal norm in Sweden, which the Swedes claim does not exist in their country. If we injured Sweden in this manner, we should apologize to it.

Slovakia: SDL Appoints 'Shadow Cabinet,' Issues Statement

AU1006153196 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 10 Jun 96 p 2

[Report by "ao": "Party of the Democratic Left: The Government Should Govern and Render Account"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The growing radicalization and polarization of society and the intensifying crisis in the government coalition create uncertainty among citizens, who expect a positive alternative. These were the words with which the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] National Board characterized the domestic political situation in Slovakia in a statement issued on Saturday [8 June].

The participants in the meeting dissociated themselves vigorously from the "unfounded accusations of constitutional officials" raised by the Slovak Information Service [SIS] director at the May meeting of the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR]. In this context, they endorsed the course of action by SDL deputies "who did not join the right-wing opposition's uncivilized protests." In the approved document, the SDL National Board points out that SDL deputies will once again submit to parliament the draft law on subjecting privatization to supervision, will demand that OKO [special parliamentary body for monitoring the secret services] and National Property Fund bodies be expanded to include opposition representatives, and will push for the independence of public service television, which should be reflected in personnel changes in the Slovak Television Council. The SDL National Board described as priorities of SDL's policy the search for solutions to imminent social conflicts and the prevention of the unprecedented stealing of common property. At the same time, it rejected early elections as a way out of the critical situation in the government coalition. "The government should govern and render account of the fulfillment of its promises," the statement reads.

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Replying at Saturday's briefing to the hypothetical question as to what he would prefer—participation in a government coalition with the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] or early elections—SDL Chairman Jozef Migas said that he would prefer elections. SDL Deputy Chairman Peter Magvasi added, however, that a new SDL congress would not have to be called in order to decide on the SDL's entry into the government, and it would suffice if a three-fifths majority of SDL National Board members approved of it. He announced that Juraj Hrasko has been reelected chairman of the SDL Council of Sections for Practical Policy. Pavol Kanis has become first deputy chairman, and Milan Hanzel and Pavel Koncos are deputy chairmen. Preparatory committees have been created in all future regions, with the exception of Bratislava, whose task is to establish regional party bodies by the end of the year. New SDL district organizations will be set up by 30 October 1996. After the conclusion of his diplomatic mission in Kiev (15 June), Jozef Migas intends to initiate talks with all parliamentary parties. However, he sees no reason for the SDL to meet with other political entities within the framework of some blocs.

[Bratislava SME in Slovak on 10 June on page 1 carries a 150-word report by "jo" on the above meeting, which adds: "The SDL National Board adopted a resolution in which it protests against the pressure on state administration staff members to join the HZDS if they want to continue working in the state administration. This was announced by SDL Deputy Chairman Peter Magvasi after Saturday's meeting of the SDL National Board. According to Magvasi's words, the SDL has information that the HZDS is exerting this pressure, above all, in the east Slovak region." The SME report also specifies the responsibilities of the deputy chairmen of the Council of Sections for Practical Policy, which it calls the SDL's "shadow cabinet"—Pavol Kanis will be in charge of defense, Milan Hanzel in charge of justice, and Pavel Koncos in charge of the economy.]

Slovakia: Coalition MP Says Some HZDS Policies 'Intolerable'

AU1106115196 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 8 Jun 96 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Anton Polak, MP for the Association of Workers of Slovakia, by Eva Laukova; place and date not given: "Some HZDS Steps Are Intolerable"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Laukova] Jan Luptak, chairman of the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS], did not participate in the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia-Slovak National Party [HZDS-SNS] coalition talks on Wednesday. He was not invited. In your opinion, what positions would he have upheld at these talks?

[Polak] From my point of view, the ZRS manifested its dissatisfaction with the disregard for the coalition partners' views when, during the discussion on the law on bankruptcy and settlement, we did not participate in the vote. We disagree with some methods and proposed laws, and we consider it essential to call meetings to address disagreements. Problems concerning the completion of the privatization process, especially the privatization of financial institutions, should be discussed as well, just like the two laws that have been returned to the legislature by the president—the Penal Code amendment and the law on territorial and administrative arrangement. I cannot be more specific because I have not been invited to any talks within the framework of the ZRS.

[Laukova] Should you be invited?

[Polak] I think I should. It is, above all, in the interest of the ZRS political party and parliamentary club to unify views and agree on a common course of action. Talks at the highest level should always be preceded by talks in the parliamentary club and in the political board. This should be followed by a meeting between the party leadership and the parliamentary club. This is not being properly respected in our association.

[Laukova] Which aspects of the conclusions of the SNS Political Board, which endorsed the Zilina resolution of this party, did you find most interesting?

[Polak] The SNS has publicly presented its view, and I share it. If we are a coalition partner and the HZDS respects the government coalition, it should also respect the ZRS and not usurp everything without us. The steps in Slovenska Poistovna [Slovak Insurance Company] should have been preceded by talks with coalition partners. The same procedure should be applied with respect to personnel issues. By not participating in the vote on the law on bankruptcy and settlement, we made it clear what power the strongest entity has without the votes of its coalition partners, if this is not respected....

[Laukova] But ZRS Chairman Jan Luptak frequently uses the excuse that you have only 12 votes in parliament, that you are powerless. At the same time, not even laws requiring a simple majority would pass without the votes of your deputies....

[Polak] This issue should have been raised a long time ago, especially in relation to the HZDS. We would save face and the unequivocal policy that we proclaimed. In my opinion, in conjunction with Slovakia's new territorial and administrative arrangement, the ZRS should obtain about 15 percent of the posts of regional

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and district office chairmen. I have been saying this for a long time, and I do not think we are asking for more than we deserve. It would be necessary to present our position to the HZDS, which claims the right to have all of the chairmen. This is unjust and unfair toward the other coalition partners.

[Laukova] You chair the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NRSR] Mandate and Immunity Committee. In that capacity, you played a role in the affair of Democratic Union [DU] petition sheets. Silence currently surrounds this affair. Has it been swept under the carpet?

[Polak] No. I myself raised this issue in the committee, but twice the committee did not have a quorum and could not confer and make decisions. We had a quorum at the last committee meeting in April, but, when eight out of 15 committee members are from the HZDS, you can imagine that it is very difficult to adopt a valid resolution. It simply cannot pass. There are other possibilities for solving the case of DU petition sheets. The problem must not remain unresolved [latentni]. The Mandate and Immunity Committee cannot afford this; it casts aspersions on its activity. This issue must be resolved by passing an NRSR resolution because the resolution of the Mandate and Immunity Committee's temporary commission, which was headed by [HZDS deputy] Dusan Macuska, clearly states that DU deputies had not been elected legally. Either they are in the NRSR illegitimately, in which case we must prove it, or legitimately. In my opinion, as I also stated in my report, they were elected legitimately, and the law—that is, the Constitution—was actually violated by the temporary commission. We must conclude this in the Mandate and Immunity Committee and in the NRSR.

[Laukova] A situation similar to that in your committee also exists in the National Property Fund [FNM] Presidium and in other bodies. When it comes to voting, you don't really have a chance. Does the ZRS feel deceived?

[Polak] I believe that we, too, should have been taken into account when these bodies were established, specifically NRSR bodies and the FNM Presidium and Executive Committee. The opposition's demands are also justified. From the viewpoint of fairness and objectivity, the opposition should have its representatives in the FNM and OKO [Special Supervisory Body—parliamentary body for monitoring secret service activities]. Let them be there, let them know what is going on to make sure that things do not happen in OKO that run counter to certain principles, to a certain democratic development of society. When we speak about democratic society and a multiparty state based on the rule of law, these principles ought to be respected.

[Laukova] Why is the ZRS coming up with these positive steps only now?

[Polak] That is hard to say. We should have done it a long time ago. The time has apparently come for us to say enough. This is because some steps taken by our coalition partner have become intolerable.

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Hungary: Kovacs on Euro-Atlantic Integration, NATO Deployment

AU1006201596 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 8 Jun 96 p 8

[Interview with Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszlo Kovacs by Dezso Pinter; place and date not given: "I Hope a Sense of Responsibility Will Prevail"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Pinter] What do you regard as achievements and what do you regard as failures in Hungarian foreign policy?

[Kovacs] I regard the fact that Hungary has gotten much closer to the Euro-Atlantic organizations as the major foreign policy achievement of the past two years. Both the EU and NATO take Hungary into consideration for the first round of their expansion. We created the organizational and personnel conditions of the domestic guidance for preparing for integration, and we have already started to prepare our economy, legal order, state administration, education, and public for European integration. At the same time, I also think it is a considerable achievement that, in the wake of our efforts, Hungary's economic and other relations with Slovakia and Romania have increased considerably, two neighboring countries with which cooperation was practically deadlocked before because of the national minority issue. At the same time, however, because of the partners' lack of readiness, we unfortunately failed to achieve genuine changes in the situation of the ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia and Romania. I am convinced, however, that the expanding relations and the increasingly frequent and broad contacts will create better conditions for guaranteeing national minority rights according to European norms. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] The opposition would like to take a bigger share in the preparations for integration than hitherto. Are there any obstacles to this?

[Kovacs] There are no obstacles whatsoever hindering this endeavor. I welcome this desire, because joining the EU and NATO is the task of the whole country, and not only of the current government coalition. This is a step of historical importance, and every responsible political force must play its part in this endeavor. The government and the coalition parties are open to dialogue and cooperation with all parliamentary parties and professional, social, and other organizations outside Parliament. The Hungarian Socialist Party [MSZP] and the Alliance of Free Democrats [SZDSZ] are endeavoring to make use of their own system of international relations for the benefit of Hungary's Euro-Atlantic integration. I welcomed the various statements according to which some opposition parties desire to make efforts in this direction. However, one can also hear an increasing number of opposition statements lately that could question Hungary's integration efforts and its suitability for joining the Euro-Atlantic organizations. For example, statements according to which Hungary should not join the EU "by all means" are misleading, albeit that they seem to be true. Such statements suggest that perhaps joining these organizations is not even important. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] It was made clear in Brussels that Hungary's integration chances greatly depend on its relations with its neighbors. Could either one of the neighbors make use of this in order to slow down Hungary's membership?

[Kovacs] First of all, I would like to point out that, irrespective of the demands of the integration organizations, it is Hungary's basic political, security, and economic interest to have orderly relations with all its neighbors. It is also obvious that the EU and NATO would not like to bring the tensions of the eastern-central European region into their midst with the planned expansion. They made it absolutely clear to all the countries in question that settling bilateral relations is an important condition for joining the integration organizations. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] Are there any other diplomatic means at your disposal that could be used in the negotiations on the basic treaty with Romania?

[Kovacs] There are always such reserve means as long as a series of negotiations continues. At a recent meeting in Salzburg, I told the Romanian foreign minister that Hungary continues to regard the inclusion of the major international documents on the national minority issue—including Recommendation 1,201 of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe—in the Hungarian-Romanian basic treaty as important. The latest developments have confirmed our intention. These documents are also present in the Hungarian-Slovak basic treaty that was ratified by both sides. The special committee of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe confirmed the validity of the aforementioned Recommendation, and reference was also made to this in the course of the debate on Croatia's acceptance as member of the Council of Europe. Unfortunately, this document has been somewhat "demonized" in Romanian domestic political life. In order to overcome this difficulty, on our part, we are ready to cooperate closely with the Romanian political forces that are interested in this treaty and in settling our bilateral relations. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] Could it happen that we will need mediators in settling the Hungarian-Romanian relations?

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[Kovacs] In my opinion, there will be no need for such mediators. After all, we do not want to sign an armistice or peace agreement; the Hungarian-Romanian relations are not so bad as to require a third party to solve the outstanding debated issues. If the need for such a thing emerged, however, we would not exclude it either.

[Pinter] Have you noticed any lack of confidence from any country in the region over the temporary deployment of U.S. troops in Hungary?

[Kovacs] Neither the countries in the Yugoslav region nor the other neighbors have mentioned this, all the more so because all of them play a role in the peace process in one way or another. It is true, however, that, without mentioning Hungary, the Russian foreign minister told me at our meeting in Moscow that Russia would not welcome the deployment of U.S. or other NATO troops on the territory of countries in eastern-central Europe, outside of the IFOR [Implementation Force] troops. However, this is connected with the Russian reservations regarding the NATO expansion, and not with the IFOR activity. [passage omitted]

[Pinter] What will be the answer of the Hungarian Government if it is asked to enable the deployment of foreign troops on Hungary's territory beyond the deadline of 20 December 1996?

[Kovacs] The government will examine the international circumstances and the situation of the region in question, as well as Hungary's security and other interests. Summing all this up, the government will then submit its proposal to the Hungarian Parliament. [passage omitted]

Hungary: NATO Base at Taszar Allegedly Too Costly

AU1006173396 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 10 Jun 96 p 3

[Report by an unidentified correspondent: "Taszar's Fate Is Uncertain"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to a Defense Ministry concept, a NATO air force base could be set up in Taszar—it was announced recently. This emerged after Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti announced that he would soon submit to the government a plan to dismantle the Taszar air force unit. Military experts think that, in the near future, there are no real chances of setting up a NATO base in Hungary.

Regarding dismantling the Taszar Air Force unit, rumors emerged this winter that, when setting up the U.S. base, the Hungarian pilots who were moved to Papa suspected that they would not return to their former base. The plan to dismantle the unit was officially announced last week, with the justification that it is not necessary to maintain three air force bases. (There is a base in Kecskemet, one in Papa, a training base in Szolnok, and a helicopter unit in Szentkiralyszabadja). At the same time, there is also a Defense Ministry concept according to which the air force base in Taszar could become a NATO base in the future.

Defense Ministry leaders have mentioned in the past that they do not exclude the possibility that U.S. soldiers might stay here after the end of their mission. A U.S. deputy defense secretary also made such a statement in March this year, although this statement was later denied. However, Hungarian Defense Minister Gyorgy Keleti firmly declared recently that it is too early to speak about this.

Defense Ministry Spokesman Lajos Erdelyi firmly denied that, either officially or "unofficially," the ministry has examined the possibility of turning the Taszar base into a NATO base: "Hungary is not a NATO member yet. Therefore, it would be useless to examine the conditions under which a NATO base could be set up in Taszar."

Military experts also discuss the issue from a professional viewpoint. NATO has air force bases in Italy and, if necessary, the Yugoslav area can be reached within a few minutes from these bases. The same area would only be "closer" by a few minutes from Taszar.

There are several arguments against the possible setting up of an air force base in Taszar—Imre Fulop, leading researcher at the Defense Ministry's Strategic and Defense Research Institute, told us. The first argument is connected to the cost: Creating a proper infrastructure for the base, its communication installations, modern installation hangars, and its buildings would cost millions of dollars.

Besides, NATO—and the United States—intend to reduce the armed forces and to eliminate their foreign bases rather than to create new ones.

According to Imre Fulop, the setting up of a NATO base in Hungary would also elicit Russian opposition, and provoking Moscow appears to be an "undesired" step in the language of NATO strategists. Nor do we know whether small-caliber tactical nuclear bombs and missiles would be kept in the storage rooms of this base.

Hungary: Finance Minister Medgyessy Views Budget Issues

AU0806205696 Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 6 Jun 96 pp 1, 13

[Interview with Hungarian Finance Minister Peter Medgyessy by Katalin Bossanyi; place and date not

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given: "The Battle Is Not Open—Medgyessy: Lobby Interests Have Come to the Forefront"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Bossanyi] In recent weeks, foreign assessments and several domestic research institutes have said that a process of reversal has started and stabilization has become slower. Do you agree with this?

[Medgyessy] We can indeed witness strange debates in Parliament. This means that the most varied lobby interests have come to the forefront, rather than that the reforms have stopped. In professional debates, some of the counterarguments might be individually justifiable but, together, they take the economy and society in a completely different direction than where they should be going. These are short-term interests which appear to be brave acts but they cause immense damage to the future. At the moment, I have to spend most of my energy on leading us back to the original direction. At the same time, I can say with a clear conscience that I cannot see any "weakening" in the government—neither the prime minister nor the ministers. However, the lobbies have launched a counterattack.

[Bossanyi] Which power groups are attacking?

[Medgyessy] The cultural-educational lobby has become strong and the health and welfare interest groups have also come together. Social insurance is in the background of this: In addition to a more justly and efficiently functioning financing system, what is at the stake in the debate is the social insurance's special personal-organizational assertion of its own interests, which they like to present in such a way as if it were in the entire society's interest. Unfortunately, the battle is not open: No one questions the necessity of reforms, in other words everyone is a committed supporter of the reforms—but not now, not with the recommended methods, and not at the pace proposed by the government. Through this, they actually manage to delay the decisions for a while. I find this very dangerous and harmful. [passage omitted]

[Bossanyi] The Economic Research Institute's recent forecast predicts 24-to-25-percent inflation, 4-to-6-percent real wage decrease, and about 1-percent growth for this year. The researchers claim that they are not pessimistic and the processes are not worse than expected either, but contrary to the government's ideas this is what the economic possibilities offer.

[Medgyessy] Indeed, it seems that macroplanning "overcalculated" the figures for this year. As I did not participate in this work, I assume the reason was that, to reduce the counterpressure, they made too big concessions. This strikes back now in the case of prices and wages, for example. However, when the budget was already planned, it was possible to see that, due to the previous year's processes, inflation unfortunately could not be reduced as fast as they would like and, as a result, real wages would also decrease more.

[Bossanyi] The government should keep its promise because it was agreed that the real wage decrease would not be more than 2 percent in the public sphere this year.

[Medgyessy] Wage increase in the public sphere cannot be made independent from the performance of the whole economy and the size of the GDP. Therefore, all I can say is that as long as I am the minister, we will not make an agreement which would create this kind of gap. This is not a matter of social sensitivity.

[Bossanyi] Does this mean a renegotiation of the agreement with public employees or an acceleration of the reforms?

[Medgyessy] Basically, we must go ahead with the reforms. This is the way, by changing the organizations and reassessing and partly closing down the institutions, to achieve greater performance with fewer staff and thus increase the wages. [passage omitted]

[Bossanyi] How big cuts do you plan in the public sphere this and next year?

[Medgyessy] Still 20 percent. As a result of the planned changes and the accelerating growth, this is the way it will be possible to stop the further decrease of real wages.

[Bossanyi] How big a real wage decrease is realistic this year?

[Medgyessy] Some 2 percent in the competitive sphere—including great differences—and 4 to 6 percent in the public sphere.

[Bossanyi] At your inauguration, you still calculated with a 2- to 3-percent economic growth for this year. Now you are only calculating with 1 to 1.5 percent. Why?

[Medgyessy] The economy has slowed down but this is the result of the necessary restraints introduced last year. It is an achievement that in spite of the adjustment we did not get into a recession. All forecasts show that the current halt will be replaced by a gradual—although still modest for the whole year—growth in the second half of the year. Domestic demand will pick up, mainly due to the investments. This sustainable growth which can be financed is the basis for an accelerating economy of the coming years. [passage omitted]

[Bossanyi] Social insurance has a high deficit, a supplementary budget seems unavoidable here.

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[Medgyessy] The government has just decided on the program of special [debt] collection and I hope that Parliament will accept this before the summer recess. Through this, we will be able to recover some of the debts but, even then, it is possible that the deficit of the social insurance funds will amount to 50 to 60 billion forints instead of the planned 18 billion. Nevertheless, the need for a supplementary budget might still be avoided. According to our current calculations, the central budget surplus will balance out this deficit. This way, the deficit of the total state administration will only slightly exceed 4 percent of the GDP.

[Bossanyi] Is this still acceptable for the IMF? This magical 4 percent was precisely one of the corner stones of the agreement.

[Medgyessy] It is, by all likelihood, because the IMF experts are very familiar with the method of debt management we also chose. In addition to this, by the time the first country review is due, the guidelines laying down the 1997 budget's key numbers will be before Parliament. These will show that the Hungarian economy is to continue the stabilization program.

[Bossanyi] The supplementary customs duty will be abolished next year and the taxes and contributions will be reduced. It is not clear how the budget will cover the expenditure if it can give up so much income? Will the deficit go up again?

[Medgyessy] Our 1997 plans are indeed ambitious but not impossible. The supplementary customs duty was meant to be a temporary method and its abolition will also reduce inflation. We will reduce the upper band of personal taxation to 42-44 percent which will reduce the collection by an average 1.5 to 2 percent, and the social insurance contribution will be reduced by 2.5 percent. To do all this, the expenditure will also have to be reduced. The reform of state administration is the natural method of of doing this, rather than implementing some undifferentiated cuts across the board.

[Bossanyi] But it was precisely you who said that no significant savings can be achieved—in the short term—through state administration reforms. Then how?!

[Medgyessy] We must be selective! The state has to define the priorities and what it wishes to develop even in the current restricted conditions.

[Bossanyi] What would you give preference to?

[Medgyessy] In my view, emphasis should be put on investments, infrastructure development, and higher education. We must curtail the expenses in the other areas. [passage omitted]

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B-H: Mladic Reportedly 'Fled to Moscow' on Russian Plane

AU1106143196 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1330 GMT 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A Bosnia-Herzegovina news agency today carried a report that Serbian President Milosevic has deferred the arrest of Karadzic and Mladic to the Implementation Force [IFOR], that is, that he has agreed to their arrest. Unofficially, it has also been learned that General Mladic fled to Moscow aboard a Russian aircraft.

B-H: Mladic Departure Seen as Possible Russia-West 'Deal'

LD1106154396 Tuzla Radio Tuzla in Serbo Croatian 1400 GMT 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The latest news. Well-informed opposition circles in Belgrade have told the ONASA agency [news agency of the Sarajevo-based newspaper OSLOBODJENJE] that about 10 days ago General Ratko Mladic, war crimes suspect, left Belgrade for Russia. Mladic left with officials of the Russian Defense Ministry and intends to remain there to avoid the Hague tribunal. This transfer comes after the installation of U.S. marines in Sector Northeast and is possibly part of a deal between Russia and the West. The epilogue is still to come.

B-H: Klickovic, Buha Meet UN Official, Discuss Elections

LD0706213496 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1754 GMT 7 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 7 Jun (SRNA)—Serb Prime Minister Gojko Klickovic and Serb Foreign Minister Aleksa Buha had talks in Pale today with Igbal Riza, the UN secretary general's special envoy for former Yugoslavia, about the conference in Florence that will be held on 13 and 14 June and the September elections in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"Riza suggested we talk about the situation after the elections in the Serb Republic and the Croat-Muslim Federation, and after IFOR [Implementation Force] departs from the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. We believe the UN should give its opinion on this," Minister Buha said after the meeting.

According to him, "the Serb Republic has been ready for a long time for the elections and believes that after the elections the joint institutions will start functioning and so the solution of many problems will become easier."

"We have again expressed our concern because of the international community's double standards. Everything is being done to coordinate the agreement on disarmament while, on the other hand, the international community personified by America does not hide its intention to again arm the Croat-Muslim Federation," Buha said.

He added that the Serb Republic leadership is also concerned at a possible unfavorable turn of events after the departure of IFOR from the former Bosnian-Herzegovina and that he hoped Riza will pass his concerns to the UN secretary general.

The foreign minister said that the issue of Serbs who remained in Sarajevo was not discussed at the meeting, because it is a problem for the international police.

"As far as that is concerned, we have no illusions and we believe there is no police or policy that could regulate everything. If people who live together are not able to work out their relations, as the example of the Sarajevo Serbs shows, to insist on life together, multicultural and multiethnic, is—to say the least—a Utopia," Buha said.

To the remark that Carl Bildt, high representative for the civiliar operation, promised a lot to the Serbs who remained in Sarajevo, and did nothing to prevent their sufferings and persecution, Buha said that all representatives of the international community are like this.

"This is how it will continue until the international community makes a decision to separate those people. It is better to be in peace next to each other than to be together in a constant conflict," the Serb foreign minister said.

B-H: Klickovic Comments on Meeting With EU's Dini, Santer

AU1006092796 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 7 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] According to Serb Republic Prime Minister Gojko Klickovic, his meeting with EU representatives Lamberto Dini and Jacques Santer mostly dealt with the preparations for the upcoming Florence summit of the signatories of the Dayton accord. In a statement for Serb Radio, Mr. Klickovic commented on other issues discussed at the meeting.

[Begin Klickovic recording] We talked about the elections because we were told that the international community is determined to have the elections and that they will be held in September, on 14 September to be precise, as planned by the Dayton accord.

Furthermore, we talked about economic revitalization and freedom of movement. As regards freedom of movement, we said that time and conditions for the return of refugees are of the essence. Of course, that

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largely hinges on the international community and so far nothing has been done to create financial conditions, i.e., rebuilding of houses, and secure other material conditions.

Moreover, we told Mr. Dini and Mr. Santer that the propaganda related to the freedom of movement is counterproductive, that we will not be able to do much about it, and that this cannot be a precondition for the elections. Everyone can vote, if not in the place where they were in 1991, they can vote in their present place of residence. This is yet another proof that the degree of democracy they require is viable, i.e., that everybody can give their vote for one of the parties on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Regarding economic reconstruction, everything boils down to building joint institutions and that is an attempt at reintegration. We did pledge to implement the Dayton accord, but we will not let anything else be done outside the framework of the peace accord, although they are actually trying to do that now.

Furthermore, more conditions were laid with regard to President Karadzic and General Mladic. We have made it clear that it is our internal matter, i.e., that it is up to the people to decide, and that we will analyze the political situation and decide what to do next. We were told to have the solution ready for the Florence summit, but we know how people feel about that and can give them our answer now. We also agreed to have less pressure exerted and fewer conditions imposed on us in our future meetings, because that could jeopardize the implementation of the Dayton accord.

B-H: Plavsic Views Dayton Accord Implementation, Elections

AU0906150896 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 0950 GMT 9 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Kragujevac, 9 June (BETA)—The Serb Republic is implementing all provisions of the Dayton peace accord consistently, acting Serb Republic president Biljana Plavsic stated.

"There are no problems from our side. The Dayton accord was signed, it is binding for the Serb Republic, and we are implementing it consistently," Biljana Plavsic emphasized in the Radio Kragujevac program, Hallmark of Time.

She assessed the recent Geneva agreement as an empowerment of the Dayton accord and added that it contained nothing that had not been proposed earlier.

"As concerns us, this agreement was not needed because we are implementing consistently all points of the Dayton accord and the Serb Republic is honoring faithfully all the deadlines encompassed in the Dayton accord," Biljana Plavsic said, emphasizing that "all problems should be sought with the other side."

"Another, really impertinent thing is that our side is being blamed for everything in the Dayton accord that cannot be implemented. This is the method that has been applied since the outbreak of the war, according to which the Serbs are to blame for everything that is happening on the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina and also the former Yugoslavia," Plavsic stressed.

She announced that everything in the Serb Republic is ready for holding the elections and she also touched upon the problem of the freedom of movement in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"There is the regular freedom of movement and the freedom of movement under inverted commas. The Muslims are organizing sizable groups of people who are stoning, insulting, and charging through our lines. Such an organization of the so-called freedom of movement is really unacceptable," Biljana Plavsic emphasized and added that the Serb Republic authorities absolutely agree to "the freedom of movement whereby the people announce themselves and then arrive in our territory."

B-H: Koljevic: Serbs Will Never Extradite Karadzic to Tribunal

LD0906142796 Belgrade FONET in Serbo-Croatian 1258 GMT 9 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Bucharest, 9 Jun (FONET)—Serb authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina "will never extradite Radovan Karadzic to the international tribunal in The Hague," Nikola Koljevic, vice president of the Serb Republic, said in Timisoara, FONET correspondent Dragoslav Markovic reports.

Koljevic, who is on a short visit to Timisoara and the Romanian part of Banat, explained that "the Bosnian Serb authorities believe that Karadzic is not guilty and that he should not be tried for criminal charges brought against him by the Hague tribunal."

In Timisoara, Koljevic attended the launch of his book "The Motherland Anxieties" published in this town in Romanian.

Prefect of Timis District Dan Poenarou received Koljevic. In the presence of reporters, the Serb Republic's vice president thanked the Serb minority in Romania, the Democratic Alliance of Serbs, for organizing the three-week-long stay for 30 war invalids from the Serb Republic. They stayed at the well-known Romanian health center of Baile Herculane.

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B-H: Krajisnik Says IFOR Preelection Role 'Very Important'

LD0706170096 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1549 GMT 7 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 7 Jun (SRNA)—Momcilo Krajisnik, the speaker of the People's Assembly of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, had talks in Pale today with U.S. Admiral Leighton Smith, IFOR [Implementation Force] commander, on freedom of movement, opening of Banja Luka airport for commercial flights, cooperation with the Hague tribunal, and a recent incident in Dobrinja [suburb of Sarajevo where line of territorial delineation is still disputed].

After the meeting, Krajisnik said he is confident that all the problems should be resolved through negotiations; he added that contacts with IFOR are very useful.

"It is certain that IFOR will play a very important role in the period before the elections," the speaker said, adding that "peace and freedom of movement are elements that will make the elections possible."

Commenting on the achievements in the implementation of the Dayton agreement, the U.S. admiral said that the implementation of its military part is going well, while the civilian part is lagging, owing to, he said, numerous problems. The U.S. admiral announced that he will be replaced by Adm. Joseph Lopez, "a very talented officer," but he did not elaborate on when the replacement will take place.

The speaker thanked Adm. Smith for "an active and important role in the preservation of peace in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina."

B-H: Krajisnik on 'Constructive' Talks With OSCE's Frowick

LD0706173196 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1549 GMT 7 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 7th June (SRNA)—Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic People's Assembly, had talks in Pale today with Robert Frowick, head of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] mission for former Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the forthcoming elections in the Serb Republic and the Croat-Muslim Federation.

"We had good talks in which we exchanged information and resolved many issues," Krajisnik said after the talks adding: "We have conveyed to Mr. Frowick and his associates our concern over the statements made by the other side, which somewhat bring into question the holding of the elections."

According to Krajisnik, the election campaign has already begun; this ought not to be interrupted, as it would represent a huge moral blow for the entire population of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"We gave assurances that we will do everything to ensure that the elections are held in an orderly manner and in the most democratic atmosphere, and that we will cooperate with the OSCE," the speaker of the People's Assembly of the Serb Republic stressed. He added that he also talked with Mr. Frowick about the question of the participation of citizens from the Republic of Serb Krajina [former rebel Serb region of Croatia] and from the Sandzak region in the forthcoming elections in the Serb Republic and Croat-Muslim Federation.

"We have no objections and are in favor of all those who have left their former homes having the right to vote in one or the other entity," Krajisnik explained, and added that they also discussed freedom of movement and stressed that this is essential in order for the elections to take place properly.

"However, we warned that this freedom is frequently abused," Krajisnik said, and added that the elections will be a major turning point which will end the transitional situation in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Frowick stressed that the talks, in which the administrative preparations for the elections were also discussed, were very good and constructive and that they were in line with the decisions of the recent meeting in Geneva of signatories of the Dayton agreement.

"We exchanged views on the conditions that need to be satisfied before the elections are held," the head of the OSCE mission said, and concluded: "We are rapidly approaching a final decision on launching the elections process."

B-H: SRS Leader: Karadzic, Mladic Will Never Be Extradited

LD0706193896 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1733 GMT 7 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 7th June (SRNA)—At a gathering held in Banja Luka [largest town in the territory of the Serb Republic] under the slogan, "For Freedom of the Serb Republic," 15,000 residents of this town and the area voiced their support for Serb Republic President Dr. Radovan Karadzic, and General Ratko Mladic.

The gathering was organized by the municipal committee of the Serbian Radical Party [SRS], and among the speakers was leader of the Serb Radicals Vojislav Seselj.

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Rejecting the responsibility of Karadzic and Mladic, as well as Milan Martic, president of the Republic of Serb Krajina, for alleged war crimes for which the United States and the West are accusing them, Seselj reiterated the position of all those present when he said the Serb leaders will never be extradited to the Hague tribunal.

"Karadzic and Mladic are the best that the Serb mother has brought into this world and that the Serb cradle has held in this century," Seselj said. He warned: "We will never give up the best ones among us and we will not deliver a single Serb."

At the gathering the radicals' dissatisfaction was expressed once again with the Dayton agreement and its maps which, as it was said, "the SRS will never accept."

Speaking on the political situation in the Serb Republic, Seselj said that the only patriotic forces presently in the Serb Republic are the Serb Democratic Party [the ruling party] and the Radical Party [Seselj's party].

B-H: SRS Head Rejects 'Imposed Positions,' Warns of Disunity

AU1006104996 Banja Luka Srpska Televizija in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 7 Jun 96

[Report by Velimir Bozic]

[FBIS Translated Text] A rally called "For Freedom of the Serb Republic" organized by the Serbian Radical Party [SRS] was held today in Banja Luka. Over 15,000 people attending the rally were addressed by Vojislav Seselj, president of the SRS and central patriotic administration [centralna otadzbinska uprava]. We have a report by Velimir Bozic.

[Begin recording] [Bozic] "There Is No Alternative to Freedom" and "We Are Coming" were the slogans at the rally of the Serb radicals which began by playing the Serb Republic national anthem. SRS leaders addressed the meeting. Party President Nikola Poposen delivered a speech on behalf of the Serb Republic's SRS stressing that freedom and the Serb Republic must be preserved and that the border between entities must become a state border, as in other modern countries.

The Serbs will not accept imposed positions, especially with regard to elections. The international community, the United States in particular, is trying to create a rift and divide the Serb nation, said Vojislav Seselj, president of the SRS.

[Seselj] We must not let them intimidate us. We must not let them disunite us. You must be very careful about Brcko. They plan to take Brcko from you, declare a neutral zone, tear the Serb Republic into two parts. The Muslims are planning to take Mrkonjic Grad. They are planning to drive a wedge between you, cause regional divisions, say that the Bosnian Krajina has been neglected, that these Serbs here are better than those Serbs, that the Banja Luka Serbs are constructive, as opposed to those from Pale, etc. They will say all kinds of things to disunite you! You must never let them do that. The Serbs from Banja Luka, Trebinje, Bijeljina, Pale, Visegrad are the same. [crowd cheers] Only together can you be strong. Only together can you form the new authorities that will reflect your desires. We will win together. Long live greater Serbia!

[Bozic] Vojislav Seselj announced a possibility of forming a coalition between this party and other RS patriotic parties, especially with the ruling Serb Democratic Party, before the September elections. Talking about the efforts of the international community to bring mostly Serbs from the Serb Republic and their leaders to the Hague tribunal, Seselj said the Serbs will never betray their finest sons. [end recording] (endall) 071800 vp/ dyrek

B-H: SRS Rally in Banja Luka Demands Overthrow of Milosevic

AU0706191796 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1621 GMT 7 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 7 June (BETA)—Today in Banja Luka the Serbian Radical Party of the Serb Republic (SRS) staged a rally involving almost 15,000 people, under the banner reading "For Freedom of the Serb Republic," and "We Are Coming."

The rally was addressed by Nikola Poplasen, chairman of the SRS of the Serb Republic, and Nikola Spiric, chairman of the executive committee of the party, while the star of the rally was Vojislav Seselj, chairman of the SRS of Serbia.

Alluding to the Belgrade regime, Poplasen and Spiric denounced those "who are conspiring with the so-called world peacekeepers, those who sold out the Serb Krajina, western Slavonia, western parts of the Bosnian Krajina, and are getting ready to sell out eastern Slavonia as well."

At the same time, the two announced the party's "certain" coalition with the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) in the coming elections in Bosnia, since the SRS and SDS are "the only two patriotic Serb parties that are able to save the Serbianhood on the left bank of the Drina River."

Seselj stressed that the betrayal of Serbianhood will last until the "terror of the red gang" and Slobodan Milosevic are overthrown.

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"He sold out the Serb land in Croatia and Bosnia for a bottle of whiskey in Dayton, and will sell out Serbia to the same bosses if we do not prevent him, because he is not interested in people—he and his wife Mira Markovic are interested only in power," Seselj said.

He added that "at the beginning of the war Milosevic was assisting Serb patriots west of the Drina with arms and manpower," and that the SRS "supported him at the time because he was a patriot, while now we have to overthrow him for he is the greatest traitor of the Serbian people."

At the rally there were many placards reading "Down with the red gang," "If you want a fez—vote for SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia]," and others conveying similar messages, but the people rallied there did now show all too great a support for the radicals.

The rally lasted around 90 minutes and ended without incidents.

B-H: Serb Intellectuals' Declaration of Support for Karadzic

LD0806160496 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1157 GMT 8 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 8 Jun (SRNA)—Twenty-four Serbian intellectuals adopted a declaration in Belgrade today on halting the proceedings of the Hague tribunal against Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president of the Bosnian Serb Republic.

SRNA is transmitting the said declaration in full:

Supporting the peace efforts of the international community aimed at establishing peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina;

Proceeding from the declaration of the Bosnian Serb Republic on the cessation of the war;

Striving toward the consolidation of the fragile peace in Bosnia- Herzegovina;

Respecting the vital interests of the Serb nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the Serb Republic in particular;

Recognizing the exceptional contribution of Dr. Radovan Karadzic to the peace process and his reputation among the Serb nation as a whole;

We, the undersigned Serbian intellectuals are adopting the following:

Declaration on Halting the Proceedings of the Hague Tribunal Against Dr. Radovan Karadzic, President of the Serb Republic

1. The stabilization of peace in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina is not possible without respect for the interests of the Serb nation in the Serb Republic and the participation of the true leader of all Serbs, Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic.

2. Attempts to exclude Dr. Karadzic from the political life of the Serb Republic in the period of its stabilization and the implementation of the provisions of the Dayton agreement and Paris accord are aimed directly against the interests of the Serb nation and represent an attack on the democratic processes in the region of the former Yugoslavia, particularly in the territories inhabited for centuries by the Serbs.

3. President Karadzic's indictment by the Hague tribunal for alleged war crimes is not founded on facts, considering that as early as 13 June 1992 Dr. Karadzic issued an order on the application of the rules of the international laws of war in the army of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, later the Serb Republic, according to which the provisions of the international agreements signed or ratified by the former Yugoslavia, the rules of international convention and generally recognized principles of international laws of war, were fully accepted and were strictly observed throughout the period of the war on the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

4. In connection with carrying out and adherence to the previous order of 13 June 1992 on respecting international humanitarian law in proceedings against war criminals, the president of the Serb Republic sent a cable to all mayors in the Serb Republic warning them to adhere strictly to all the stipulations of international humanitarian law in proceedings against war criminals and to humanely treat persons detained in prisons and collective centers; the president made the mayors personally responsible for what happened in their municipalities.

5. The assembly of the Serb people in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, prompted by Karadzic, in Banja Luka on 11 August 1992, passed a declaration of acceptance and support for all the humanitarian efforts by the international community; the Serb authorities also voted in favor of the immediate and unconditional cessation of war and the consensus on the political resolution to the crisis.

6. Radovan Karadzic, the president of the Serb Republic, did not issue during the civil war on the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina a single order or any other document that might have stirred up war hatred, called for or incited genocide and ethnic cleansing against the war enemies, the Muslims and the Croats.

7. During the civil war on the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina, President Karadzic did not issue a

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single order or any other document inciting offenses that the international community judges to be war crimes.

8. At the initiative of President Karadzic, the People's Assembly of the Serb Republic passed, on 17 December 1992, a declaration on ending the war, which expressed the will of the Serb people to end the war and cooperate with the international community. On several later occasions Karadzic presented peace initiatives that proved that the Serb side was not an initiator or a cause of the war conflict on the territory of the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

9. Bearing in mind the fact that the Hague tribunal is illegal, that the accusations and the proceedings by the tribunal against the president of the Serb Republic for war crimes are groundless, not founded on facts but motivated by obvious political and other aims, we demand that the proceedings against the president of the Serb Republic be suspended in the interest of strengthening and stabilizing the peace and protecting vital interests of the Serb people in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The declaration on the suspension of the Hague tribunal's proceedings against Radovan Karadzic, the president of the Serb Republic, was signed today by: Professor Dr. Smilja Abramov, Academics Mihailo Markovic, Ivan Maksimovic, Milorad Ekmecic, Pavle Ivic, Miodrag Jovicic, Dejan Medakovic, Ljubomir Tadic, Niksa Stipcevic, Vasilije Krestic, Nikola Milosevic, as well as by Dr. Slavenko Terzic, Dr. Marko Radulovic, Dr. Tadija Ivanovic, Dr. Dusan Radmanovic, Vojin S. Dabic, Prof. Dr. Rados Ljusic, Prof. Dr. Danilo Basta, Prof. Dr. Caslav Ocic, Prof. Dr. Rade Mihaljcic, Prof. Dr. Milos Blagojevic, Prof. Dr. Nada Milosevic-Djordjevic, Dr. Mirjana Stefanovski, and Prof. Dr. Kosta Cavoski.

B-H: Brcko Official 'Optimistic' About Arbitration Outcome

AU0706195796 Banja Luka Srpski Radio Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 6 Jun 96

[Report by Predrag Curkovic on interview with Miodrag Pajic, president of the Brcko Municipal Assembly; place and date not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] One of the burning issues regarding the Dayton accord implementation is that of the international arbitration in Brcko, anticipated by Annex 2 of the accord. That is what our colleague Predrag Curkovic discussed with Miodrag Pajic, president of the Brcko Municipal Assembly.

[Curkovic] International arbitration is a kind of court that is to make the decision regarding the dispute. This problem has been politicized to quite a great extent lately, said Brcko Mayor Miodrag Pajic.

[Pajic] [Word indistinct] is the separation line between the two entities, and not the town of Brcko, which is what the Muslim side is trying to present. There is absolutely no dispute about this being a Serb town, and it will remain a Serb town.

Therefore, the subject of arbitration can be the border between the entities, up to 12 nautical miles, which is what we should own in accordance with international law, and exercise the rights granted to the Serb people by the Dayton accord, which is to have their entity called the Serb Republic. [sentence as heard]

[Curkovic] Mr. Pajic is absolutely optimistic about the outcome of the arbitration.

[Pajic] As far as the outcome of the arbitration is concerned, I am absolutely optimistic. I think that the people are also optimistic, which you can see on the faces of the people and through contact with them—no one is thinking about anything else but the optimum, positive resolution of this issue for the Serb people.

B-H: 3 Serbian Parties To Participate in Bosnian Elections

LD1006124396 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1117 GMT 10 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 10 Jun (SRNA)—The Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] plans to take part in the elections in the [Bosnian] Serb Republic in a coalition with the Yugoslav United Left [JUL] and the Party of Independent Social Democrats [SNSD], today's DNEVNI TELEGRAF says.

"Some differences between the SPS, the JUL, and the SNSD are not an obstacle to their joint participation in the Serb Republic elections," the newspaper says.

According to DNEVNI TELEGRAF, the Serb Republic elections will be an important contributing factor to the SPS's success in the elections in the FRY.

B-H: Banja Luka Party Supports Karadzic Declaration

AU0906190096 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1351 GMT 9 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 9 June (BETA)—The Radical Fatherland Front Nikola Pasic [Radikalni otadzbinski front Nikola Pasic—ROTNP] from Banja Luka today condemned "the populist" behavior of Serbian Radical Party leader Vojislav Seselj in several towns of Bosnian Krajina.

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In this party's statement, Seselj's speeches are deemed "a nationalist and ideological tease with the aim of dividing the Serbs into the traitors and the patriots."

"Seselj's labeling of the political parties and individuals at these meetings was rooted in demagogy, lies, hatred, and various insinuations," the statement claims.

Simultaneously, ROFNP supports the latest declaration by a group of 24 Belgrade intellectuals "as the obstruction to the Hague Tribunal, because it contains the truth which is guiding the politicians to the correct path of the democratic peace promotion."

At the end of the statement, signed by ROFNP President Bozidar Bojanic, all political parties that will take part in the upcoming elections are asked "through consensus to come out with a joint list of candidates for the member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency and 14 deputies in the joint Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly, who will represent the Serb Republic."

B-H: 'Witness Q' Takes Stand Against War Crimes Suspect Tadic

AU1106105996 Paris AFP in English
1031 GMT 11 Jun 96

[By Nicolas Miletitch]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] The Hague, June 11 (AFP)—Bosnian Serb Dusan Tadic, on trial here for crimes against humanity committed during the war in the former Yugoslavia, faced the first of his accusers at the International Criminal Tribunal here Tuesday.

The witness, identified only as "Witness Q" to protect his identity, took the stand Tuesday morning to give evidence in closed session.

A written version of his testimony, which will centre on events during the war against Muslims or Croats in and around Tadic's hometown of Prijedor in northwestern Bosnia, will be availabe "in two or three weeks," according to the tribunal press service.

A second witness was due to testify in open court in the afternoon. In all, 12 witnesses are to give evidence behind closed doors to protect their identity.

"Dusan Tadic is not worried by a confrontation with these eyewitnesses. He is even more relaxed than he was at the beginning of the trial," a Serb friend who is living in the Netherlands, Dusanka Isakovic-Bekker, told AFP. (passage omitted)

Up to now, much of the evidence in the five-week-old trial has been devoted to attacks on the Serbs for their role in the "ethnic cleansing" of Bosnia. Much of the evidence from the 16 expert prosecution witnesses give an extensive background to the conflict and the role of Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and his one-time protege, Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic.

The prosecution has pressed its point that Milosevic and Karadzic conceived and implemented the policy of "ethnic cleansing" designed to create a Greater Serbia—a policy which Tadic allegedly carried out on the ground. (passage omitted)

Several European observers here expressed disappointment that the public had lost interest in the trial after the first days.

Some said the lack of interest showed the choice of Tadic, a minor player in the events in the former Yugoslavia, was a "strategic error." (passage omitted)

B-H: FM Prlic Explains Refusal To Sign Arms Accord

AU1106115896 Paris AFP in English
1142 GMT 11 Jun 96

[By Antoine Jacob]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Oslo, June 11 (AFP)—The signing of a disarmament accord on ex-Yugoslavia scheduled for Tuesday was delayed after a row over the wording of the preamble to the accord, which the Sarajevo government fears will kickstart diplomatic recognition of the Bosnian Serbs.

Sarajevo has refused to accept the Republika Srpska's demand that it be treated equally, in the introduction to the text, with Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The Sarajevo government has blocked the signing, which had been scheduled for Tuesday morning, stating that the two Bosnian entities—Republika Srpska and the Muslim-Croat Federation—cannot be on the same level as the Bosnian state that it represents until the election.

Putting the Republika Srpska on the same footing would represent, in the eyes of Sarajevo, the beginning of diplomatic recognition of the Bosnian Serbs, according to diplomatic sources.

"We want to specify two types of people signing: three states and two entities. That's our basic proposal but we are searching for a compromise. The agreement is too important," Bosnian Foreign Minister Jadranko Prlic said.

At the crux of the debate is the fact that Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia are the three signatories of the Dayton peace accord, but in Annex 1B of the accord, under which the

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disarmament accord was designed, all five parties are stated as being on equal footing.

The signing of the accord, which was agreed upon in content on Thursday in Vienna, has been delayed until further notice, according to the Norwegian foreign ministry.

The members of the Contact Group (United States, France, Britain, Russia, Germany), as well as Norway, continued Tuesday to try to find a solution by meeting with the former warring parties.

"We are waiting to see what will come out of the talks before setting a new time" for the signing ceremony, Norwegian foreign affairs ministry spokesman Ingvard Havnen said.

One suggestion presented by the Norwegians and Americans consisted of signing the accord without the preamble—thereby avoiding the controversial wording—but that proposal was rejected after Bosnian Serb representatives said that changing one part of the accord would jeopardize the rest of the agreement.

"We are trying to find a solution but the margin of maneuver is narrow," said a diplomatic source close to the negotiations.

"The final decision will be taken at the last minute at the highest level," he said, noting that it would now be difficult for the Bosnians to give in after having objected so strongly.

The Vienna agreement sets heavy weapons ceilings for Yugoslavia, Croatia and Sarajevo, with an annexe fixing a 2:1 ratio for arsenals of the Moslem-Croat Federation and Republika Srpska.

The document was negotiated under the presidency of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which is to be represented in Oslo, and the members of the Contact Group, as well as Italy, the current president of the European Union.

The representatives of the five signatories are, according to Norway, the foreign ministers Jadranko Prlic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Milan Milutinovic of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Mate Granic of Croatia, Aleksa Buha of the Republika Srpska, and the deputy minister of refugees of the Muslim-Croat Federation, Vladislav Pogarcic.

B-H: Serb Assembly Speaker, Zubak Discuss Demarcation Line

LD1006214696 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1930 GMT 10 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 10 Jun (SRNA)—Serb Republic People's Assembly Speaker Momcilo Krajisnik had talks in Pale today with Kresimir Zubak, president of the Croat-Muslim Federation, on all contentious issues of demarcation between the two states.

The talks were also attended by Serb Republic Vice President Nikola Koljevic, Deputy Prime Minister Velibor Ostojic, and Anto Valenta, member of the central commission for demarcation.

"The meeting today was organized with the intention of exchanging information on some partial solutions for the demarcation line," Krajisnik said after the meeting.

According to him, the accent was on finding a solution for the demarcation line between the Serb Republic and the Croat-Muslim Federation in parts where the Serb and Croat nations live along the border.

"Proposals by both sides are very constructive and we are hopeful that before our meeting next week we shall receive a satisfactory response," the assembly speaker said.

At the meeting today they discussed the release of the remaining POW's; positive results can be expected before the next meeting, according to Krajisnik.

Confirming the statement by the Serb Republic Assembly Speaker, Zubak added that there were some unresolved issues on which an agreement was possible.

Krajisnik and Zubak had talks on the forthcoming elections in the Serb Republic and the Croat-Muslim Federation.

B-H: RS, Federation Agree on Payment Methods, No Single Currency

LD1106110096 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 0845 GMT 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Banja Luka, 11 Jun (SRNA)—The delegations of the National Bank of the Bosnian Serb Republic [RS] and the Croat-Muslim federation [Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation] have agreed to establish payment operations on the basis of commodity exchange and clearing payment, with the German mark as the basic unit of account in payments, Manojlo Coric, the governor of the RS National Bank, said in Banja Luka today.

At the meeting, held yesterday in Medjugorje, near Citluk [western Herzegovina], in the presence of IMF representatives, it was agreed to set up without delay groups of experts for payment operations between the RS and the federation.

They should meet on 18 June and coordinate the techniques of payment operations, with the agreement of the relevant authorities. Following this, commodity

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exchange between the entities on the basis of clearing should begin.

"Representatives of the National Bank of the Croat-Muslim federation had insisted on a single currency being introduced throughout the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but we did not agree to this," Coric explained, adding that the IMF representatives accepted in full the reasons for the Serb side refusing to accept a single currency.

The governor said that there was talk about setting up a central bank at the Bosnia-Herzegovina level, but that the Serb side maintained that it was too early to talk about this until the elections had been held. Coric added that by regulating the payment operations between the RS and the Croat-Muslim federation a big step has been made. "Taking the German mark as a means of payment and keeping the dinar [FRY currency] as our currency are guarantees that the RS does have its own bank and national currency," Cosic said.

B-H: Muratovic Briefs Press on Islamic Bank Aid

AU1006150096 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 10 Jun 96

[Report by Senada Cumurovic]

[FBIS Translated Text] Hasan Muratovic and Izudin Kapetanovic, republic and federal prime ministers, today received a delegation from the Islamic Bank. The talks focused on Islamic Bank aid to Bosnia-Herzegovina. Senada Cumurovic has the details.

[Begin recording] [Cumurovic] (Dr. Ahmed Muhamed Ali) made a brief statement and, in addition to expressing satisfaction with today's talks with the republic and federal prime ministers, Muratovic and Kapetanovic, also [words indistinct] the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the struggle during the four-year war.

As far as aid and cooperation are concerned, (Dr. Ali) said that the Islamic Bank was exploring how to form a basis for better cooperation. As Bosnia-Herzegovina is not a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference [OIC] it cannot receive loans from the Islamic Bank, which is comprised of and helps only OIC members. Republic Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic nevertheless stressed some forms of cooperation and aid that the bank could extend to Bosnia-Herzegovina, and said:

[Muratovic] In the past we received certain funds, which were not very substantial but helped a lot. Today we explored the possibilities for more aid, which would enable us to go ahead with reconstruction and in particular to overcome our budget problems. Several combinations are possible, and I believe that the Islamic Bank [words indistinct] a fund, which could yield a relatively limited sum. However, we will try to go through the World Bank and Islamic Bank and negotiate deals that [words indistinct].

[Cumurovic] In addition to talks on continued cooperation, the Islamic Bank representatives also announced an educational donation worth $15 million that should be forthcoming, Prime Minister Muratovic said.

B-H: EU Officials, Muratovic Address Journalists in Sarajevo

AU0706142796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1300 GMT 7 Jun 96

[Report by Miralem Kruskic]

[FBIS Translated Text] Lamberto Dini, Italian foreign minister and chairman of the EU Council of Ministers, and Jaques Santer, president of the EU Commission, today visited Sarajevo. The prominent guests from the EU were also received by Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina. After the talks with our country's officials, Jaques Santer and Lamberto Dini and their hosts, Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic and Federation President Kresimir Zubak, held a news conference. Miralem Kruskic reports:

[Kruskic] At the very beginning of the news conference, two agreements on the donations for the reconstruction of our country were signed formally. After that, the numerous domestic and foreign journalists were addressed by Lamberto Dini, president of the EU Council of Ministers, who stressed the importance of holding elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina despite the significant problems.

[Begin Dini recording, in English fading into Serbo-Croatian translation] Despite all the difficulties, we are very encouraged by the explanation of the situation that was presented to us at today's meeting by the representatives of the authorities. We are also encouraged in having seen that the representatives of Bosnia-Herzegovina are very determined to do everything they can for the elections to be held in the best possible way. [end recording]

[Kruskic] At the beginning of his address, Mr. Jaques Santer, president of the EU Commission, stressed that there are, in fact, two reasons why he and Lamberto Dini came to Bosnia-Herzegovina. The first refers to the implementation of the Dayton agreement, and the other to the future relations between the countries that have (?emerged) from the former Yugoslavia and the EU. He then spoke about the EU's great role in the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and added:

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[Begin Santer recording, in English fading into Serbo-Croatian translation] We should now try to establish the ways in which we should realize successfully the $1.8 billion that have been collected for the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the last two donors' conferences. [end recording]

[Kruskic] One of the hosts of the guests from the EU, Prime Minister Muratovic, concluded by thanking journalists for attending the conference in a great numbers. He reiterated the importance of the EU delegation's visit and the indisputable fact that the EU remains the greatest donor to our country.

[Begin Muratovic recording, in English fading into Serbo-Croatian translation] You all know very well that our people are intensely watching every move by the EU, because its help has been coming from the first day, all the way until the Dayton agreement and its implementation. [end recording]

[Kruskic] In reply to a journalist's question on what status the Serb Republic will have at the forthcoming conference in Florence, Mr. Lamberto Dini said that it will appear within a unified Bosnia-Herzegovina delegation.

B-H: Silajdzic on Founding of Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina

LD1006192896 Tuzla Radio Tuzla in Serbo Croatian 1400 GMT 10 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The cantonal council of the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tuzla-Podrinje canton branch, was founded in Tuzla last night. The Mose Pijade hall was full. The party president, Haris Silajdzic, delivered a speech. Hajrudin Salaskovic reports:

[Salaskovic] The journalists' first impression—and there was an impressive number of them at last night's promotional rally of the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Tuzla-Podrinje branch—was that the organization of the promotional rally was highly professional: the 15-minute video spot on Bosnia-Herzegovina: the party and its president; the artists who addressed Bosnia; and the Bosniaks with messages and songs.

The political and procedural part was carried out correctly; the party activities were held in the municipalities of the Tuzla-Podrinje canton [words indistinct]; the decision on the establishment of the cantonal council of the party was read. Izet Zigic, a member of the executive commission and coordinator of the activities in this canton, informed the meeting of the party's activities in the region and its basic principles.

In a very full Mose Pijade hall everyone was expecting the address of the party's president Haris Silajdzic. Without a written speech, Dr. Silajdzic, like an experienced modern political leader, spoke about Bosnia-Herzegovina's past, the current situation, and facts which warned about its division; on the necessity to safeguard the internationally recognized borders and, of course, on the future of this single state. From the speech Haris Silajdzic made last night, we have chosen for our news bulletin the part in which he explains why the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina was set up.

[Begin Silajdzic recording] We formed this party and gave it the name you see—the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina. Why the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina? There were other names. Because we fear for Bosnia's future. We fear for the borders, for some parts of Bosnia, we fear Bosnia could be divided. To be divided now, after all the sacrifices we have made.

It is a fact that efforts are being made in this direction. Not any more by military means, but now through political, more dangerous means.

A few days ago I was talking to some people from abroad, who have a different view of events. I told them that I have a feeling that there was more of a state here in 1993-94 than there is today. They said: Yes, you are right.

So, the duty of this party is to show the world and us, and our neighbors as well, that Bosnia-Herzegovina will not be divided, that it will stay the way history and we know it, the way the Berlin Congress and AVNOJ [partisans' conference during the Second World War] knew it, the way the constitution from 1974 knew it, and finally, the way the international community has recently recognized it.

You have seen from the video clip—there is a bit too much of me in front in the film , but that is what it is like in politics—scenes from the United Nations. The United Nations, the whole world, recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina as an international entity, we became then a member of the international community with all rights and within the borders which we know.

Thus, the message of this party is first of all that Bosnia-Herzegovina will not be divided, irrespective of the problems and ordeals we will go thorugh in the near future. And there will be problems and ordeals.

A very difficult period awaits us. I do not speak about the economy. I hope we will have on 25 June a gathering here of prominent experts—some of them are sitting here. We will then talk in great detail about what to do and how to do it, we will also adopt a program and, I hope, implement it after our victory at the elections. [end recording]

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[Salaskovic] At last night's promotional rally, the cantonal council of the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina for Tuzla-Podrinje canton branch was elected. Izet Zigic was elected as its president.

B-H: Mediator on Failure of Refugee Policy in Bosnian Federation

LD0806161796 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1152 GMT 8 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 8 Jun (SRNA)—Christian Schwarz-Schilling, mediator for the Muslim-Croat federation, has said in Sarajevo that "the municipalities of Bugojno, Stolac, Capljina, and Vares have done nothing for the return of refugees."

He said that "in Vares the fourth attempt to form an interim municipal council has failed."

Schwarz-Schilling proposed that the deadlines for holding elections at cantonal and federal level be respected, but municipal elections should be postponed in order to allow the international forces and newly elected authorities to pave the way for fair elections.

B-H: Poll Indicates 'Crisis' in Federation Relations

AU0706181696 Sarajevo DNEVNI AVAZ in Serbo-Croatian 1-2 Jun 96 p 13

[Report by Fadil Mandal: "Federation Needs a Faster 'Walking Aid'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina is not still capable of standing on its own legs, let alone making a few steady steps in a row. All the "walking aids" so far have not helped, while the frequent changes of "nannies" like Robert Owen, Christian Schwarz-Schilling, and others are obviously not yielding expected results.

Of course, it would be politically unfair to assert that precisely those "nannies," that is, the Americans and the Germans, are generating crises in the relations between the federal partners. The nervousness in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina basically stems from the unsettled relations within it. Mutual accusations are piling up, and every now and then one draws upon unsettled accounts from the recent past. The opposition is blaming the ruling parties for the apparent gridlock in the federal project, while the Party of Democratic Elections [SDA] and the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] are accusing each other of having insincere ultimate intentions, and so it goes on in a vicious circle.

Shifts at the Top?

Careful observers of circumstances in the Federation agree that the cause of all its problems is in the constant fogging of the basic grounds and principles on which the Federation was founded at the Washington, Vienna, Bonn, Sarajevo, and other talks. Bosniak political representatives seem to be insisting on a federation of cantons, which is supposed to be a bait for the other entity and a way toward an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the other hand, the Croats, through statements by Franjo Tudjman, Bozo Rajic, and Kresimir Zubak, are persistently channeling the situation to result in a division at the level of the Federation, as well as in one at the level of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Lately, demands have been expressed, particularly by some opposition circles, that the two top officials at the helm of the Federation be removed. The results achieved by Vice President Ganic and President Zubak so far cannot be assessed as satisfactory.

However, it seems that those people who claim that their departure would not bring about any essential change are right, because both Zubak and Ganic are just implementing the policies of the parties that designated them. It is the HDZ and SDA that will eventually make decisions on possible new candidates.

"There is no federation of cantons, for there is just a federation of two peoples, just as there is no unified army, for there are only its two separate components—the Croatian Defense Council and the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina," HDZ Chairman Bozo Rajic stated recently at a panel in Sarajevo. In practical political terms, this means that the Federation is supposed to be arranged as a "two-component whole," which is similar to the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its two entities.

Can the Bosniak partner accept this logic? Judging from prevailing opinions among the public and statements by President Izetbegovic and Prime Minister Muratovic on several occasions, there is no bargaining over such ideas. "That is a road that leads toward the disappearance of the Bosniaks in the region," Haris Silajdzic, former prime minister of the Republic/Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and now an opposition leader, puts it explicitly. That is, it could be said that, on this question, there is consensus within the Bosniak national corps.

How to overcome conceptual differences in the political wills of the two sides is a question that they themselves cannot answer at the moment. Bait like the program for the training of the Federation army and the abundant financial means for its reconstruction and economic recovery just shake up firmly entrenched attitudes occasionally, particularly those of the Croat partner and its tutor in Zagreb.

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U.S. Pressure

Perhaps something will change in this respect owing to the arrival of the U.S. representative for civilian matters of the peace agreement for Bosnia-Herzegovina, namely, (?Richard Sinclair). In any case, indications of a more serious involvement of the United States in the settlement of the crisis in the federal relations exist. The Clinton administration certainly expects the ruling and most responsible parties in the Federation to cooperate in this. Some information coming from Western diplomatic circles speaks of a possible change in the strategy to persuade the federal partners to cooperate.

This probably means that there is going to be stronger pressure put on Croatia by setting conditions for its admission to the Council of Europe, while at the same time isolating the Croat political leadership in Bosnia-Herzegovina, pressing them to finally turn their eyes away from Zagreb and toward Sarajevo.

This is going to be a difficult thing to achieve, but it is feasible, given a resolute action.

First Question: In your opinion, is the Croatian-Bosniak Federation in a serious crisis?

	Percent
Yes	56
No	23
Do not know	21

Second Question: Do you think it is about time for new people to be sought for leading positions in the Federation?

	Percent
Yes	76
No	5
Do not know	19

Third Question: Would you support a division of the Federation into a Bosniak part and a Croat part?

	Percent
Yes	4
No	86
Do not know	10

Fourth Question: In your opinion, who is able to contribute most to the speedier enforcement of the Federation project?

	Percent
A) United States	33
B) European Union	3
C) SDA, HDZ political leaderships	29
D) Republic of Croatia	4
E) Oppositions in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia	6
F) None of the aforementioned	3
G) Do not know	22

B-H: Izetbegovic Urges Mostar Population To Vote in Elections

LD1006182796 Sarajevo BH PRESS in Serbo-Croatian 1631 GMT 10 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 10 Jun (BH PRESS)—In a statement to BH PRESS on the elections in Mostar, Alija Izetbegovic, the president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, urged the people of Mostar to turn out and vote for those who have been advocating freedom and the unity of the city in a consistent and uncompromising way.

"I have full confidence in Mostar's current authorities headed by Mayor Safet Orucevic. They have successfully passed their test even in the most difficult times. I am in daily contact with them. It is important that they have our support at this juncture," President Izetbegovic said.

B-H: Mostar Party Branch Conveys Support for Karadzic

LD0706191396 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1736 GMT 7 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 7 Jun (SRNA)—At a constituent session held in Bileca [eastern Herzegovina], the Mostar municipal committee of the Serb Democratic Party conveyed the unreserved support of the people of the Neretva River valley to Dr. Radovan Karadzic, president of the Serb Republic, and General Ratko Mladic.

"We would interpret the possible trial of Karadzic and Mladic for alleged war crimes at the international tribunal in The Hague as a trial of the Serbian people," the Mostar municipal committee of the Serb Democratic Party said.

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B-H: SDA Fails To Register for Mostar Elections

LD1006172996 Mostar Croatian Radio Herzeg-Bosnia in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 10 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The deadline expired at midnight for submitting lists of candidates for the municipal and city councils elections in Mostar due to take place on 30 June 1996. The lists were submitted by the Croatian Democratic Union, the Croatian Peasant Party, the Croatian Pure Party of Rights [Hrvatska Cista Stranka Prava], and an association of citizens calling itself For a United Mostar. The latter list is headed by Safet Orucevic. Dragan Ziga, an independent candidate, has also put himself forward. It is interesting that the strongest party in the Muslim part of Mostar, the Party of Democratic Action [SDA], failed to submit its list of candidates.

In addition to the above parties, the Bosniak Liberal coalition also submitted its list for the council elections but with incomplete details. This list will most likely be declared invalid.

B-H: 5 Parties Establish 'Joint Front' in Mostar Elections

AU1006194796 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 10 Jun 96

[Report by Halil Sefka]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Party of Democratic Action [SDA], the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Liberal Party [LS], the Liberal Bosniak Organization [LBO], and the Serb Civic Council [SGV] today coordinated their stances and drafted a joint, Mostar list of citizens for an integral Mostar. Halil Sefka reports:

[Sefka] Representatives of political parties agreed in Mostar today to go to local elections for the city council with a list of citizens titled "Mostar List of Citizens for an Integral Mostar." The list contains names of Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. The joint list was supported by the SDA, the Party for Bosnia-Herzegovina, the LS, the LBO, and the SGV. A coalition list was put forward by the SDA, the LS, and the LBO for six municipal councils in Mostar. It is worth noting that the list contains names of Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs. Prompted by this, eastern Mostar Mayor Safet Orucevic said that this move has established a pro-Bosnian joint front, and every citizen, irrespective of ethnicity, has the chance to cast his or her ballot for an integral and multiethnic Mostar.

B-H: Chirac: Elections Must Be Held; No Link to Karadzic

AU1106123596 Paris AFP in English 1128 GMT 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Geneva, June 11 (AFP)—French President Jacques Chirac said here Tuesday that legislative elections scheduled for mid-September in Bosnia-Herzegovina must be held "whatever happens."

He said he saw "no link" between the holding of free and democratic elections and the fate of Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, both indicted by an international war crimes tribunal.

There has been international criticism that the elections could not be valid if held while Karadzic and Mladic have not yet been brought to justice at the International Criminal Tribunal that sits in The Hague.

Chirac, speaking to reporters at UN headquarters in Geneva, said the Dayton peace accords that ended Bosnia's nearly four-year-long war set a specific time for elections to be held in Bosnia, namely no later than September 14, nine months after thepeace agreement was signed last December 14 in Paris.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is charged with overseeing the elections and is to decide if conditions are correct for holding them.

"I want these elections to be held whatever happens on the date set (by Dayton), if only to show that the different parties are aware of the requirements of democracy in Europe," said Chirac who is attending an international labour conference here.

"As to the Bosnian Serbs indicted by The Hague tribunal, I certainly want justice to be done. But I do not see a link with the elections," Chirac said.

B-H: Commentary Sees 'Discrepancy' Over Election Rules

AU1006154596 Hanau NOVA BOSNA in Serbo-Croatian 8 Jun 96 p 2

[Commentary by ONASA: "The Desirable and the Possible"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE] announced 12 conditions for the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the question is what is the purpose of this list of criteria presented by U.S. Ambassador Robert Frowick, OSCE chief in Bosnia-Herzegovina and head of the Provisional Election Commission? Which one of these conditions can be met at least to an elementary extent? Is there

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any key criterion without which the elections cannot be held, that is, what should happen to induce the OSCE to decide that the conditions for holding the elections have not been created? What will change after the announcement of the 12 criteria?

Nothing will change, just as nothing will significantly change after the summit in Geneva, and just as nothing will qualitatively change in Bosnia until the elections. The distance between heaven and earth remains the same. The discrepancy between the desirable and the possible, between the Bosnian reality and needs of a normal state remains the same.

Ambassador Frowick points out as the most important criteria a politically neutral environment and the freedoms of movement, association, and expression. Actually, all of the 12 criteria could be reduced to the politically neutral environment. Apparently, however, there will be no such environment. The elections will be neither fair, nor democratic, nor will they be normal. This is common knowledge. Therefore, this list is a cosmetic operation that is supposed to cover the essence which is below any standards. Earlier one talked about necessary preconditions for the elections, while now the topical assertion is that the elections are necessary, regardless of conditions.

The less time there is, the less talk about the criteria there will be. Indulgence and lowered standards can already be noticed equally with the top leadership of the Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities and with the opposition.

B-H: UBSN Fears 'Renouncement' of Dayton Accord

AU0906210096 Belgrade BETA in Serbo-Croatian 1750 GMT 9 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 9 June (BETA)—Sejfudin Tokic, president of the executive committee of the Union of Bosnian Social Democrats (UBSD) stated today that the Dayton accord was currently "undergoing the biggest crisis since its signing."

"The negative trends have taken such proportions that there is a danger of complete renouncement of the Dayton accord," Tokic said at the UBSD news conference today.

He said that the harmonization of the constitutions of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation and the Serb Republic with the Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina was running behind the schedule provided in the peace accord and the disarmament talks, while "there is no mention of the refugees' return to their homes."

"The part of the peace accord that refers to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation is regressing rather than progressing and even the frequent holding of the assembly sessions of the Serb Republic and the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation cannot conceal the tardiness in its realization," Tokic said, as ONASA reports.

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Croatia: Main Opposition Party Said To Betray Coalition

AU1006131296 Paris AFP in English 1218 GMT 10 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, June 10 (AFP)—The main Croatian opposition party, the HSLS, has been accused of betraying the opposition coalition by saying it would hold talks with the ruling party under certain conditions, a newspaper said Monday.

The independent daily NOVI LIST said that the Croatian Social and Liberal Party (HSLS) had come under fire from other opposition parties for saying it might hold talks, particularly on the situation in Zagreb—where the government has dissolved the coalition-controlled city council.

HSLS vice-president Ivo Skrabalo told AFP on Sunday that the conditions set for the talks with the ruling Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), which included the reduction of presidential power and the appointment of an HSLS mayor of Zagreb before the end of the month, would be hard for the ruling party to meet.

HSLS secretary-general Karl Gorinsek told AFP: "The goal of these talks is to regulate the political situation in Croatia and especially the crisis in Zagreb municipality."

NOVI LIST quoted another opposition party, the Croatian Party for Social-Democratic Action (ASH), as saying that "only a united opposition can get Croatia and Zagreb out of the dark night in which they find themselves."

A commentary in the paper said that the proposed talks "signalled the end of the seven-party opposition coalition in Zagreb."

"(President Franjo) Tudjman has no need to hold talks now. He can simply reap the fruits of the initiative in which the HSLS and the opposition have lost all their credibility in Zagreb," it said.

The HSLS has said it is expecting a response from the HDZ on Monday but as of noon (1000 GMT) none had been forthcoming.

In months of stalemate earlier this year, Tudjman four times refused to accept the opposition's choice of mayor of Zagreb by exercising his presidential veto. The council was then dissolved on a legal technicality.

The situation in Zagreb was one of the reasons cited by the Strasbourg-based Council of Europe, which coordinates democracy and human rights in Europe, for refusing Croatia's membership application last month.

Croatia: HDZ's Principles for Party Cooperation Talks

LD1006201096 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1500 GMT 10 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] announced at a news conference in Zagreb this afternoon its program principles for talks on cooperation with the Croatian Social Liberal Party [HSLS]. Snjezana Kralj has a report:

[Kralj] Although a previous agreement between the HDZ and HSLS says that no statements on cooperation are to be made until negotiations have been concluded, the HDZ announcement today of its program principles comes only as a follow-up to an HSLS proposal for an agreement on cooperation, Ivic Pasalic, member of the HDZ negotiating team and the party deputy chairman, said at the news conference. In this context he said that the HDZ program principles are not a reply to the HSLS document on offer, but only represent a proposal for negotiations. [passage omitted]

The HDZ program principles for negotiations on cooperation between the HDZ and HSLS say:

The HDZ has since its foundation seven years ago been trying to cooperate with all Croatian state-building parties. Therefore, proceeding from decisions reached at the second and third HDZ general assemblies, during which at the proposal of HDZ Chairman Franjo Tudjman a decision was made to establish cooperation with all parties of the center in Croatia; on the basis of frequently repeated calls by the HDZ chairman, particularly at the session of the HDZ main committee on 24 and 25 February 1996, and at the session of the the Presidential Council on 25 May 1996; in line with its fundamental program principles as the central, state-building, and people's party which has a majority in both chambers of the Croatian Assembly, and which is open to dialogue and cooperation with parties of the center; and with a view to strengthening the sovereignty of the Croatian state and improving democracy, the HDZ invites the HSLS to embark on permanent cooperation in the responsible task of building a state administration, local administration, and self-administration at all levels.

In this context the HDZ is proposing the following as the basis for negotiations:

The HDZ and HSLS will jointly direct efforts toward establishing Croatia's territorial integrity by peacefully reintegrating the Croatian Danubian region into the constitutional and legal order of the Republic of Croatia;

The HDZ and HSLS will join efforts to strengthen and preserve the sovereignty of the Croatian state; they are

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in agreement that Croatia, as a central European and Mediterranean country, will not accept any political and economic associations which would lead to Croatia joining any forms of Yugo associations, even in the wider context of economic, regional, Balkan, or southeastern associations;

The HDZ and HSLS will promote, in accordance with their program principles, Croatia's admission to European political, economic, and security integrations, particularly Croatia's admission as a full-fledged member to the Council of Europe, European Union, Partnership for Peace, and NATO. If the European Union continues to insist on Croatia joining regional associations, Croatia will persist in its demand to belong to the Central European group of CEFTA countries.

The HDZ and HSLS will give full, joint and effective support to the implementation of the Washington, Dayton, Paris, and other agreements and the overall peace process in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with a view to implementing the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the basis of securing equality, constitutionality, and the sovereignty of the Croat nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, forging firm links with Croatia, and creating a new world order in this part of the world.

The HDZ and HSLS are in agreement that the reconstruction of the country and resolution of the problems in connection with all war victims and their families, Homeland War defenders, refugees, and displaced persons is the most important task for the state of Croatia. Particular attention will be paid to resolving the problems of imprisoned and missing persons;

The HDZ and HSLS will do everything to ensure that all levels of state administration and local administration consistently observe human rights and freedoms, as guaranteed in the Croatian constitution, the principle of constitutionality, and the rule of law.

The HDZ and HSLS will promote the generally accepted principles and traditions of civilized society, the core of which is a free and responsible individual in a free and sovereign nation within the international community of nations.

The HDZ and HSLS will promote and protect the independence of the media and the freedom of press in line with the highest standards of the most developed European democratic states, based on the principles of observing the constitutional and legal system, international conventions, and individual freedom and responsibility.

The HDZ and HSLS will urge the consistent implementation of the constitutionally based principle of the division of the state authorities into legislative, executive, and judicial branches, which includes the independence and responsibility of each of them.

The HDZ and HSLS will continue and speed up the rationalization of state administration, reducing bureaucracy in legal matters at all levels of state administration.

The HDZ and HSLS will work on building local self-administration and administration in accordance with the European charter on local self-administration.

The HDZ and HSLS will work on drawing up and implementing an economic policy of development, which will make full employment possible, open new places of work, and create conditions for increasing the wages of workers and all other employed people.

The HDZ and HSLS will urge the protection and reconstruction of villages by promoting family farming.

The HDZ and HSLS will effectively promote Croatia as a social welfare state and a state of social justice in which particular care is taken of all deprived groups of people and individuals; urgent measures will be taken to increase pensions and disability benefits.

The HDZ and HSLS will promote the protection of the family, youth, and childbirth; the HDZ and HSLS will pay special attention to Croatia's demographic renewal within which particular attention ought to be paid to the return of Croatian expatriates.

An economic policy of development will secure more funds from the state budget for education, science, culture, the arts, and sports; particular attention will be paid to observing university autonomy.

The HDZ and HSLS will promote a health service based on solidarity, universal accessibility, and professionalism, with particular attention being paid to the struggle against all forms of addiction.

The HDZ and HSLS will promote healthy living, the environment, and health in accordance with international conventions on environmental protection.

The HDZ and HSLS, with a view to successfully implementing the above-mentioned principles, accept that all bodies of administration and self-administration at all levels—from municipalities, towns, counties, to the bodies of central state administration—must be set up on the basis of election results. This means that the party which won a majority is given the mandate to set up executive authorities, whereby both the HDZ and HSLS will participate in the authorities in accordance with their election results.

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If the HDZ and HSLS coordinate their views on the above-mentioned program principles, a special agreement will set out ways and instruments for implementing their cooperation in carrying out duties in local self-administration and administration.

Croatia: HSLS Sets Down Conditions for Talks With HD

AU1106102796 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 10 Jun 96 p 2

["HSLS Document" by Professor Zlatko Kramaric, vice president of the HSLS: "Starting Points for Talks With HDZ"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Assessing the position of the Republic of Croatia and the condition of the Croatian nation as very grave because of the external and internal political, economic, social, and other circumstances, the Croatian Social Liberal Party [HSLS] is to accept the cooperation offered by the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] to achieve the democratization of Croatia and the internal stability of its society, provided that the Croatian Democratic Community accepts and agrees to the following starting points for the talks:

I. PRECONDITIONS FOR THE PROCESS

1. By a special act, which is to precede the talks, the following is to be determined:

a) the composition, authorities, and procedure of the activity of the special body to control the implementation and realization of the obligations agreed and undertaken, and to solve any possible disputes;

b) the method and dynamics of consultations at the level of the presidents of the parties;

c) the method and dynamics of consultations at the level of the Clubs of Deputies in the National Assembly of the Republic of Croatia.

2. Every obligation mutually accepted will be separately laid down in written form, with the deadlines of implementation determined, signed by the presidents of the parties, and communicated to the Croatian and international public through the public media on the same day and at the latest the day after the acceptance of an obligation, specifically:

a) on Croatian Television: at the beginning of all newscasts and daily bulletins; it will also be broadcast via satellite;

b) on Croatian Radio: at the beginning of all newscasts and daily news;

c) in all the daily newspapers.

II. THE HSLS'S GENERAL REQUESTS

1. To change the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia in that part relating to the determination of the jurisdictions of the National Assembly, the government, and the president of the republic, and a reorganization of their mutual relations so as to increase the powers of the National Assembly of the Republic of Croatia and simultaneously reduce that of the president of the republic.

2. To fulfill all obligations undertaken from the Council of Europe.

3. To change the electoral system for the National Assembly of the Republic of Croatia, the representative bodies of local self-government and government units, and mayors and municipal heads; the unconditional introduction of multiparty electoral committees and multiparty commissions to supervise the conduct of elections at all levels and to strengthen their supervisory authorities.

4. Strictly to implement the human and civic freedoms and rights granted by the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia.

5. Strictly to implement the constitutional principle of the division of power at all levels by determining incompatibilities of functions and by their immediate division in practice.

6. To abolish all forms of "moral and political fitness" as conditions for privileges in getting a job, loan, or other benefits or rights of citizens.

III. INDIVIDUAL AND IMMEDIATE MEASURES FOR THE PROCESS OF DEMOCRATIZING CROATIA

Within 15 days of the official announcement of the beginning of the talks between the HSLS and HDZ, the following personnel changes and other measures must be carried out, as a confirmation of good and sincere intentions at the beginning of the talks about the democratization of Croatia.

1. The public ombudsman is to be chosen from one of the opposition parties;

2. The mayor of Zagreb, chosen from the HSLS, is to be approved and the municipal authorities will be formed by the HSLS and HDZ along with other parties of the coalition;

3. The general director of the HRT [Croatian Radio Television] is to be from the HSLS and within 15 days from the day of his appointment both the directors of television and radio, as well as the chief editors, should be appointed from among the ranks of professional staff, having nothing to do with party memberships;

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4. The composition and policy of the Council for Telecommunications are to be revised;

5. The procedure of collecting fines in the Italian Union/ NOVI LIST case is to be cancelled;

6. The turnover tax on services in the printing industry is to be abolished;

7. The charges against the editor and journalist of FERAL TRIBUNE are to be dropped;

8. Radio 101 is to be granted a license to broadcast;

9. Writs for elections will be issued in the Rijeka-Primorje County.

Unless these measures are taken within the time limit, that will be the end of any further talks with the HDZ about the democratization of Croatia.

IV. CHANGES IN THE STATE ORGANIZATION OF CROATIA—THE LEGISLATURE

1. There should be a change in relations between the Chamber of Representatives and the Chamber of Counties, that is, a strengthening of the supervisory function of the Chamber of Counties;

2. There should be full answerability of the government to the National Assembly of the Republic of Croatia;

3. There should be changes in the working procedure of the National Assembly (the introduction of electronic voting and changes to the procedure of voting);

4. All questions of national importance are first to be discussed in the National Assembly of the Republic of Croatia and these should be binding on the central executive power of the republic.

THE JUDICIARY

1. A procedure should be started to change the law on the State Judicial Council, with immediate changes to the composition of its members; revision of the election of judges;

2. A procedure should be started to change the law on the criminality of releasing information in the media determined as representing state secrets;

3. The military courts should be abolished;

4. There should be the initiation and/or acceleration of court proceedings against those who committed criminal offenses after Operation Storm;

5. There should be changes to the Law on Court Fees;

6. "Vukojevic's Article" should be removed from the Law on Binding Relations.

THE EXECUTIVE AND GOVERNING AUTHORITY

1. The army and police should be depoliticized (on both the symbolical and content levels) and an efficient multiparty control of their work should be organized;

2. The secret services should be improved (coordinating their work, making efficient parliamentary control of their work possible, preventing the president of the republic from influencing their work, and having opposition parties play a part in coordinating them);

3. Local self-government should be reformed (in line with the European Charter on Local Self-Government) and local government, as follows:

reorganization of the counties, as bodies of local government (not of self-government, too) according to regional principles, a complete change of all mechanisms of supervision of the work of the units of local self-government (for instance, the abolition of the ability of the president of the republic or any other central state authority to approve or refuse to ratify elected mayors, as representatives of self-government), the separation of Zagreb into a unitary territorial entity, the separation of the representative and executive bodies of the city from the "Zagreb Ring," a special status for large towns, immediate elections for the mayors and municipal leaders as the representatives of local self-government.

V. PUBLIC ACTIVITIES

1. There should be complete independence of the media and freedom of the press;

2. The conditions and procedures for independent (local) television and radio stations to get broadcasting licenses should be liberalized;

3. Changes should be made at the university (the election of a new head of the university, de facto autonomy of the university and its faculties, as well as university personnel).

VI. THE ECONOMY AND PUBLIC SERVICES

Within three months of the official announcement of the beginning of the talks between the HSLS and HDZ:

1. All privatization, that is, projects for ownership transformation, must be revised and all illegal privatization annulled;

2. All managerial credits should be invalidated, if the conditions regarding the period of grace, the interest rate, and mortgages are not in accordance with what is decided by the Chamber of Representatives of the Assembly of the Republic of Croatia;

3. A new law on privatization should be passed, which will prescribe a minimum of 50-percent distribution of

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the shares owned by the Croatian Privatization Fund without charge to citizens of the Republic of Croatia;

4. There should be a program of restructuring the public enterprises of the Republic of Croatia;

5. A strategy of economic development should be adopted for the Republic of Croatia;

6. Shares owned by the Retired and Disabled Workers and Peasants Pension Fund should be allocated to pensioners;

7. 50 percent of the amount of frozen foreign currency savings should be given to the owners of the frozen foreign currency savings and the state should pay for this amount abroad;

8. A state audit should be undertaken with all bodies subject to state auditing for 1991, 1992, 1993, and 1995, and an audit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Croatia, the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Croatia, and the MIORH [Pension and Disability Insurance of the Republic of Croatia] for 1994;

9. There should be audits on transactions of the commercial banks and insurance companies for 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995;

10. There should be an audit on transactions of the enterprises with a majority control of the Croatian Privatization Fund and by pension-disability funds of workers and peasants for 1992, 1993, 1994, and 1995;

11. A law on Denationalization should be passed and implemented;

12. The chief state auditor should be chosen from the HSLS;

13. The chief auditor for the finance police should be chosen from the HSLS.

[Signed] Prof. Zlatko Kramaric, vice president of HSLS

Croatia: HSLS Demands Seen as Extreme in Talks With HDZ

AU1106080496 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 10 Jun 96 p 2

[Commentary by Mladenka Saric: "Gotovac Wants Maximum"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The media explosion about the possible negotiations of sworn political enemies—the ruling HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] and the strongest opposition party HSLS [Croatian Social Liberal Party]—about possible cooperation and future partnership and division of power, day by day receives additional elements. Yesterday, the champion of the Liberals, Vlado Gotovac, presented journalists with the list of conditions that the HSLS had given to the HDZ, as the framework of topics for any kind of more serious negotiations. Already last week one could hear in the lobbies of the National Assembly that conditions were difficult, that they would provoke indignation in the HDZ, and that one could hardly expect that under those conditions a triumphant glass of champagne would be sipped. However, a glance suffices to see that those demands are, in fact, extreme.

So the HDZ, as the ruling party, is requested to change the Constitution so as to reduce the authority of the president of the Republic, in order to strengthen the parliament. That request falls into general political place because the Liberals often repeat it. What is perhaps more interesting is the list of the moves the HDZ should make within 15 days of the announcement of the start of official negotiations. The HSLS, among other things, demands the office of the ombudsman for the opposition, confirmation of the elected mayor [of Zagreb], and division of the executive power in Zagreb among all parties in the game, the seat of the director of HRT [Croatian Radio and Television] for the Liberals, and other things.

The question is whether the HDZ will agree to do that and why it should. And how serious are all the intentions of the participants of this most recent negotiating match? In fact the extreme conditions can serve as an alibi to both parties to interrupt the negotiations. The HDZ remains the party that has offered cooperation, and met with no response. The HSLS, on the other hand, has the alibi that it has tried, offered conditions, and it did not work. Who wins what, or loses what, will perhaps be clearer after the HDZ response.

Croatia: Parties Critical of HDZ-HSDS Rapprochement

LD1006204196 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1730 GMT 10 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Ever since the announcement of the negotiations between the Croatian Democratic Union [HDZ] and the Croatian Social Liberal Party [HSLS] was made, some opposition parties have been reacting vehemently in an attempt to play down the significance of the talks and of their possible positive outcome, in particular. Those who have openly advocated democracy, are now against what is considered quite normal in western democracies, i.e. talking and searching for fresh political solutions.

In its statement today the main board of the Croatian People's Party [Hrvatska Narodna Stranka—HNS] said that it does not want to question anyone's right to talk

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and negotiate, but that the rapprochement between the HDZ and HSLS is an attempt to reach agreement behind the public's back. Such agreements make nonsense of political competition on the basis of programs, skills, and specific features. Without going into the reasons given by the HSLS for their rapprochement with the HDZ, the HNS says that this development not only dilutes the resistance so far to the HDZ by other opposition parties but will serve to make even more difficult the position of the opposition leaders in their attempts to resist pressures from the people in power.

President Ivan Jakovcic and Vice President Damir Kajin, leaders of the Istrian Democratic Alliance [IDS], said in Pazin that all parties have the right to choose with whom to enter into agreement but that in this case the HSLS is not observing the existing agreement among the opposition parties. As the IDS leaders said, they also were offered cooperation with the HDZ. They said that dialogue among political parties is necessary but insisted that the IDS is primarily interested in strengthening the opposition coalition. We welcome the conditions that the HSLS has set to the party in power, but we think that for the most part this is political science fiction.

Croatia: Failure To Enter Partnership for Peace Assessed

AU0906180096 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 7 Jun 96 p 2

[Commentary by Drazen Vukov Colic: "Lethal Mathematics"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Biographies picturesque enough to sum up experiences sufficient for many individual lives can only be created in extraordinary, equally heroic and tragic, times of changes. Such is the story of Jasen Drnasin and his magnificent success, the story of stuff that legends are made of. He managed to push his way through to the inaccessible West Point. That already makes—regardless of his final success in his class—one of the finest pages of the new but abundant book of Croatia's military pride, and Drnasin's admission is a confirmation by the Pentagon, Congress, and the State Department of Franjo Tudjman's and Gojko Susak's highest hopes. The military relations and cooperation of Croatia and the United States are so strong and good that the Croatian Ambassador to Washington Miomir Zuzul has a hard task to achieve—in political and especially economic relations—something at least close to what William Perry and Gojko Susak have achieved.

However, not even military relations that good can flourish in the polluted cage of Croatian diplomacy and politics, and certain important events have recently proved that—although Zagreb, by the mercy of the Pentagon, can call itself "a regional force" to please itself—it was Zagreb's policy that made U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry break the promise he had made in Zagreb almost three months before (30 March): to influence NATO ministers in their meeting to admit Croatia to the Partnership for Peace as early as May. Another Ministerial Meeting was held recently, but Perry has not placed Croatia on the agenda.

In the meantime, Solana promised Tirana—one of the most prominent and active members of Partnership for Peace—it would be admitted to NATO "in the first package," and the Slovenians announced, after numerous meetings in Berlin, that their chances of being the first state admitted to the Western defense alliance are great. For Croatia, in the worst possible scenario, that would mean that the border between the worlds runs along the Sutla river, and Pantovcak [elite part of Zagreb, most politicians live there] might see alert NATO forces and grim nuclear weapons as close as 30 kilometers from Zagreb. Not even William Perry is powerful enough, let alone naive enough, to push Croatia into the symbolic waiting room for the Partnership for Peace at a time when Croatia has become a kind of stigmatized country for the State Department and for the European centers.

That is how the illusion of certain Croatian politicians went down. The illusion was that disputed political relations with Europe will never endanger (or slow down) the military admission of Croatia to the transatlantic alliance, where Washington would still remain the leading force, even after Berlin, but that would gradually change, and the powerful European members—12 out of 16 NATO members—will not allow Washington to protect certain sloppy regimes out of its short-term interests.

Gojko Susak spoke quite carelessly about the lethal mathematics that resulted in the withdrawal of the American support because of the Croatian diplomatic and political own goals—in one of his numerous recent speeches (on the occasion of installation of the HDZ's [Croatian Democratic Community] "vow fondation"), mentioning the admission to the Partnership for Peace in a rather indefinite future tense ("this year"). On that occasion he also said something—that had been, frankly, known before, although it had been secreted for propaganda reasons—that sounded very ominous and dangerous: The club of wavering military-strategic hopes is not "vital in itself for the Croatian military security," and Croatia cannot submit its forces to anyone because of the "danger of Orthodox and Muslim fundamentalism," and it turns out that Zagreb is ready to wage war on anyone and despite everyone, even if Washington—as the greatest and most important friend

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of Croatia wants the relations with Belgrade "calmed down" and connections with Sarajevo raised to a level of a historical alliance.

After the deception that had originated from the myth that the American military support does not have a European price, new illusions seem to be created. There is, for instance, the laconic statement that this region is so important to Washington in the geopolitical sense that the Pentagon will take constant care of Zagreb regardless of the outcome in Bosnia-Herzegovina—although the Croatian ambassador to New York claims, much more realistically, that the general level of American interests in Croatia corresponds to the rise and fall of interests in the Bosnian crossroads. Croatia is thus in constant convulsions of broken promises, and it only occasionally—as Drnasin has shown—gets things not available to everyone, but that cannot explain why ordinary things are out of its reach.

Croatia: E. Slavonia 'Over 80 Percent' Demilitarized

AU1006170196 Paris AFP in English 1637 GMT 10 Jun 96

[Report by Sonia Bakaric]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, June 10 (AFP)—UN officials say that the demilitarisation of Eastern Slavonia, the last Serb-held part of Croatia, is over 80 percent complete. For the Croats, this marks "the end of the dream of Greater Serbia".

"Over 80 percent of the Serb heavy weapons have been withdrawn from the region towards the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) under the supervision of UN military observers," Colonel Jean-Marie Jockan, the chief of staff of the UN forces in the area, told AFP.

A pro-government Croatian newspaper, OBZOR, echoed sentiments expressed in the rest of the press when it wrote Monday that "the demilitarisation of Eastern Slavonia marks the end of the dream of Greater Serbia."

The idea of "Greater Serbia," backed by Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic, was to link Serb-held territory in Croatia and Bosnia with Serbia itself.

In Croatia, over one quarter of the country's territory was won by rebel Serbs in 1991. Most was recaptured in two offensives last year, but Serbs still hold part of Eastern Slavonia.

The area, representing 4.4 percent of Croatia's territory, was put under UN administration for a maximum of two years under an agreement signed last November after which it is due to return to Croatian control.

According to the UN, on May 21, the official start of demilitarisation, the Serbs said they had 120 tanks.

"There are now no more than about 20, mainly T-34s, T-35s and T-55s," Jockan said over the telephone from Vukovar, in eastern Croatia.

"The artillery pieces were estimated at about 100, and 20 are left," he said.

The demilitarisation process is due to end on June 21 when the UN forces will start checking that heavy arms have been withdrawn from about 100 sites.

"We go where we want and we will not always announce our visits in advance ... In total, eight teams will inspect about 100 sites in four days," Colonel Jockan said.

UN spokesman Philip Arnold told AFP that the general demobilisation of Serb fighters in this region—estimated at about 5,000 officers and soldiers—was "almost complete."

"The local Serb military authorities have been bringing their troops in from their field positions into barracks. Once there, they hand in all their weapons and are gradually demobilised," he said.

The demobilisation began on June 5 and is due to end on June 15.

Arnold said there were "no tensions" in the area because the Serbs were carrying out the demilitarisation themselves.

According to Jockan, the only major incident during this time involved the presence of a Serb militia group called the Scorpions, loyal to infamous paramilitary leader Zeljko Raznjatovic or "Arkan."

Jockan said UN troops had broken up one party of paramilitaries in the area, estimated to be several hundred strong, while another group left the region in a convoy which he said was mainly made up of limousines.

The paramilitaries were notorious for their "ethnic cleansing" campaign against the Croat population in the area in 1991.

In Belgrade, Arkan's party, the ultra-nationalist Party of Serb Unity, said Monday that the Serb-held part of Eastern Slavonia was "already part of Croatia," and called for the normalisation of relations with Zagreb.

"The war is over. The Serbs have lost," party vice-president Borislav Pelevic told a news conference.

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He said the most the Serbs of Eastern Slavonia could hope for now was some kind of special status.

Croatia: Government Official Views Transition in Slavonia

AU0706184096 Split NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 7 Jun 96 pp 2-3

[Interview with Ivica Vrkic, head of the Government Office for the Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Srijem, by Bojan Divjak; place and date not given: "Serbs Can Only Dream About Autonomy in Vukovar"]

[FBIS Translated Text] After the initial UNTAES [UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia] successes, over the last 15 days—starting with the beginning of demilitarization—the process of peaceful reintegration of eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and western Srijem has moved into somewhat roiled waters. There have been some armed provocations against the international forces, new demands for Serb autonomy, and tensions in the relations between the two delegations regarding the choice of the place in which to negotiate. NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA talked to Ivica Vrkic, head of the Government Office for Transitional Administration, about all this, as well as about the measures which should follow if the demilitarization succeeds.

Goodwill

[Divjak] The most important part, demilitarization, is going on right now, and it seems that the rest of the heavy weaponry, which has not already been transported to Serbia, will be symbolically delivered into the hands of UNTAES. However, what will happen to the handguns and small arms, which will represent the biggest danger to those who return?

[Vrkic] I think there should be no problems with demilitarization, particularly with the heavy weaponry which is already being towed out of here, and only those pieces which they do not find interesting will stay and be delivered to UNTAES. Small arms represent a bigger problem, and in the following days the registration of those arms should commence, and only those who will be given certain documents will be allowed to carry them. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the demilitarization itself will not be a major problem, for several reasons. The first one is that the Serbs have realized that they have no more power to wage war, and that they cannot achieve anything with war. The second even more significant reason is that by political means they now want to realize what they have not succeeded in realizing through war. More specifically, they want to get paid for the delivery of weapons and power to UNTAES by asking not only to have their rights protected in the spirit of the agreement signed but also to be given some kind of autonomy or even a state within a state.

[Divjak] It is certain that they will try to get paid also for the indications of readiness to cooperate, which they have already shown in their "Vukovar Initiative," but they receive support for such ideas from a part of the international community. Croatia will obviously be exposed to political pressure to negotiate about this and waste time. What is your estimation of that possibility?

[Vrkic] Croatia has no reason and will not agree to such initiatives because Croatia has already offered them the same thing as to all her citizens—free life. Those who doubt that do not doubt that Croatia will do so, but they doubt any form of Croatia's good will. After all, they have demonstrated this with their thesis about being jeopardized in the beginning of the war, and what is going on today tells us that the Serbs have not changed their objectives; they are the same as they were then when they were taking up arms, only now they will try to achieve their goals by political means. The problem is that they only change techniques, but they do not change their objective. Thus, they fit into the interests of those countries which have never accepted the fact that Croatia exists as an independent state. Those countries, maintaining the idea about some kind of Yugoslavia, or Greater Serbia, are only using the Serbs for their own interests in the control of this region. Therefore, the Serbs find allies all over the world who will realize their interests in the conditions they set before Croatia. Not because Croatia is not developing in a democratic way but because Croatia is not developing the way some of them would like her to. Therefore, there is a danger that we will continue to be exposed to those pressures. However, we must stand against that.

[Divjak] Unfortunately, Croatia herself offers a sufficient number of reasons for such pressures, not because of the Serbs, but, for instance, because of journalists and the mayor of Zagreb. But that is not the subject of this interview. How will the Croatian Government, represented by yourself, stand toward those pressures regarding the future of eastern Slavonia?

[Vrkic] The best way for Croatia to fend off such pressures is not to isolate herself from Europe, but on the contrary to continue to insist on her arguments and keep on opening up to Europe. There is no reason for justification, but we must make our internal policy and the direction of our development more and more democratic. We must admit we have our weak points, but not because of our malice, but because we are a developing society. After all, many of the countries in

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Europe have not fulfilled the conditions imposed on us, let alone the admission of Russia into the Council of Europe.

Serb Kitchen

[Divjak] Last week you said that the Serbs once again insist on talks being held at checkpoints, not in towns, and that in that case Croatia will no longer negotiate. Do you think that the Serbs could go that far, to sever relations anew, and will Croatia insist upon her stands?

[Vrkic] We will do everything to prevent such interruption of relations, because I think it would be very dangerous for all of us living in this territory. Therefore this kind of stronger political stand is not intended to provoke a break in relations, but it is intended to unmask all that is secretly attempted to be pushed underneath as a new political option of the local Serb politicians who now want to infiltrate those political topics which have no hold in any of the agreements which they have signed. In using their rhetoric, today they are going even lower, for less than what they earlier accepted, of course, then the most important thing was to sign anything and keep the status quo. So by this what they want today is to provoke us and the transitional administration to remove those processes which lead to peaceful reintegration. Croatia will not allow herself to be provoked, but it will also not be tricked by blackmail nor will Croatia allow any prolongation of the time limits for the realization of the peace process. We want to sharpen the situation so that one can see that we have recognized the intentions which the Serbs have hidden so far, but that does not mean that we intend to interrupt the talks, and that does not mean either that we will allow the transitional administration to have itself, or Croatia, blackmailed by anyone. If the Transitional Administration is the only administration in that area, we ask from it to determine the ways peaceful reintegration can be realized only if all the sides stick to the signed agreements.

[Divjak] However, the Transitional Administration has not determined its stand toward that—in the meantime, have you had any contacts with General Klein? [Vrkic] The transitional administrator is in the United States now, then he travels to Moscow, so my information on him is not the most recent. But in our conversations so far I have been warning him about the possible problems, and I think that he knows precisely what is going on, and I believe that he will not be tricked by any kind of political games. The proof of that is that Croatia has, in those circumstances, peacefully come to her eastern border. Telephones, post offices and other things function, which only seem to be cosmetic measures, but that is a sufficiently significant sign that Croatian authorities are slowloy but surely entering the occupied territory.

[Divjak] Beyond doubt, the new big game has started. To what extent is it Belgrade's plan, and to what extent an independent move by the local Serb leaders?

[Vrkic] I think that those are only warmed-up ideas from the old Serb kitchen, and that they now, regardless of the noise and agitation, have less and less space for the development of such ideas. Because they now, nevertheless, see the whole construction of theirs put into the framework of Croatian borders, which they never before have recognized. Of course, they correct that plan now that they have not accepted the Z-4 plan, and are trying to get as much as they can. Unfortunately, they will probably get support for that somewhere, but I think that regardless of that support, Croatia has enough power—primarily political but also military—to defend her state interests. Croatia will defend those interests exclusively according to the provisions of the documents she signed in Erdut, Dayton, and Paris.

Pensions in Darda

[Divjak] You have constant official contacts with the Serbs in the occupied territory, and probably also some other sources of yours. Do you not think that—despite that at one moment such a possibility occurred—in that territory the critical mass has not yet been created which could influence the change of the existing policy?

[Vrkic] I think that it is still a region subject to turbulences. Many people are not sure of their position—many of them because they are aware of what they have done, many of them because they cannot accept Croatian symbols and live in this country as their citizens, many of them have never thought of living outside of Yugoslavia or Serbia. That is a different collection of political interests, prejudices, and mentalities which is the result of political movements in that region. However, I am convinced, according to concrete signals, that some of the local people are ready to accept Croatia as their homeland. The best proof of that is that on one occasion they had an opportunity to realize their right to pensions, 96 of them in Darda signed the papers asking for Croatian documents in order to get their pensions, and they are also ready to accept kuna as the means of payment. That means that they are rational people who, when given an opportunity to make their own decisions, can make a proper decision. Unfortunately, the majority of the Serbs in that area still do not have such an opportunity.

[Divjak] Let us come back to the details of the peace process which, if the agreement is respected, would be current after demilitarization. Concretely, what would

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life be like in the territory administered by UNTAES, which will hold the power? Who, for instance, will do the paper work in some unit of the local administration; what conditions will one have to meet to perform that duty; which currency will be used in trade?

[Vrkic] General Klein is both legislative and executive power in that region, but he has insufficient number of staff to exercise his authority the way it is usually done. However, there is no need for that, either, because his objective is to establish Croatian authority as soon as possible. That means that it is necessary to create parallel projects which mean the transition toward the final establishment of Croatian authority. Security and order must be established there as soon as possible, but not the way Serb leaders think. They want to have their own police and to have the international community furnish the funds for the reconstruction, in order to strengthen themselves, and that then the Croats would return into their system because they are ready to accept Croats, but not the Croatian authorities, too. Therefore we demand from Klein to activate the joint police forces trained in Budapest as soon as possible, and to make that the core of the future police in the region. When this is done, then one will be able to introduce other institutions. Furthermore, to make it possible for the people in that region to realize their rights, the representatives of the bodies which can provide that must enter the region, and one cannot do that from an airplane or a helicopter, but one has to do that in an office building. In that way both the kuna and Croatian public enterprises are introduced there. General Klein will have to keep some of the present institutions, but in such a way that he integrates them into Croatian institutions, which Croatia has nothing against. That is the only way which at the end of this year should result in the entry of all elements of Croatian authority, and thus create conditions for the return of refugees.

Border Control Regime

[Divjak] What will be the regime of the local authorities in the places envisaged for the pilot projects for the return?

[Vrkic] Apart from pensions, we envisage the introduction of INA [Croatian Oil Industry] to Djeletovci, and the supply of fuel by INA for the whole region. We have agreed to have a floating exchange rate of the kuna, German mark, and dinar for three months, but bearing in mind that we will favor the kuna and give it a more favorable status in order to create a monetary situation in which the kuna will be the only means of payment. Order and security will be maintained by the joint police forces, and our intention is that there where the Croats will return the ratio in the police will be balanced in relation to the ethnic structure in that area.

[Divjak] For some time now, there have been rumors that the Knezevo-Udvar border crossing between Croatia and the Republic of Hungary will be opened. What regime of border control will be there?

[Vrkic] Our demands, very firm ones, are that the regime should be the same as in the Bajakovo border crossing. However, we are ready to talk about modifications and crossings to a shorter period of a month or two, but certainly not at the expense of Croatian laws and sovereignty. As far as we are concerned, that crossing will not be open as long as the Croatian police and the Croatian customs office will not be there. How we will realize that is still being seriously discussed, but the most important thing is that General Klein accepts the fact that it should be realized under same preconditions as in Bajakovo.

Croatia: Commentary Views Draft Law on Information Freedom

AU1106081196 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 8 Jun 96 p 4

[Commentary by Vesna Antonic: "Defining Information Freedoms"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Even though the parliamentary representatives have to face the thorough scrutiny of some 60 articles of the draft law to regulate public information, it can be said in advance that, after the Croatian Journalists Society's [HND] statement, their job will be much easier. Instead of the expected two draft laws defining information freedoms, the representatives on the benches of the National Assembly will get only one text—the one proposed by the government. As is already known, the journalists' association has given up its proposal.

One must remember that the HND, which according to the draft law determines the rules of the journalistic profession, has systematically pointed out its dissatisfaction with the current law, the "mandate" of which expires by 30 June this year, as decided by the Constitutional Court. The reason for the dissatisfaction, they have pointed out, is that the curent law is below the threshold of democratic quality, protection, and promotion of the freedom of information. In the struggle to achieve its objectives, the HND had announced its competitive, alternative draft law.

The circumstances have, however, changed. Jagoda Vukusic, the first lady of the journalists' guild, and Vesna Alaburic, lawyer, both experts in all journalistic ways and byways, have participated in the creation

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of the government's draft law. The government has, namely, accepted the majority of their (their journalists') points.

So they have together made a text, which was additionally brushed up on Monday at the government's coordination for internal policy. That joint work resulted in a text based upon the provisions of the Croatian Constitution and the documents of the Council of Europe—those related to public information. In that way the stands regarding the definition of the authorization have been coordinated, and thanks to the HND, there is also an alternative solution regarding the participation of journalists on the occasion of appointment and dismissal of editors in chief, and on the occasion of adopting statutes.

Of course, there are several problems remaining in the negotiations between the authorities and the journalists' guild, and the representatives will have the final word. They are to decide if the council for protection of public information is needed at all, which has been proposed by the sponsor of the law (the HND claims the opposite). The representatives in the National Assembly will also discuss and try to answer what the right to privacy entails, particularly when public persons are considered. In the aforementioned case, the sponsor refers to both the Constitution and the Council of Europe, while the guild emphasizes that the public is entitled to full information and refers to the equality of all people before the law. Finally, the representatives will also decide about what the law declares to be a secret, that is, what is simply not to be published. Let us remember, the Law on State Secrets has not been adopted yet, and it is so much talked about and indicated as necessary to be adopted. The concept of "the state secret," however, has been built into the draft law on public information.

The thing which is particularly important to point out is that both the HND and the government agree that the freedom of public information must not be limited in any way, nor does anyone have the right to influence the flow of public information by persuasion or abuse of one's office. Defining the information freedoms, as it is pointed out, only increases the responsibility for accuracy and veracity of information.

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FYROM: Implications of Latest Greek 'Threats' Examined

AU1106141996 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 4 Jun 96 p 2

[Commentary by Nevenka Mitrevska: "Who Is Breaking the Agreement?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] New threats of an economic blockade are arriving from the south. First the government in Athens, through Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos, stated that it will begin to "discourage" Greek businessmen from their possible intentions of investing in the Republic of Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM]. And now the press there is passionately elaborating on the following topic: Macedonia does not want to change its name, and Greece will punish it for that.

Over the last five to six years, Greek threats of blockades have been so frequently repeated and accomplished that nobody gets particularly upset anymore. It is nearly 100 percent possible to predict when one of their politicians is going to address the public on the "Macedonian question," as well when their press is going to release another torrent of hostile texts against our country. It happens regularly on the eve of every new round of Macedonian-Greek discussions concerning differences over the name, as is the case now when discussion are scheduled to be held in New York. The same thing happens whenever their politicians realize that the long battle against young Macedonia over its name is lost; or whenever they are anticipating some domestic event (like the upcoming PASOK Congress); times when it is good to demonstrate "strength" and consistency in defense of so-called national interests for internal purposes. The latest threats of a "controlled tension" in the position concerning Macedonia, as Pangalos says, or of a "controlled blockade," as the press reports, deserve due attention because they represent an explicit threat from Greece on the usage of the name Macedonia following the signing of the Interim Accord last September. Moreover, these threats are following a period in which Macedonian-Greek relations, without much fuss and fanfare, but to the benefit of both sides, have been successfully developed. With the aim of supporting its own blackmailing rhetoric, the southern neighbor is again accusing us of "consistency" in relation to the name, and therefore of an alleged violation of the New York Accord.

Is the Accord Really Being Broken and, If So, by Whom?

Let us begin with Macedonia and its "consistency" regarding Greek requests to change the name. The Accord addresses this issue only in Article 5, which does not say a word about changing the name. In fact, it says both sides "will continue negotiations under the auspices of the UN secretary general" with the intention of "reaching an agreement on the differences" about the name. In the second paragraph of the same Article, there is a compulsory obligation for both sides to "cooperate with the intention of enabling mutual relations in spite of their respective positions" about the name. The Republic of Macedonia does not consider the offensive "Skopje Republic" term Greece is using as an obstacle to bilateral cooperation. It is regularly sending its ambassador to New York; that is, it is participating in the efforts of UN representative Cyrus Vance and of the two sides to reach an "agreement over differences" concerning the name. On the contrary, Greece is violating Article 5 of the Accord by demanding a change in the name (there is no such condition in the Accord) and threatening "tensions" in relations with Macedonia, although the same Article commits it to cooperation despite differences over the name.

By pressing the Macedonian state to change its name, and thus the Macedonian nation to renounce its national identity, Greece is also violating Article 3 of the Accord, which says both sides "will respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity, and political independence" of the other side. Responding to a question in Paris, President Gligorov compared the obligations Greece undertook in the Accord to its actual attitudes by saying the following: How can it claim to be interested in saving our integrity if it is asking us to give up our identity?

Finally, one deliberate source of tension in the relations with Macedonia, which came as a threat from Pangalos, is in direct contravention of Article 8 of the Accord, which explicitly states: "The sides will refrain from erecting any obstacles to the flow of people and goods between their territories."

What are the chances that the threats of new blockades against Macedonia will come true? Can Greece really "live," as Pangalos has recently stated, without the Interim Accord? Greek politicians have so frequently demonstrated disrespect for all rules of civilized international manners, not only with respect to Macedonia, that anything is possible, even a new "control" or a partial blockade. Our country will then have no choice but to prove again that it too can urvive without the Interim Accord and without Greek businessmen. If that is the price of maintaining the territorial integrity of the Republic of Macedonia and the national identity of the Macedonian nation, which we have so far managed to defend, we will have to pay it. What does Greece have to gain from this? Nothing but another dishonor before the world and the fact that it will have to hand over

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the Macedonian market, which is obviously interesting to Greek businessmen, to some other foreign businessmen who are less dependent on politics. In that case, the European Union and the United States will have new headaches as they offered their "good offices" in the Accord, which has now been broken by the Greek side, to help both sides develop mutual relations despite differences about the name. So it may be more practical for Macedonia and Greece, as neighbors, as well as for the European Union and the United States, as guarantors, not to wait for the Greek threats to come to fruition but to ask for and receive the promised "good offices" on time.

FYROM: Russian Embassy on UNPREDEP Mandate

AU1006173596 Skopje MIC in English 10 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] We feel it is curious that in such cardinally changed conditions UNPREDEP [UN Preventive Deployment Force] should remain in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] with the same mandate as the time of the most serious Yugoslav crisis, the Information Service of the embassy of the Russian Federation in Macedonia stated in its answer to the question by DNEVNIK about a possible Russian veto at the next review of the eventual extension of the mandate of the UN forces in the country. At the last extension of the UNPREDEP mandate up to November, this year, the Russian representative in the Security Council was restrained. The response of the Information Service of the Russian Embassy goes as follows: "As it is known, in the beginning, Russia actively supported the deployment of the UN military contingent in Macedonia. The UN troops have played a really important role with their preventive mission in Macedonia, in terms of deterring the expansion of the YU crisis, the stabilization on an internal plan, and have demonstrated the value of the concept of preventive diplomacy.

"In line with the positive changes in the region, we feel it is time to deal with the question of bringing the characteristics of the Macedonian operation in coordination with the new reality in the region.

"The internal situation in the region of former Yugoslavia is largely different than the situation in 1990, when this operation was established. The process of implementation of the peace accord is underway in Bosnia. The UN operation in eastern Slavonia emerged at a crucial moment, the Agreement on the development of relations and cooperation between Macedonia and FRY of April 8 has also developed as a stabilizing factor, and there is considerable progress in the relations between Skopje and Athens.

"In relation to this, we feel now is the right time to bring up the question of 'reconfiguration' of the operation, from the aspect of changing the mechanism of preventive diplomacy, which has to operationally adapt to the changed circumstances, and from the aspect of the financial crisis of the UN.

"That is also the reason why we did not pose the question of entirely changing the operation.

"The UNPREDEP forces should continue existing in the current form another four months. The Security Council should return to this question immediately after the holding of the elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina—the key stage in the peace process. This will have an influence on the overall situation in the region, and then, the Security Council will have to make a decision which will be in accordance with the real situation in the Balkans.

"Unfortunately, our proposals did not find approval in the project of the resolution, which had an ultimate bearing on our decision to cast such a vote.

"We hope that at the next review of the mandate of the UN forces in Macedonia, all our proposals will be taken into account, the political as well as the financial.

"Depending on that, we will also define our position in regard to this operation."

FYROM: Russian Diplomat Views NATO Expansion

AU1006194196 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 10 Jun 96 p 2

[Interview with Juriy Petrovich Trushin, "head of the Russian Embassy in Macedonia," by Gordana Risteski on 7 June; place not given: "Macedonia in NATO—Displacement of Global Security in Europe"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Risteski] Your country, Mr. Trushin, is facing presidential elections. The atmosphere is unusual in many ways: There are several candidates in the race and President Yeltsin and the Communist Zyuganov are the favorites. They have all accepted the Western model of propaganda, joined with Russian emotions. Basically, Russia has never before experience such a situation in the preelection ring, where all means are in use.

[Trushin] I agree that the closer the elections get, the more emotional the atmosphere is becoming. It is understandable because these are the first democratic elections in Russia, and these elections will define the strategy for development in Russia in the next few years. Many different political currents have proposed candidates, and so there will be 11 people running in

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the elections. This fact in itself is not unusual in election practice. However, as our analysts and experts assess, two candidates have real chances: The present president and the representative of the broad bloc of national and communist forces, Gennadiy Zyuganov.

[Risteski] What are your forecasts for the outcome of the elections?

[Trushin] One cannot make any serious forecasts now. You know, a characteristic of our country is the impossibility to see into the "mysterious Russian soul."

Who could have ever thought that a man like Zhirinovskiy could remain in the political arena for two elections?

I am firmly convinced, as are my colleagues, that, regardless of who is going to win the elections, Russia will continue with the market reforms, with the road of democracy that it is following now.

So, if other forces come to power in Russia, I do not believe that there will be any cardinal changes in the Russian internal, let alone foreign policy.

New Policy

[Risteski] In the last parliamentarian elections, one could see some corrections in the Russian foreign policy course when the elected majority in the Duma were communists. Russia is again insisting on the image of a "major power." It is particularly obvious when it "shows its teeth" to NATO by objecting to its plans for expansion, as well as to the plans of the countries in central and eastern Europe to associate themselves with the alliance, including Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM].

[Trushin] First, in our discussion, I would not like to use in our discussion terms that have not been accepted in international diplomatic practice, such as "showing teeth," "the Russian bear...."

[Risteski] I am not a diplomat, and the language of journalists is more relaxed.

[Trushin] Yes, this is a journalistic expression, it is symbolic. However, if we speak in a strictly diplomatic language, we can say that, with the coming of the new minister [Yevgeniy Primakov], some accents have been introduced into our foreign policy, but we cannot speak of a change in the foreign policy orientation.

Our policy is defined by the president, and its orientation and basic goals remain unchanged. I here refer to the following: Full territorial integrity, economic development, the strengthening of stability, and the creation of favorable conditions for the development of market reforms in the country.

[Risteski] Nevertheless, a change in the priorities in Russian foreign policy has taken place.

[Trushin] You are right, the new policy promoted by our new minister has brought about a diversification. It is becoming active on a wider front; we have started greater cooperation with the CIS countries. This does not mean that we are going to create a new Soviet Union. As I have said, nothing is repeated in history. However, the processes of integration with the republics of the former USSR have an objective character and I believe that the world is showing understanding for this.

Regarding your remark that Russia is trying to become a "major power," I think that there is no need for such attempts because Russia has always been and will always be a major power. There should be no disputes on this matter.

[Risteski] I did not say "it is trying to become," but it is trying to restore the image....

[Trushin] Yes, I understand. It is sufficient to take a look at our geographic, political, and strategic reality to understand Russia's place and role. Now, as far as NATO is concerned, our attitude toward the alliance is generally known. We are against NATO expansion in the sense of its military infrastructure. We have explained this in your mass media. I do not find it appropriate to go back to why this is our position.

Nevertheless, it is our pleasure to note that our voice was ultimately heard. The last session in Berlin confirmed that the alliance has started a gradual adaptation to the changed reality in the multipolar world.

In the communique that was adopted in Berlin, we professional diplomats became aware of what was directly stated in the document for the first time, and that is that NATO is one of the components of the system of common European security. Not the only one, but one of the components, together with all the other structures. This is in harmony with our approach. I believe that NATO's political expansion is possible, without getting close to Russia with military structures, which means atomic arms, NATO bases, and large military exercises.

[Risteski] Nevertheless, nobody in NATO speaks of any intention to deploy armies and bases on the territories of the members of the Partnership for Peace program or to deploy atomic arms.

[Trushin] Yes, but you should see the Washington Agreement of 1949, on the basis of which the alliance was created. One of the articles directly states that NATO member countries are automatically obliged to accept the deployment of atomic arms and armies on their territories.

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[Risteski] That agreement was made in 1949. Who could ever think then that Russia would become a member of the Partnership for Peace?

[Trushin] You are right. However, NATO's military organization has to be transformed in conformity with the new political reality. The fact that, at NATO's meeting of "16 + 1" in Berlin, multinational tactical European forces were finally created is, so to say, the "first swallow," the first step toward the adaptation of NATO to modern conditions. What are they now? There is no ideological opposition, there is no USSR. We are partners, as we and the Americans claim.

Everybody Chooses Allies

[Risteski] Russia's objection to Macedonia's NATO membership and the diverging assessments on the UNPREDEP [UN Preventive Deployment Force] mandate were seen by us as pressure from a big country, contrary to the right of a small country to take care of its security itself in conformity with its own interests.

[Trushin] I fully agree. We do understand the concern of the small countries for their security and their efforts, so to say, to join a system of collective security. We understand this very well; that is, that each country, each sovereign state, should choose its allies and partners, as well as a system of collective security.

We have underlined this many times: Primakov and Yeltsin have underlined that we will respect the sovereign choice of each country to join this or that military and political organization, and we do not pretend to have any veto rights.

In explaining Russia's position, we just want those small countries that wish to join NATO and believe that Russia is unjustified in making obstacles to understand our concern, why we are opposing it. For instance, we are not against Macedonia's entry into NATO and in favor of the unpredictable situation that may follow. We are simply expressing concern because NATO's expansion is not just a question of the internal stability of the countries that join, but of the global European situation. Regardless of the promises of the NATO leadership that nothing is going to happen, that everything will be just fine, and that they will cooperate with Russia, it objectively creates a new geographic and political situation, and primarily a new military situation that casts suspicion on the military agreements that were reached with the United States at the time of the USSR. Our army leaders will be forced to ask for appropriate answers. It is the task of every country to take care of its stability and national interests.

[Risteski] Mr. Trushin, please be more precise: What could those answers be?

[Trushin] It will depend on the concrete political situation. When the military and political structures of NATO are moved toward Russia, we will have a new situation and our state will think in this direction. I am not such a strategist to be able to say what will happen. Nevertheless, I say that the answer will be adequate and that it will not lead to anything good. Everything will become a mess then, and a new arms race will begin.

[Risteski] That sounds like a threat.

[Trushin] No. I would not like it to sound like a threat at all, because the meeting in Berlin and some other meetings have shown that there are solutions and compromises, there are possibilities, there are positive experiences. NATO has started to adapt itself. Even they admit that the alliance is just one component. They did not say this before. So, there are other components, and the most important of all is the OSCE [Organization for security and Cooperation in Europe], where we are all together, where we can create a system of security for all.

Lies...

[Risteski] Nevertheless, the Russian reactions so far have created concern in Macedonia, because Macedonia is far away from the Russian border, because our country has never belonged to the Warsaw Pact, and because of the Russian position regarding UNPREDEP in a situation, as you know, where there is consensus here about our economic and security associations.

[Trushin] I understand. If we talk about UNPREDEP, yesterday, we submitted to the Foreign Ministry our official position on the voting in the United Nations. This will be published in the mass media. The same will happen as during the voting in December—it is a lie to say that Russia votes "against" it. In December, there was an unanimous vote for the continuation of the [UNPREDEP] mandate for six months, and now Russia has abstained. There is a big difference between a vote against and an abstention.

[Risteski] Yes, the abstention is the first step toward not voting!

[Trushin] No, I do not agree that we are against the UNPREDEP forces. We simply believe that the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces in Macedonia in 1992 was actively supported by Russia. In the meantime, many serious events have taken place in the region. In a positive direction. In Bosnia, there is the process of the implementation of the Dayton agreements, in Eastern Slavonia as well, the relations with Federal Republic of Yugoslavia have been stabilized, there has been progress in Athens-Skopje relations, and so on.

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[Risteski] However, analysts expect that if IFOR [Implementation Force] withdraws from Bosnia at the scheduled time, there will be another ignition of war there. In the meantime, the tensions in Kosovo have risen.These risks are quite big. Does this fit into the framework of the promotion of the situation?

[Trushin] Yes, we are bearing all these things in mind. We are aware that the positive trends in the region have not gone beyond possible setbacks. This is why we have not raised the question of the operation of the whole contingent. We only suggested that the UN Security Council extend UNPREDEP's mandate for four months. Why? Because there will be elections in Bosnia in September and this is the key moment for the stability of the Balkans. The solution will depend upon the newly created situation then.

I wish to state with full responsibility in front of your people that neither then, in December, nor now, has Russia put at stake the presence of the peacekeeping contingent in Macedonia. It is only concerned with its modernization and its adaptation to the present conditions.

If the situation in Kosovo is deteriorating, as you say, the mandate of these forces will have to remain and they will have to be reinforced.

Insulting Stiffness

[Risteski] Evidently the war in Bosnia helped Russia with the implementation of its redefined geographic and strategic policy in the Balkans. If some displacements are taking place regarding the countries of the former Yugoslavia, about which you spoke in your interview for DNEVNIK, you support the Russian theoreticians who say that the main link in the chain of the "Orthodox alliance" is now Greece.

[Trushin] As far as the "Orthodox alliances" are concerned, our view is as follows: As you know, there was a time in the history of the Balkans and Russia, particularly during the Russian-Turkish wars and some other wars during the so-called Eastern crisis when these ideas had a uniting role. They helped the Balkan nations to liberate themselves from Turkish slavery.

We are now living in a different time, in a completely different reality, and all independent nations, Orthodox or Catholic, are turned to some new values that are imposed by the new world. These values are as follows: United Europe, the ideals and principles of the Helsinki and Paris agreements, and so on. This is why I do not believe that the idea of a union based on the "Orthodox principle" can be useful.

On the other hand, nobody denies that the common cultures, religion, and history have always united the Balkan and other Orthodox nations. However, I would not transform this into a political alliance.

[Risteski] Our audience is familiar with your assessments of Macedonian-Russian bilateral relations, as well as with the importance that the highest ranking politicians in Macedonia attach to the relations between Macedonia and Russia. What are the intentions of the Russian side for the intensification of these relations, taking into account that Mr. Oleg Soskovets' [Russian first deputy prime minister] visit to Macedonia has been postponed so many times; that an ambassador has not been appointed to Macedonia yet?

[Trushin] I will honestly and openly say of the timing of the establishment of our relations—their full establishment—and the signed agreements—those that are waiting to be signed, six of them—that everything is good, but I, as the head of the Russian Embassy in Macedonia, am very concerned because the timing, the character, and the level of relations do not coincide with our interests or the possibilities that exist.

There is a stiffness in the realization of the scheduled visits. You mentioned Soskovets's visit. It is true that it has been postponed three times. It is even more insulting because both ministries, yours and ours, keep on preparing it and then it is always canceled at the last minute. We do not see any political motives here, however, the reasons are derived from the difficulties that are met in such a period of transition, which has imposed too many obligations on both sides. The latest postponement of Soskovets's visit to Macedonia was as a result of the fact that he had been charged with the elections. To be honest, this caused a lot of disagreement.

[Risteski] Yes, but your answer does not sound sincere.

[Trushin] Yes, I agree. Your criticism is righteous. It is a major negative point for us, and it also created a feeling of resentment in our Ministry.

[Risteski] Do you have anything new to say after your recent visit to Moscow?

[Trushin] I was in Moscow, and I talked to some high-ranking officials about Soskovets's visit. They all said that they are doing their best. Probably, if Soskovets is busy, another of Chernomyrdin's deputies will visit Macedonia. Why does it have to be Soskovets now that these six agreements by which we will establish the conditions for our economic cooperation have been signed?

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As far as the ambassador is concerned, I can tell you that this process has been intensified, and we will know his name very soon. I do not exclude the possibility that this may occur in the next few days. However, the proposal will have to pass through the parliamentary procedure. It will have to be confirmed by the president, so perhaps it might take two or three months.

FYROM: Skepticism About Benefits of NATO Expressed

AU1006155496 Skopje DNEVNIK in Macedonian 8 Jun 96 p 15

[Commentary by Ubavka Matevska Skalovska: "Macedonia and NATO: Another 'Victory' for Those in Authority"]

[FBIS Translated Text] If the European experience has taught us that the formation of blocs and coalitions does not lead to stability on the continent, as German Chancellor Kohl said recently, then his meeting with French President Chirac and the decisions made at that time make for very interesting analysis. The military cooperation between these two European countries, which expressed a wish at the recently held NATO summit in Brussels for European independence in heading operations and the alliance in general, will be promoted as an attempt to slip out from under the U.S. umbrella and influence. On first impression, it seems that it really has to do with creating a small coalition at the back door.

This is perhaps only a small part of what is happening inside NATO, and it demonstrates that there is a need to search for new forms of existence to justify its continued survival amid the changed geographic, political, and economic conditions of the European Continent. Let us not forget that NATO actually used to be an organization for protection from the communist threat. In light of the conditions created by the collapse of the bloc, it really is necessary to find a good reason for its continued existence. This is particularly important when the esprit de corps in this military alliance is very weak and, according to some assessments, artificial and therefore without any prospects.

It seems that all this searching for new structures for the survival of something that is basically outworn brings to the surface the need for the continued military presence of the leading force in the world on the European Continent. The aim of such artificial creations and the "production" of tense relations and conflicts that can be activated at a given moment is to maintain the status quo, or, if you prefer, to accomplish the proclaimed U.S. policy of remaining the most powerful force in the world; that is, of maintaining control over the general trends in the social, political, and economic life of everyone everywhere at all times.

Here we come to the real point: Will Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] continue to look for protectors and tutors who "know" what is best for it and who will tell it what to do as an independent country? Are we going to continue to act like immature children who, when the things go wrong, blame the one who up until yesterday was their protector—let's not say tutor. Those who choose this course will thus be able to evade responsibility for their inability to make decisions and will try to justify their survival on the political scene by saying that the other side is not offering anything, either.

That is exactly why the agreement regulating the status of forces of NATO and Partnership for Peace member countries was characterized by the Macedonian legislature as an additional victory of the policy conducted in Macedonia. What is missing is the well-known adjective "working." When we view all the other victories of Macedonian authorities (membership in the United Nations, as they like saying, the interim reference FYROM, the accord with Greece according to which we changed the flag and renounced the Macedonian Slavic minority in the neighborly country...), one's blood simply runs cold at the "lucky" thought of the possible results of this victory. According to what the defense minister said in the Assembly when the agreement was ratified, "one of the basic rights, as well as the major obligation, of the Republic of Macedonia is to maintain a ready force with one soldier in every thousand trained for participation in peacekeeping operations sponsored by the United Nations or the OSCE." Does that it mean it will be our right to send our children out into the world to keep peace and to receive them back with all honors "in a body bag," because it is a simple fact that people get killed while establishing and keeping the peace?

In that sense, there was a very contradictory conclusion expressed in the Assembly that same day: The signed agreement is supported as a result of Macedonia's foreign policy and the interest of all its citizens. Have the authorities in Macedonia and those sitting in the legislature received unreserved support from the citizens of this country for such steps? Is it possible that they have some system of communicating with the public that only they are familiar with and which indicates to them the true wishes of the people, a system which is obviously not accessible to those who are not their associates and who have other information? Is this not another "victory" for communication and for democracy itself?

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In accepting the "victory" of our inclusion in collective security systems, it is worthwhile to explain some of the other resulting obligations. So far we have heard only about the protection we will receive without any explanation of where this potential threat to peace and stability lies and what we need protection from. It would be good to hear what it really means, materially and economically, as the defense minister concluded his remarks by saying that from 1993, when the decision for full NATO membership was made, until now, all structures in Macedonia have been permanently engaged in fulfilling the conditions and standards for membership in the alliance.

At the same time, it would be interesting to introduce the Macedonian public to the expert analyses of institutions in the West related to economic indicators and who and how much will have to be paid for the membership of the new countries. At the same time, it is worthwhile to read the conclusion of the British-U.S. information security council, created for NATO, according to which the funds for military assistance that have been allotted to some east European countries would have been better used to modernize their economies and to develop democratic institutions.

This would actually decrease political instability in these countries and provide better security in the region. Another point the Macedonian Government will have to explain before membership, which it expects to attain by the end of the year, is the following: By what financial means will the defense budget be increased by 60 percent, which, according to some estimates, is the minimum required for an entry visa? This question is particularly important when one considers our country's economic situation and constant financial problems.

Will there be another "victory"? Will Macedonia receive a credit to help its membership that must be repaid by those who will travel around the world to keep peace and preserve the interests of their creditors when the creditors themselves do not require a change in the direction of democracy or better standards of living in the countries striving to match their pace, or at least to come closer to it?

FYROM: Miljovski on Cooperation Agreement With EU

AU0306084096 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 31 May 96 p 4

[Interview with Jane Miljovski by Svetlana Jovanovska in Brussels on 30 May: "Europe Compromised at the Last Moment"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Brussels, 30 May. The second round of negotiations between Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] and the European Union on the Agreement on Cooperation lasted only one day in Brussels. It was an intensive, exhausting, and long day, in which unexpected changes and permutations took place. The regional approach and the evolutionary clause were points of dispute. A European compromise with respect to the question of the region was expected and sensed. However, the evolutionary clause was a part in which the European administration was unresponsive to the Macedonian requests. At the last moment, there was a change and Europe compromised. Not too much, but not too little. Can we speak of victory? Of losers and winners? What does this Agreement actually represent for Macedonia? How much closer does it put us to the European family? What will it signify for the economy? Jane Miljovski, head of the Macedonian delegation at the negotiations, answered all these questions here in Brussels.

[Jovanovska] Mr. Miljovski, what was the solution, or if we may say so, the compromise that was made in the regional question?

[Miljovski] We were practically tortured by two opposed sides. The one told us that we cannot enter a region that is Western Europe without the terms "region" and "regional cooperation" in the Agreement. On the other hand, we feared that somebody might once again sit down at a green table and start working out maps and caps for us and join us to other countries. This fear was the reason for some, who are not familiar with Macedonian history, to think that we are reacting nervously to the term "regional cooperation," that is mentioned in the Agreement.

Second, we managed to define the region. For us, the region is everything that they refer to here as South-East Europe. So, the region is composed of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Romania, and Turkey, and naturally by Greece, Albania, and Yugoslavia as well [Bulgaria is omitted—as published]. This has nothing to do with any divisions. It is quite normal for us to have some comparative advantages and an interest in cooperation with them. It is quite normal that we can thus construct bridges more easily, because they are close to us in history and mentality.

Nevertheless, we wanted to be protected from the plans of some superpowers that might be drawn up in our absence. This is how we managed to resolve this question—with a broad definition of the region as South-East Europe.

Third, we managed to correct what we felt to be unfair. It is not fair to make all this a condition for our further promotion of relations with the European Union! So far we have proven to be able to cooperate in the

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region. This is not something that you will prove and that is the end of it. This is something that has to be repeated on a daily basis! We are simply compelled to cooperate with the neighbors. This is why some parts of the text were offensive for us. Does anybody have to tell us what our interests are? We know them, and we follow them. We reacted to these parts, and I believe that after such a definition of the region, by excluding formulations that represented conditions and that had not been present in the previous agreements, the text itself became close to the other agreements that the Union has signed with other countries. When you say compromise, I wish to add that it is a fact that every agreement is a compromise. However, in this case, it is not a compromise that can be taken as a concession. We have not renounced our view on what regional cooperation should be like, and Europe has not renounced the importance of regional cooperation. All this has simply been defined to our and their benefit. We have discovered what was common to the views of the one and the other side, and we emphasized it.

[Jovanovska] Can the evolutionary clause, for which a proper formula was also found, be called a compromise? Why did the European Union decide to make exceptions precisely in the case with Macedonia and why did it offer a formula that is not suitable for us?

[Miljovski] It is clear that the Union had offered us a type of agreement that is different from the previous ones. It is also clear that it has started thinking about the solutions that it applied with the other countries because it is concerned for its own future. We came on the agenda after the negotiations with those countries, at a time when the Union started thinking that in some areas it had been too much generous. This is exactly why the offered text was so restrictive. There remained some open points, but only a few and we can solve them through written communications. However, all this is on the right path and we have a text that is acceptable for the one and for the other side.

On the one hand, it does not put them into an awkward situation of making promises that something will automatically follow without any criteria, and on the other hand, there is a clear stance that our wish for a stronger association with the European Union is respected and that it will come true after some conditions are fulfilled. The text is correct for both sides. There are neither defeated nor winners here.

[Jovanovska] How did the agreement come true knowing that after the first part of the negotiations yesterday it seemed that it was impossible to reach any concessions on this point?

[Miljovski] It is true that at the beginning of yesterday's negotiations it seemed that the Commission would not accept the evolutionary clause. I think that two factors were of influence. First, our reiterated stance was that if we cannot agree about this point, it will be difficult to sign an agreement. Second, we explained the reasons why we rightfully expected the Union to offer us not only the same conditions as it had offered the other countries, but even better ones, because of what we had achieved over the last years. We made it perfectly clear that the text as it was would have been interpreted as a bad sign. Do the ones who are making the most radical reforms by themselves and without any foreign pressure have to be pushed away? These two matters became clear and in a fast consultation in the break the negotiators received the green light to modify the formulation on the evolutionary clause.

For my part, I am unable to discover what made them make this change. We had used all possible channels. Our diplomatic representatives in every country were active in paying visits to presidents and foreign ministers of European Union countries, letters had been written, and all this created a positive atmosphere. It seemed at the negotiations that all this came as a surprise. However, this second phase was well prepared and that is how we came to this text with the negotiators.

[Jovanovska] When is this Agreement to come into force and be applied?

[Miljovski] If we manage to solve some other minor differences and if the European Commission and the Macedonian Government accept the text, it can come to force only at the moment the Macedonian Parliament ratifies the agreement. As far as they are concerned, I still do not know whether the procedure ends in the Commission or whether it has to proceed to the Council of Ministers, which is more likely. It is hard to anticipate when. However, it is important to say that when the agreement is reached, when the text of the agreement is completed, it will come into life even before it is ratified, because the activities will start and that is very important for us. Here in the European Union they know that when Macedonia is in question, a number of programs come easily to life. There are only a few other such countries for which Europe well knows that they are successful in applying their programs. There is such a positive atmosphere also in the negotiations with PHARE.

[Jovanovska] How much closer is Macedonia now to the European Union and to the European lifestyle in general?

[Miljovski] Normally, this does not mean that we are a member of the European Union. Several phases are needed. This is an agreement on cooperation that is

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signed for a period of four years and there are chances of its becoming an agreement for association. The period to the year 2,000 is no more than three and a half years. However, this is not going to represent a great restriction for us if our reforms move forward, if progress becomes visible, and I believe that we can approach the second phase even more quickly. Some say that these phases have been invented with the aim of slowing down the steps toward the Union. However, there is also another aspect. You see, these are the most developed countries in Western Europe. It is not that easy to reach their level.

I am constantly trying to explain another matter. The Agreement with Europe is an acknowledgment for us that what we are doing here is in the European spirit. The Agreement with Europe can also accelerate our country's steps toward the application of European standards. Nevertheless, we cannot import Europe from Brussels. This agreement on cooperation is not an agreement for the import of European standards in Macedonia. European standards must come to life in our own minds and legislative system and in the general daily policy and practice. Furthermore, when we talk about Europe, we must know that it has much stronger moral traditions. We will also have to start building such a social attitude that is not covered by laws but by simple customs, by a feeling for what is moral and what is not, or for what is good and what is not good. This is Europe. So, we are building Europe ourselves. Moreover, when we say Europe, and if I am not wrong, it implies a certain standard of living. We have yet to reach this standard. The degree of employment likewise. We are on a higher level than a number of European countries regarding the degree of inflation and stability of the currency. However, there is a lot of work ahead of us regarding the national income per capita and development. You see, a full opening of Macedonia to Europe at this moment may be lethal for many of our industries. A gradual rapprochement to Europe, the one that the Union imposes, actually enables a less painful transformation. It will certainly be painful for some branches. With the opening of the economy, European goods, prices, and quality will start to arrive. It will compete with some of our goods of bad quality and high prices. This will automatically lead to the closing down of a number of factories and the transfer of the workers to some other fields in which we are doing better and for which Europe is also opening for us. This means that the gradual rapprochement with Europe is beneficial. I do not advocate fast rapprochement. It needs preparations.

This agreement, first of all, gives us financial support in the sense of access to their solutions, assistance in the legislative system, because one of our obligations is to consult them when we pass laws. It will no longer be possible for someone to invent something totally new. The legislative system will have to be harmonized. Not to be identical to theirs, but harmonized. The reforms must be implemented. Some laws must be passed. So, we will slowly be incorporated into Europe. They are just helping us in this.

[Jovanovska] The Agreement on cooperation also contains a voluminous technical part that encompasses the Macedonian exports to the European Union in a whole range of production branches. Macedonia receives export quotas. However, what does this actually mean and what quotas did Macedonia receive?

[Miljovski] In the Agreement, there is not a very bad situation in any field. The worst, and it is referred to two to three products, is related to the exports that we used to have in former Yugoslavia. With a range of products, as for instance with tobacco, we have an unlimited right to exports under privileged conditions. With a number of products, with which Europe is forced to protect its own market, we have received a quota that is equal to the one of the former Yugoslav quota. If we now compare this with what we had asked for, one may say that this is not too much. For instance, we asked for exports of zinc of 60 percent more than the whole of former Yugoslavia used to export. These matters are calculated "per capita." Although this general logic is applied in the Union, we have managed to fight for an unlimited level of exports. The second important segment in the Agreement is that the quotas automatically rise every year. The ones that are agreed today will increase by 5 percent next year. The third matter is that the quotas are not fixed and they are relaxed if nobody protests. They come into force only if a member country of the European Union makes an official protest against a disrupted situation in the market. Only then does the European Union apply the quotas, if someone protests, and even if we exceed the defined quota there will not be any problems. Unless, as I said, a country protests, claiming that the import of some products is too big. We have managed to obtain a large field for the main products.

Finally, with the reforms and the gradual rise, we have a chance to promote performance. We do not depend on anybody now. In the past, although we were in Yugoslavia, which had an exceptionally privileged treatment in the European Union, there was the rule—first come, first served. The Macedonians were often left without anything. Now we may have a situation in which one company takes the part of another. However, this will certainly be the Macedonian quota.

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Poland: Belgian Minister on Poland's NATO, EU Membership

BR1006133096 Brussels LE SOIR in French 8-9 Jun 96 p 2

[Interview with Belgian Defense Minister Jean-Pol Poncelet by Olivier Alsteens in Warsaw; date not given: "His Trip to Poland, Candidate for NATO and European Union Membership"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Alsteens] You seem quite enthusiastic on the occasion of your official visit to Poland.

[Poncelet] I am convinced that Poland is going to play a major role in future years in security and economic terms. I am struck by the enthusiasm of its people and their commitment to life. I have seen a country being reborn. The Poles set goals and make every effort to achieve them. It is impressive. I visited the royal palace, which has been entirely rebuilt over recent years. What country would dare undertake such a project?

[Alsteens] How do you judge the country's economic development?

[Poncelet] Poland is a country that must be taken into account: 40 million inhabitants, a committed and inexpensive labor force, a significant geographic situation, and many raw materials. A lot is happening in this country.

But this visit is also important from a strictly Belgian point of view. For the first time in a long while, a French-speaking Belgian minister is returning to foreign policy. This is important....

[Alsteens] You have met with church officials....

[Poncelet] I was determined to do this in order to hear different points of view. The Polish church is aware of having played a political role during the communist era. Today, it seems to have been overtaken by events and is asking itself many questions. It was revolutionary. But the present revolution is taking place outside the church.

[Alsteens] It is now the political parties that dominate Polish life, with, it seems, two main aims: NATO and EU membership.

[Poncelet] The desire for EU and NATO membership is constant and growing. This membership is inevitable. Even the Russians have just made it understood that they no longer have any fundamental objection to it.

[Alsteens] A senior Polish officer was explaining to us that his country is in bed with an elephant. The elephant sometimes wants to turn over. So you have to avoid being crushed....

[Poncelet] This is a very visual image. Poland has an important historic and strategic role. It has perfect knowledge of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine. In addition to a role as political buffer zone, it can reveal to us the true nature of the Russian bear. The Poles have formed a joint battalion with Ukraine, for example. The Poles intend to consolidate Ukraine's economic and political changes.

[Alsteens] Have you noted any impatience regarding NATO membership?

[Poncelet] There must not be any damaging prevarications. The process is under way. Let us ensure the conditions for its success in order to avoid an excessive influence by external factors, such as the elections in Russia and the United States.

Above all else, the Poles want to be able to benefit from NATO's Article 5, which guarantees collective defense. They are affirming their attachment to Europe, which they want to formalize through membership in the EU. They want to avoid becoming a gray area on the edge of the Union.

In our discussions, the Poles stress the need to negotiate with countries that will not be joining NATO. New links must be established. I draw a parallel with the new links that will be required with the EU countries that do not participate in monetary union. The question for the Poles is when and how. Poland weighs heaviest of all in the dynamic for enlargement.

[Alsteens] When you met with Polish MP's, they spoke of relations between the government and the Army.

[Poncelet] We are having the same debate in Belgium. We discussed at length with members of the Polish parliament the practicalities of parliamentary control of the armed forces—how to impose political authority on military structures and purchasing procedures. It is a very important debate. Political supervision of the armed forces is one of the fundamental requirements for NATO membership.

[Alsteens] Your visit also had bilateral aims....

[Poncelet] We assessed the things we have in common. Like Belgium, Poland has powerful neighbors. The Poles are anxious to ensure their security, and Belgium embodies the Atlantic alliance. It has always been strongly committed to NATO, and its headquarters are in Belgium. We are working together on certain operations in the former Yugoslavia.

This visit to Poland is important. At the beginning of July, Belgium will assume the WEU [Western European Union] presidency. We assessed bilateral cooperation,

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but also cooperation with the WEU. Such cooperation will be strengthened under the Belgian presidency. In bilateral terms, we are going to concentrate our efforts in order to extend joint activities between our Navies and Air Forces, but in other areas, too.

Poland: Gdansk Shipyard Unions Vote for Strike

LD1006163196 Warsaw TV Polonia Network in Polish 1500 GMT 10 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Gdansk Shipyard protest committee has decided to stage a two-day sit-in strike at the shipyard on 12 June. However, the final decision on the strike will be made by the work force.

[Second reporter] The decision to hold a strike was made by all trade unions active at the yard. The decision will be recommended to the work force at a rally tomorrow. The final decision on whether to start a sit-in warning strike will be made by the work force. This will be their response to the decision to shut down the Gdansk Shipyard.

The protest committee has demanded a restructuring plan that will permit the yard to continue its activity. Trade unionists are also calling for retraining to be made available to those workers who lose their jobs.

The protest committee has not ruled out a more radical form of industrial action in the form of a blockade of roads and public administration offices.

Poland: Walesa Wants Shipyard Workers To Have State's Shares

LD1006150496 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1419 GMT 10 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Gdansk, 10 Jun—According to Lech Walesa, Gdansk shipyard workers should take over the shares currently owned by the government. "If I were in their place, I would take over the 60 percent of the shares owned by the state because the state is not capable of governing," the former president of the Polish Republic told a PAP correspondent today.

Walesa also said that he felt solidarity with the shipyard workers but that he could not get directly involved in their protest action. This could be read as wanting to demonstrate his "political presence at any cost." According to the former president, the government should not remain indifferent to the difficulties being experienced by the Gdansk Shipyard. "If you own 60 percent of the shares, you ought to help the plant."

When asked to comment on the possibility of the shipyard workers taking to the streets, Walesa said: "It depends on under which banner they will do it." He also said that he always was and still is with the shipyard workers, but the principles are now different from what they were before.

Poland: PM Cited on Enterprise Surveillance Controversy

LD1106123596 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1005 GMT 11 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz said that it is the obligation of the State Protection Office [UOP] to inform the highest state authorities of [the existence of] threats, and that is why the secret order from the head of UOP that was made public by [Union of Labor] Deputy Napierala should surprise no one. This order concerns the monitoring of all threats associated with social disturbances and strike actions in certain work enterprises.

The prime minister told Polish Radio today that it is strange that Napierala did not first address his doubts to the Sejm committees dealing with the special services. The head of government did not agree with the assertions by certain deputies that instructions similar to that revealed last Sunday should first be commented on by Sejm committees:

[Begin Cimoszewicz recording] I do not think that such a system would have any sense, where every decision by the head of UOP was subjected to prior supervision by parliament. Confusion of the roles the various institutions of a state have to play in that state in accordance with the constitution must not be allowed. Parliament has full right to supervise the activity of the government and its agencies, to evaluate that activity, but surely it cannot be the case that the activities of bodies within the executive that constitute a part of their statutory and constitutional prerogatives should be dependent on an expression of consent or the lack of such consent. This would lead to or would threaten, at the least, a weakening in the performance of executive functions and obligations by these institutions. [end recording]

Ryszard Himcza, press spokesman for the minister of internal affairs, reported that Minister Siemiatkowski is to meet with deputies of the Union of Labor [UP] to clarify with them the misunderstanding that has arisen over the UOP heads's order on the monitoring of work enterprises:

[Begin Himcza recording] Internal Affairs Minister Zbigniew Siemiatkowski wrote to Deputy Ryszard Bugaj asking for a meeting with the UP parliamentary floor group. During this meeting, Zbigniew Siemiatkowski would like to clarify the doubts of deputies regarding UOP's implementation of its statutory obligations. Minister Siemiatkowski assures Deputy Ryszard

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Bugaj that he will present relevant information and documents at this meeting. [end recording]

Poland: Minister Defends UOP Head's Surveillance Order

LD1006143296 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1300 GMT 10 Jun 96

[Passages within quotation marks recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] Minister of Internal Affairs Zbigniew Siemiatkowski has said that Andrzej Kapkowski, head of the State Protection Office [UOP], had the authority to issue an order instructing that certain work enterprises be put under surveillance because of possible social unrest or industrial action. Konrad Napierala, a Union of Labor [UP] deputy, revealed the contents of the order at a news conference yesterday.

Siemiatkowski said that similar orders had been issued by all UOP heads since 1990.

[Siemiatkowski] "It [the order] was consistent with the law on the State Protection Office, which instructs the UOP head and other institutions employed to protect the state to gather all information important to the country's internal security."

[Unidentified correspondent] Former Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy said that, when he was prime minister, he never used UOP to test opinions and social moods prevailing at work enterprises.

[Siemiatkowski] "I can assure you, ladies and gentlemen, that the present prime minister, previous prime ministers, and future prime ministers did and will make use of reports prepared by UOP."

[Announcer] According to Siemiatkowski, Deputy Konrad Napierala should not have disclosed the contents of the document but should have approached the appropriate Sejm commission with regard to that matter.

[Siemiatkowski] "He could have discussed all of his doubts there and heard the arguments. I think that as a deputy he did the wrong thing by revealing the contents of a document marked secret, although what was contained in it was not very significant from the point of view of the [UOP's] tasks."

Poland: Further on URM Land Deals

WS0706091096 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 31 May 96 p 4

[Letters by Andrzej Szymczak, Andrzej Kosinski, and Stanislaw Kolanowski, with replies by reporters Michal Majewski and Pawel Reszka: "How URM Officers Bought Land Cheap"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Andrzej Szymczak letter] In response to the article by Michal Majewski and Pawel Reszka entitled "How URM Officers Bought Land Cheap" (on a transaction in which the State Treasury lost $830,000) carried by RZECZPOSPOLITA on 17 May 1996, No. 114 (4368), and in light of:

—expressed doubts of whether I properly estimated the costs of the land,

—a leveled charge of unethical conduct, which in the general context of the article suggests that I conspired to incur huge losses for the State Treasury,

I hereby present an explanation and additional information.

First of all, there are a number of distorted and false statements within the article that require rectification. Already in the opening passages the authors state that a resolution dated 4 October 1991 on the amendment of a number of conditions for preparing housing investment projects in the years 1991-95 and on amendments to several other resolutions (Legal Journal No. 103, Item 446 and later amendments), which allows land to be purchased without a bid, "was applied only twice, in both cases by state administration officers." This is untrue. Perhaps this is a deliberate distortion of facts because, when I spoke with Mr. Reszka last year (only he spoke with me), I informed him that to my knowledge the provision was applied far more frequently, particularly by gminas. I personally estimated the value of land in observance of this procedure at the request of one of the Warsaw gminas [Warsaw city districts have the status of the smallest administrative units].

It is not true that the cost estimate was commissioned by the Nad Fosa [By the Moat] cooperative or that the cooperative members approached the head of the City District Administration Office in Warsaw. I carried out the appraisals following requisition No. 40/95 issued by the head of the City District Administration in Warsaw in reply to an offer I had submitted. The appraisal was passed only to the client—that is, the Warsaw City District Administration Office. The cooperative did not receive it. Mr. Andrzej Lichosik thus could not have found a copy of it in the cooperative's files because it was never there, and, suggesting any such thing is improper, to say the least. I could not show the cost estimate report to editor Reszka in the course of the aforesaid meeting without the consent of the City District Administration Office in Warsaw, which owns the report.

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Writing about me, the authors state: "He expressed surprise when we told him that he works in one building with the founders of the By the Moat cooperative" and that "it just so happens" that I work in the same building that houses the offices of the Real Estate Division of the Auxiliary Economic Unit [Wydzial Nieruchomosci Gospodarstwa Pomocniczego—GP] of the Office of the Council of Ministers [URM]. These expressions suggest to readers that I conspired with the founders of the cooperative and the GP URM. At this point, I wish to question the conduct of the reporters, who drew very farfetched conclusions from the fact that we work in the same building. Trying to understand the reasoning of the authors of the article, I wonder how I can influence the verdicts of the Court of Appeal, which is also housed in the same building. My only encounter with people whom I knew were members of the cooperative—that is, Jacek Szymczak and Witold Snobkowicz—was during an inspection of the estimated land lot, which I carried out in their presence on 19 May of last year.

The statement that "he admitted he did not have many orders, just one, two, or three a month...sometimes there are none," distorts the meaning of what I said in answer to a question about the number of orders I had. What I did say was that I realized few orders not because they were scarce but because of a shortage of time as this is something I do in addition to my professional duties, after working hours and on days off.

Another inaccuracy refers to experts appointed by the authors of the article—"we did not tell them what the expertise was for or that the price had already been estimated by another expert." However, when I was realizing a order with Ms. Monika Nowakowska at the end of 1995, she told me that the RZECZPOSPOLITA reporters were questioning my appraisal of the land and spoke of "prosecutor proceedings." Ms. Nowakowska said at the time that the price estimate I gave did not vary considerably from the prices for land in that part of the city.

I wish to state that I appraised the land lot located at Powsinska Street 69/71 according to existing regulations. Bearing in mind that the lot was intended for multifamily cooperative housing, I used the cost comparison method generally applied in such cases. Taking into consideration information on transactions made in the area and the value of land, I applied the method of comparing real estate in pairs. Thus, I estimated the value of the property by comparing prices obtained in sales of similar estates or obtained in appraisals of similar property, with corrections made to account for the differences influencing the value of the estates. I consider it a mistake to apply the investment method and the simple capitalization technique to assess the value of land for cooperative multifamily housing. Paragraph 11, Point 2 of an instruction issued by the housing and land economy minister on 1 March 1995 detailing the principles of estimating land prices (Polish Monitor No. 13, Item 163) states that the investment method is used only for land bringing profit. Paragraph 12, Point 2 of the aforesaid instruction provides that, in applying the technique of simple capitalization, the value of real estate is estimated on the basis of annual profit from the estate. This method can be applied for assessing the value of real property bringing profit, such as commercial companies, banks, and so forth. Because the article claims that methods employed by experts hired by RZECZPOSPOLITA to estimate the value of the land gave similar results, I may presume that, in the comparative method, the analysis of the value of the land was carried out on the basis of data given for a profit-bringing estate. Why? Could it be that, by failing to inform the experts what the purpose of the evaluation was (as the article writes), RZECZOSPOLITA misled them by asking them to assess the value of land that could be used, for example, for commercial purposes?

As for the extra emphasis the authors of the article placed on the attractive locality of the land by pointing out, for example, that the vicinity "is simply nice, quiet and very green," I wish to add that they overlooked the fact that the land is situated a couple of dozen meters from a gas station and the GP URM's car service facilities, very close to a sewage pumping station and the Siekierki heat and power plant.

From the Authors

1. Mr. Andrzej Szymczak, the expert who assessed the value of the land sold to the cooperative, has his regulations mixed up.

The regulation we quoted is from the law on amendments to the law on land economy and expropriation and several other laws, dated 10 June 1994 (Legal Journal 84, 1994). Article 3 of this document adds a new section to Article 6 of the law on changes in the conditions for preparing housing investments in the years 1991-95:

"The provisions of Section 2 apply to land under the proprietorship of the State Treasury. Land granted by voivodes via bids cannot be sold or enjoy life usufruct." [zwolnienie gruntow od sprzedazy lub oddania w uzytkowanie wieczyste w drodze przetargu nastepuje zarzadzeniem wojewody]

The provision thus refers to State Treasury property. It has nothing to do with the property of gminas. From the moment it became effective, it was applied in Warsaw

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only twice, both times by state administration officers. We clearly explained this in our article.

Andrzej Szymczak misquotes a passage from our text: "It was applied only twice, in both cases by state administration officers." The full sentence reads: "In Warsaw, it was applied only twice, in both cases by state administration officers."

2. Andrzej Kosinski, head of the City District Administration Office in Warsaw, refused to show us the price estimate. He argued that it was the property of the By the Moat cooperative. Andrzej Lichosik, the chairman of the cooperative, and Andrzej Szymczak also refused. This compelled us to appoint an independent expert.

3. We did not suggest to our readers that Andrzej Szymczak is "conspiring" with GP URM employees and the founders of the By the Moat cooperative. We stated that Andrzej Szymczak works in the same building with some of them. We then described his reaction to our request to comment on the fact.

4. In our opinion, Andrzej Szymczak said in the talk that he was not getting many orders.

5. We did not tell Monika Nowakowska why we needed the expert report, nor did we tell her that the plot of land had already been priced by another expert. We do not know where she found out about the entire issue and what exactly she discussed during her conversation with Andrzej Szymczak in late 1995. This is because in late 1995 we did not even know that a person like Ms. Monika Nowakowska existed. We had the land priced at the turn of April and May 1996.

6. If we assume that Andrzej Szymczak priced the land in line with the appropriate regulations, why does his expert report estimate the value of the land at $840,000, whereas two other specialists jointly estimated the value of the plot of land at more than $1.6 million?

It should also be noted that, on 7 September 1995, the Mokotow District Board made a decision in which it approved a draft plan to build a housing-and-service complex submitted by the By the Moat cooperative. The draft envisions, among other things, construction of a 3,000-meter office building on the land. Recently, the By the Moat board changed plans and declared that it will build only blocks of apartments. However, Andrzej Szymczak priced the land back in May 1995.

During an interview with a RZECZPOSPOLITA journalist (it took place while RZECZPOSPOLITA was collecting material to publish the article), he said that, when he was pricing the land, the By the Moat cooperative's plans were not yet completely specified; however, "there was talk of apartments." In reply to one question, he said that the fact that the cooperative's plans, approved by the Mokotow District Board, envisage construction of a large eight-floor service building on the plot of land "should not have any influence on the pricing itself." He added that the acceptable difference between estimates made by experts is within 20 percent.

The experts who worked for RZECZPOSPOLITA were not misled. Their task was to "determine the market value of the land for sale."

7. We maintain our opinion that the plot of land that was purchased by the By the Moat cooperative is in a very attractive part of the city.

* * *

A Strange Journalistic "Logic"

[Andrzej Kosinski letter] Due to the fact that in Issue No. 114 (4368) RZECZPOSPOLITA carried an article by Michal Majewski and Pawel Reszka entitled "How URM Officials Bought Land Cheap" (a Transaction in Which the State Treasury Lost $830,000), I demand that you publish my reply to the allegation leveled at me.

The article begins with a subhead that is at the same time a ruling handed down by Michal Majewski and Pawel Reszka—"A Transaction in Which the State Treasury Lost $830,000." The authors asked the following question to justify such a ruling: "Did the head of the City District Administration in Warsaw properly represent the interests of the State Treasury?"

(...) The only implicating document (a document that implicates the head of the City District Administration—editor's note) is the new pricing made by undoubtedly very good experts; however, "those experts were not told about the purpose of the work and about the fact that the price of the land had already been fixed by a different expert."

The professional experience acquired by me and my employees who had real estate priced for the City District Administration rules out the possibility of not informing an expert about the purpose of a price estimate he is to make; this determines the choice of the appropriate pricing method. Another thing that is not understandable is the fact that the experts employed the investment method in the case of a plot of land that was selected for housing purposes. In light of the aforementioned doubts, I believe that the expert report can be treated as the main argument supporting RZECZPOSPOLITA's allegation only after it is supplemented with additional explanations from its authors.

Then the authors went on to describe the "astonishment" of an anonymous person who is "one of the best known

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notaries in Warsaw." This is understandable because the judge knows regulations regarding the land economy very well. It must be pointed out, however, that he does not have to in practice "reconcile" those regulations with each other or with the real situation, which is not yet envisioned in the legal regulations. Those regulations are every day in practice applied by a representative of the State Treasury, who has practically "unlimited" possibilities of deciding whether the State Treasury is to receive money in smaller or greater installments.

Greatly as I respect the judge, good knowledge of the regulations is a necessary, yet insufficient condition to make good decisions as far as real estate of the State Treasury is concerned (...).

I will ignore minor inaccuracies found in the article because they are not very significant compared to the basic allegation leveled at me. However, a ruling was handed down. The "logic" in the reasoning of the journalists who leveled the accusation is bizarre; the easiness with which they made their ruling, without taking any trouble to provide arguments supporting the accusation, is indeed amazing(...)

At the same time, be advised that the appropriate explanation regarding the substance of the issue as well as the procedures that were applied have been passed to the employees of the URM Inspection Bureau(...)

Andrzej Kosinski, head of the City District Administration in Warsaw

From the Authors

1. When we wrote that we did not tell our experts about the purpose of the appraisal, we meant that we did not initiate them into our preparations for publishing the text on the controversial sale of State Treasury land to a housing cooperative set up by URM officials.

Of course, from the formal point of view, the experts were familiar with the purpose of the appraisal. They included it in the expert report they drew up: "The Purpose of the Appraisal; Determining the Market Value of the Plot of Land for Sale."

2. The experts invited by RZECZPOSPOLITA fixed the price by employing two different methods to make the appraisal as accurate as possible. The estimates the experts obtained by using a price comparison method and the estimates they obtained by using an investment method that involved the technique of simple capitalization did not differ much ($89 and $93 per square meter, respectively). The expert invited by the head of the City District Administration set the price of the land at the equivalent of $45.7 per square meter.

The thesis that the land was selected for housing purposes is contradicted by a decision concerning the conditions of erecting buildings on this plot of land, which the Mokotow District Board made on 7 September 1995. The administration approved a draft document, provided by the By the Moat housing cooperative, which envisioned construction of a housing-and-service complex. The draft envisions, among other things, construction of a 3,000-meter office building.

We believe that, when selling the land to the By the Moat housing cooperative, Andrzej Kosinski should have known what the cooperative was planning to build on the land. It should be noted that he signed the notary act on the sale of the land on 3 November 1995, whereas the decision that specified what should be built on the land was made on 7 September 1995.

3. We did not hand down a ruling on the head of the City District Administration; all we did was ask whether he represented the interests of the State Treasury well enough. We felt compelled to ask this question because Andrzej Kosinski sold the land to the By the Moat cooperative for $840,000, whereas experts whom he himself termed as "very good" set the price of the land at more than $1.6 million.

4. We intend to make known the results of the explanatory proceedings conducted by the URM Inspection Bureau.

* * *

Undeserved Harm Done to Many People

[Stanislaw Kolanowki letter] (...) As far as the purchase of the plot of land on Limanowskiego Street by the By the Moat housing cooperative is concerned, as far as I know there is no doubt that none of the malfeasances suggested (in the text—editor's note) actually took place, and the speculations presented by the authors are based on a false assumption (...)

The only real consequence of publishing such an article is undeserved harm done to many people; this harm is particularly painful because the integrity and good name of those people were publicly called into question (...)

I would also like to inform that

—as a property expert I was not and I am not on the voivode's list,

—information concerning my previous employment was inaccurate,

—neither I nor any members of my family are buying an apartment in the By the Moat housing cooperative (no advance payment has been paid).

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Stanislaw Kolanowski, URM employee

From the Authors

1. The reason the name of Stanislaw Kolanowski appeared in our text was that, together with other URM officials, he is a member and a founder of the By the Moat cooperative, which purchased from the State Treasury a plot of land that had been managed by URM.

2. We do not think the text included slanders; it merely described, step by step, how the cooperative, set up by URM officials, became the owner of the land that had been managed by URM.

3. The name of Stanislaw Kolanowski is listed in the central register of people who are authorized to price real estate. The register has been published by the Ministry of Land Use Management and Construction. We apologize that in the text we included false information that Stanislaw Kolanowski is an expert on the voivode's list. However, this information does not have a great impact on the issue we described.

4. We do not understand what inaccuracies concerning his previous employment Stanislaw Kolanowski has in mind.

5. We did not write that Stanislaw Kolanowski or a member of his family is buying an apartment in the By the Moat cooperative. We merely informed that Stanislaw Kolanowski is one of the founders of this cooperative, which follows from the data available in the Register Court of Law. Also, we were unable to report whether Stanislaw Kolanowski made an advance payment to buy such an apartment. The Board of the By the Moat cooperative consistently refused to give us detailed information on members of the cooperative.

Poland: Oleksy Meets SdRP Activists, Views Economy, Church

WS1006130896 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 10 Jun 96 p 2

[Report by Pawel Krysiak from Gorzow Wielkopolski: "The SdRP Head in Gorzow; The Budget Is Religiously Equitable"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Activists of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP] in Gorzow do not agree to concessions to the church. They criticize the idea of paying religion teachers salaries from the state budget; they were also critical of the president's indecisive stand on the Concordat.

At the SdRP convention on 8 June in Gorzow Wielkopolski, SdRP Chairman Jozef Oleksy said: "The left wing should support a woman's right to have an abortion and separation of church and state, and it should be against extreme clericalism."

The Church, Oleksy, Dialogue

When GAZETA WYBORCZA asked Jozef Oleksy about the present state of the dialogue between the church and the left wing, he replied: "The church is forgetting that infallibility on issues of faith does not entail infallibility in evaluating the functioning of the state. The church's readiness for dialogue is next to none."

According to the SdRP leader, "a large area of prejudices and mutual suspicioun has appeared." "There is a big difference between what church officials believe participation of the church in public life should involve and what we think of it; it is time to talk about this," Oleksy declared, adding: "The left wing is ready for such talks, meetings, seminars."

The delegates were outraged at the left wing's submissiveness toward the Episcopate: "The budget is religiouslzxy equitable. Both believers and nonbelievers make their contributions to it. Why should we not use this money to pay salaries to religion teachers?" Zbigniew Binias of Miedzychod wondered. "One-third of society lives in poverty, whereas we spend money on religion teachers," a delegate from Osna said angrily.

"Walesa used to go to charge car batteries in the Vatican. I hope our president will not be charging car batteries at Primate Glemp's; I hope he will discuss things with his electorate," the Miedzychod activist warned President Kwasniewski.

The convention appealed to all leftist parliament members to keep the promise they gave in 1993: first the constitution, then the Concordat.

Troubles With Liberalism

During the debate on the economy, the delegates made many complaints: "The SdRP is maliciously said to be building capitalism." Oleksy explained that the concept of capitalism does not fit the reality of the end of the 21st century. "In the period of transformation, there must be as much liberalism in Poland as possible; there must also be as much interventionism as necessary. It is not worthwhile to criticize liberalism, which results in economic growth."

To sum up, Oleksy said the following: "The grassroots fear that the fact that the party is part of the government may weaken the leftist image of the party. In the strange platform presented by the Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland entitled 'An Agreement With Poland,' I noted rhetoric that is used by the SdRP. Even in the right wing there are amateurs who want to be more leftist than the SdRP itself."

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Romania: Roman Suggests Talks With U.S. Republicans on NATO

AU1006124196 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 7 Jun 96 p 1

[Article by Democratic Party President Petre Roman on U.S. presidential candidate Bob Dole's NATO enlargement proposal: "Do Not Forget Romania"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Republican presidential candidate Bob Dole's proposal for a rapid NATO enlargement by accepting Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland as full members has created real distress in our country. As is known, in accordance with the Washington Treaty on NATO establishment, the instruments for joining this organization for countries invited to become members are submitted to the U.S. Administration. Therefore, the U.S. Congress endorsing a decision to invite Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland to become NATO members means placing Romania in an uncertain position in terms of its national security. At the same time, such an development of NATO would not be in line with the fundamental mission of the alliance, indicated in the most recent of its documents, namely: "The alliance ensures the essential basis for a stable climate of security in Europe, based on the increase in democratic institutions and on the engagement to resolve all disputes peacefully." On the basis of Romania's achievements on the path of democratizing society and creating a market economy, we can rightfully state that our country, as a free, sovereign, and democratic country, has clearly and unequivocally placed itself among the ranks of and on an equal footing with those countries that aspire to NATO membership, such as Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Poland. Evidence of the above is also the decision of the Romanian Parliament on 5 June to send an appeal to the 16 parliaments of the NATO member countries, requesting support for Romania's efforts for the earliest possible integration into the structures of the alliance.

No argument of a geostrategic nature, in the context of rearranging the strategic interests in a post-Yalta world, can prevail over such a determined and deeply motivated aspiration of Romania to become a NATO member.

We request that the Republican Party of the United States hold talks with politicians in Romania to clarify all the aspects and consequences of the draft law on NATO enlargement submitted to the U.S. Congress.

Romania: Cioflina Displeased With Dole's NATO Proposals

AU1006154496 Bucharest AZI in Romanian 8 Jun 96 p 3

[MEDIAFAX report on statements by Chief of General Staff Dumitru Cioflina: "General Cioflina Aims at Bob Dole"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The chief of the General Staff of the Romanian Army, Army Corps General Dumitru Cioflina, said that the proposals submitted by Bob Dole to the U.S. Congress regarding the association of some formerly socialist European countries with NATO are but part of the electoral campaign.

"The presidential candidates are duty-bound to make proposals to support their electoral campaign," said Cioflina, who believes that Bob Dole was doing nothing else than attracting votes. "The three states proposed by Dole—the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary—have a strong lobby in the United States, and several hundred votes count a lot for a candidate for the office of U.S. president," Cioflina said. Without presenting the official position of the Romanian Army on this matter, General Cioflina added: "Life will show what the reality is."

On 4 June Senator Bob Dole, Clinton's opponent in the presidential elections, submitted to the U.S. Congress a text that includes a draft resolution and a draft law that both refer to the pace at which NATO expands toward eastern Europe.

The draft envisages granting $60 million to the states that wish to become NATO members with complete rights, and the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary are named for the first wave of admission.

Romania: Prospects for Early NATO Membership Slim

AU1006160496 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 6 Jun 96 p 1

[Editorial by Romulus Caplescu: "Has Romania Missed the Train of NATO Adherence?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Is the decision adopted in Berlin by the NATO Ministerial Council (a decision that has also been termed by some as "historic"), to confer upon the European countries a more important role within the alliance, capable of exerting a beneficial impact upon the projects for NATO's expansion to the east or not? For the time being, it is difficult to give an answer to this question, but the statements and clarifications made at that meeting, as well as certain events directly linked to the respective subject matter, provide some helpful indications for forming an educated opinion.

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Thus, on the one hand, there is the school of thought that NATO's shift of emphasis from the western to the eastern shore of the Atlantic has proved that the alliance is capable of adjusting to the new requirements, something that is an encouraging sign regarding the NATO expansion, which is so strongly desired by the Soviet Union's former partners in the defunct Warsaw Pact. On the other hand, the decision made by the ministers present at that meeting can also provide a reason for concern for the candidate countries—including Romania, of course—that the alliance would rather concentrate on reforming its internal structures now, to the detriment of the plans for expansion to the continent's eastern zone.

It is true that NATO Secretary General Javier Solana gave assurances that the "expansion train is still on the rails," but it remains to be seen at what speed it is moving and particularly who is going to be allowed to step aboard. This is a problem that seriously concerns us, the Romanians, because the Berlin meeting seems to have increased the possibility that our country will not be included in the first wave and may even remain outside the organization for a long time to come, until the next wave, if such a second wave is ever going to come about. There has been a lot of talk recently about the bargain allegedly struck between NATO and Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov, according to which Moscow would agree to a limited expansion (as it is felt to be less "provoking") that should only include Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. In exchange, NATO should pledge not to move its troops to the east, let alone its nuclear weapons. Meantime, Primakov has denied the existence of such a bargain, but this denial may be motivated by electoral considerations, since the Kremlin leaders do not wish to appear to be showing "weakness" before the West on the eve of the presidential ballot in Russia.

What about the position of the United States, the de facto leader of the Atlantic alliance? Well, the news coming from that direction does not seem to be too encouraging, either. First of all, the White House—through its spokesman—expressed its endorsement of a slow pace of expansion ("NATO is not a club that one can join as easily as batting an eyelid!") and emphasized that this process will take place "according to a calendar to cover the years 1996 and 1997, when we will examine who the eligible members might be." In other words, there is the possibility of extending the expectancy period by another year, instead of the assertion to date that the end of this year is the deadline for announcing who has passed the entrance exam and who has not.

Even more disappointing for us is the position of the Republican Party, which has a majority in the U.S. House of Representatives and Senate, which—while criticizing the delaying tactics of the Clinton administration—has submitted to the two chambers of the U.S. Congress an initiative (which has no power of law) to accelerate the expansion process. So far, so good, only that, once more, only Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary are mentioned by name, countries whose aspirations to join NATO will also be supported by a budget of $60 million. This sum is certainly small, but the first thing that springs to mind is Romania's absence from that list.

Romania will also be the great absentee at the summit scheduled for the weekend in Poland, which will be attended, aside from the president of the host country, by the presidents of Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Slovenia, together with those of Austria, Germany, Italy, and—the big surprise—Ukraine! Among other things, the meeting will also discuss the coordination of the efforts of the countries from the phantom-like Visegrad group with a view to being admitted to the Euro-Atlantic structures.

Of course, all these things are not new. Romania has never had any reason to have too many illusions along these lines, despite the eulogies raised by its participation in the Partnership for Peace. There is no doubt, however, that, given the aforementioned reality, the Romanian diplomacy cannot remain with its arms crossed and must speak out on this matter, on which the country's future security depends.

Romania: Daily Warns Political Class of Electorate's Revenge

AU0906150396 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 4 Jun 96 pp 1-2

[Editorial by Ralu Filip: "Absenteeism—A Reaction Against the Political Class?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Organization and absenteeism were the main problems in last Sunday's elections. These problems will certainly trigger heated and controversial political disputes, particularly when certain candidates try to strike political capital out of them.

It is obvious that the organization of the elections was deficient. First of all, because the entire electoral process was delayed prohibitively long, something which has had a series of negative repercussions: the hurried organization of polling stations; delays in posting the lists of voters, something which prevented their being checked and corrected; the lack of signs for voting stations; and the poor quality of the paper and print on voting slips. All this has culminated with the lack of ink and seals, a problem which acquired nationwide proportions.

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The delay of the electoral process has led to many irregularities noted at the polling offices. These shortcomings were not due to fraudulent intentions, but rather to ignorance of the law stipulations by the majority of the members of the electoral bureaus of the polling stations, who were not sufficiently trained and were also superficially selected.

The striking thing is that the poor organization of the elections has affected all competitors, including the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR].

Nevertheless, it is not the organization of the elections which is the most important problem, but rather the issue of absenteeism. After all, the deficient organization of the election has only affected those who went to the polls, not those who stayed at home. Therefore, the deficient way in which last Sunday's local elections were held does not explain or elucidate in the least the absenteeism, which has deeply shaken the political class, particularly with the legislative and presidential elections around the corner. The political leaders, analysts, and commentators are now trying to find the causes of this phenomenon, which has canceled many of their previous electoral calculations.

Seen from a general angle, the degree of absenteeism in Romania is not much higher than in the neighboring countries or Western Europe. The average participation in the polls in Europe and the United States is about 50-60 percent. Therefore, in this respect at least, Romania is not much different.

If absenteeism must not be dramatized, this does not mean that it should be ignored. In the opinion of many political commentators and analysts, the main cause of the nonparticipation in the polls is the population's disappointment with both the activity of the local administrations and of the political class. This disappointment was caused, on the one hand, by their inefficiency when it came to dealing with the people's problems and the difference between the agenda of the political class and the reality; and, on the other hand, by the involvement of many mayors and politicians in various scandals and corruption acts. This has led many analysts to state that the population expects nothing more from the current political class and, in the best case, it no longer trusts its offers. The people are convinced that the personal or party interests of the candidates to the mayoral positions have priority over the interests of the citizens. In this respect, absenteeism can be interpreted as a reaction against the political class or lack of interest toward the policy and behavior of the political class.

Another cause is the deficient organization of the electoral campaign. It was not only the administration, which failed to properly prepare the elections, but also the parties themselves. Many candidates were announced in the last minute and their programs were put together in a hurry, or even replaced by scanty surrogates. On the other hand, many candidates avoided a confrontation with the electorate and only preferred to seek and engage in a confrontation with their adversaries. Other candidates tried to hide the black holes in their programs by incriminating the "riches" of one or the other of their countercandidates or by simply claiming to be poor themselves!

As usual, there was an abundance of electoral promises, particularly in the last stages of the electoral campaign. They were nonrealistic and demagogic promises, which further increased the electorate's distrust and blurred the differences between the various electoral campaigns and messages, so that it became impossible to distinguish between the competitors.

Regarding the electoral campaign proper, very few competitors observed the fair-play rule. Ilie Nastase was simply demolished, with the most incorrect means being used against him to this end. However, the anti-PDSR campaign waged by certain publications has also negatively affected the Democratic Convention of Romania [CDR] candidates, whom the population also warned, through absenteeism, that it does not consider them better, more competent, and more correct than the PDSR candidates.

Disgusted by the vulgar show of the electoral campaign, a large part of the population turned indifferent toward the elections and eventually refused to go to the polls, since it did not know whom to trust and who is going to do what if he becomes mayor.

Another cause of the absenteeism may be the lack of an effort to mobilize the people to turn out for the vote. For instance, the Romanian Television has broadcast many debates, which only focused on the possible winners of the elections. No program was devoted to explaining the importance of the local elections for the daily life of the citizens. The paradox is that two of the producers of the political debates on the television were involved in the Pro-Democratia [Pro-Democracy Association] actions, without realizing that the voters are more important than the competitors!

The nonpolitical organizations LADO [League for the Defense of Human Rights] and Pro-Democratia, for instance, have also failed to take steps to mobilize the electorate, by explaining to the people the duties of the mayors and of the local and county councils and why they should turn out to the polls.

That is why, on election day, most of those who went to vote did not know whom to vote for and many of

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those who did not go to the polls did not go because they thought the local elections were not important and only the legislative and presidential ones were.

Last Sunday's local elections are a serious warning for the political class. If the precipice which separates it from the people and their real problems remains as wide as it is now and if personal or party interests continue to have priority, then the voters will take their revenge, maybe even more drastically than they did now, at the upcoming legislative and presidential elections.

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Federal

FRY: Government Reshuffle Expected in Sep

LD1006145396 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1117 GMT 10 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 10 Jun (SRNA)—The governments of the Republic of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia will go through another reshuffle in September, the DNEVNI TELEGRAF has reported, quoting Serbian government sources. The newspaper says that the announced reorganization will be short-lived as both governments will be completely changed on the eve of the general elections.

Serbia

Serbia: Milosevic on Elections, War Crimes, IFOR

BR1006145096 Madrid EL PAIS in Spanish 10 Jun 96 p 3

[Interview with Serb President Slobodan Milosevic by Renate Flotau and Olaf Ihlau in Belgrade; date not given: "There Was No Innocent Side in the War in Bosnia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Slobodan Milosevic, 54, is not a politician given to excessive media appearances. In very little time he has gone from being a villain, considered by many to be the tyrant of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to a hero, held up by the United States as the architect of the peace agreement reached in Dayton. This interview, held in Belgrade, comes at a crucial time for him. The EU and Washington are pressuring him to hand over and remove from political circulation the Bosnian Serb leaders Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, both of whom have been accused of crimes against humanity.

[EL PAIS] For years now you have been the key figure in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. How do you see your role?

[Milosevic] I have advocated the continuity of a multinational Yugoslavia ever since the first symptoms of disintegration made themselves felt. Every diplomat in the world knows that I made efforts to find a peaceful solution to this conflict. The solution in Bosnia can only be found in a formula that equally protects the interests of the three peoples involved: Serbs, Croats, and Muslims. The Dayton peace agreement acknowledges that.

[EL PAIS] In the West many people saw you as the person primarily responsible for the war. Today, in the view of both the Europeans and the Americans, you are the most important partner in the peace process. Are you pleased with that change?

[Milosevic] The war in Bosnia was not a one-sided thing, nor did it involve just one people. The three peoples involved are responsible for the war, but some members of the international community have an especially large share of responsibility to carry. I am doing what I can to contribute to peace. And if the United States and Europe now consider me an important partner, then they have their reasons.

[EL PAIS] The fratricidal war in the former Yugoslavia led to more than 250,000 deaths and four million refugees. Was it worth the effort?

[Milosevic] Neither 250,000 deaths nor just a single one can justify a civil war. I and all of my contemporaries have learned a great deal from everything that happened. One of the things we learned was the choice of collaborators and allies—some of whom I would never choose again.

[EL PAIS] Serbia is the territory where the Serbs live, you said in 1991, claiming the right of the Serbs to live in a Serbian state. What did the war do to help the Serbian people?

[Milosevic] I fought to keep Yugoslavia together, because that responded to the Serbian people's interest. Those of us who fought to keep a multinational Yugoslavia were branded nationalists and aggressors. The international community imposed brutal sanctions on us. While those who, with aggressive nationalism, fought for the secession and creation of ethnically clean minstates were called democrats and received recognition and international support. Europe acted against its own interests in the Yugoslav crisis.

[EL PAIS] What did the Serbs gain from the war?

[Milosevic] This war was forced on the Serbs living outside Serbia. By virtue of the Constitution of one of the three states of this Republic, the Serbs in Bosnia were going to be declared second-class citizens in some Islamic state. In the end the Serbs obtained their own Serbian Republic in Bosnia.

[EL PAIS] Serbian writer Dobrica Cosic felt that the end of the war spelled disaster for the Serbs. He said that the victims fell in vain, and that Croatia was the winner.

[Milosevic] I do not agree with that. Serbia could not have prevented any of the wars that it fought. It is not true that Serbia lost in the peace what it won in the war. For that reason I am convinced about the peace, because it is a historic opportunity for the interests of Serbia and the Serbian people.

[EL PAIS] Bearing in mind all the cumulation of hatred, is it even realistic for the refugees to return as set out in the Dayton agreement?

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[Milosevic] The wounds are deep; there is no doubt about that. But these are not the first wounds the Yugoslavian people have inflicted upon themselves. In other places, many peoples who once clashed subsequently turned into neighbors and allies.

[EL PAIS] The French and Germans for example, but it takes many generations.

[Milosevic] Not in our case. The primary goal now is to safeguard peace. Then we can reverse many results of this bloody civil war. We must regain normal conditions. The return of refugees is possible because these people want to return to their homes. With the help of the international community we will continue creating the conditions for reintegration based on security at a personal, legal, and property level.

[EL PAIS] Do the unyielding people surrounding Radovan Karadzic in Pale think the same?

[Milosevic] I do not know anyone in Pale who is against the application of the Dayton agreement.

[EL PAIS] Do you think it is possible to hold elections in September, as set out in Dayton?

[Milosevic] They have to be held and they will be held, because as long as there are no legal democratic institutions in Bosnia the situation will not normalize. These elections are crucial to the country's future.

[EL PAIS] Will the institutions be occupied by representatives of the old nationalist spirit?

[Milosevic] No. The elections will lead to radical changes and positive results. I am sure of that.

[EL PAIS] That is an optimistic opinion.

[Milosevic] The war is over. Everyone knows that.

[EL PAIS] Karadzic too?

[Milosevic] Although there were problems with some individuals, that will not affect the cause. The people want peace.

[EL PAIS] Is it not a delusion to think that the IFOR troops can be withdrawn at the end of the year, as planned?

[Milosevic] The withdrawal plan is still realistic as long as nobody tries to postpone the elections scheduled for September.

[EL PAIS] One thing undermining the future coexistence of the Balkan peoples is the issue of war crimes. How is the Serbian Government cooperating with The Hague?

[Milosevic] In Serbia people think that all war criminals have to account for their crimes. The officials in Serbian territory will have to assume their part of the responsibility. Now the trials of Serbian war criminals—if there are any—should not be held outside Serbia. You will not be able to find anyone who will justify these kinds of crimes, apart from those who committed them.

[EL PAIS] Do you think that Karadzic and General Mladic will have to pay for what happened in Bosnia, or do you think—like Mladic—that the International War Crimes Tribunal [IWCT] in The Hague is prejudiced against the Serbs?

[Milosevic] I do not think that the IWCT is an organization spreading slander. But the official stance makes it quite clear that it is a political institution, not a judicial one. There were no innocent parties in the three-way civil war in Bosnia. The only innocent people were the weak, who, irrespective of the ethnic group to which they belonged, suffered most from the horrors of war. Justice will only be effective if everyone is treated alike. But the activities of the IWCT do not give that impression.

[EL PAIS] General Mladic, for whom an arrest warrant has been issued, recently attended the funeral of a comrade in Belgrade, yet he was not bothered.

[Milosevic] You are familiar with the climate and the rules in this region. Not just in Serbia but especially here. A funeral is a sacred day. Even if Izetbegovic had attended the funeral there would have been nothing to fear.

Serbia: President Milosevic Interviewed

AU1006152596 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 10 Jun 96 pp 140-144

[Interview with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic by Renate Flottau and Olaf Ihlau "in his office in Belgrade"; date not given: "The Key to Peace"]

[DER SPIEGEL] Mr. President, for years you have been a key figure in the conflict over the former Yugoslavia. How do you see your role?

[Milosevic] I advocated the continued existence of the multinational Yugoslavia when the first signs of disintegration occurred. When it collapsed, I tried to protect the parts of the country that wanted to stay together as Yugoslavia—Serbia and Montenegro. All diplomats in the world know that I tried to achieve a peaceful settlement of this quarrel. A solution in Bosnia can only be accomplished by a formula that safeguards the interests of all three ethnic groups—the Serbs, the Croats, and the Muslims—by granting them equal rights. The Dayton peace agreement accepts this as a realistic necessity. Its success depends on its

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complete implementation. Relations between the three peoples on the basis of equal rights, this is the key to peace in Bosnia.

[DER SPIEGEL] Many people in the West still believe that you are mainly responsible for the war in the Balkans. Yet today you are the most import partner for the Europeans and Americans in the implementation of the Dayton peace agreement. Are you amused or satisfied with this change?

[Milosevic] If a country disintegrates and if a war is waged there, then there is no place for fun or joy. I am neither amused nor satisfied. The war in Bosnia cannot be attributed to an individual or a single people. All three ethnic groups are responsible for the war. Especially great responsibility is borne by some members of the international community. I am doing everything possible to contribute to peace. If the United States and Europe now consider me to be an important partner, they probably have serious reasons to do so.

[DER SPIEGEL] The genocide in the former Yugoslavia claimed over 250,000 lives, and 4 million were driven from their homes. Was this worth the price, and what would you have done differently in retrospect?

[Milosevic] Neither 250,000 deaths nor a single casualty justify a civil war. Like everybody else, I have learned a great deal from what happened in Yugoslavia. One thing is the selection of aides and allies. I would not choose some of them any more. However, one does not always immediately see people's true faces in difficult times.

[DER SPIEGEL] By claiming in 1991 that Serbia is where Serbians live, you insisted on the right of the Serbs to live in one state. What has the war achieved for the Serbs?

[Milosevic] I fought for Yugoslavia's preservation because this was also in the interest of the Serbian people. There, all Serbs lived in one state, and the interests of the other Yugoslav peoples—the Croatians, Muslims, Slovenes, and Macedonians—were also safeguarded there. Unfortunately, the true interests of the Yugoslav peoples have lost the struggle against their own nationalism because this nationalism was not only very aggressive but also promoted strongly from outside. The fact that, with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia [FRY], we succeeding in preserving a multinational state and in preventing nationalist conflicts is an enormous achievement in view of the large conflict in the Balkans.

At the same time, the media distorted facts about Yugoslavia during these war years and subordinated them to those who wanted Yugoslavia's disintegration. We who fought for the preservation of a multinational Yugoslavia were branded as nationalists and aggressors. We were brutally exposed to sanctions by the international community. Those, however, who sought secession and wanted to create ethnically cleansed ministates with aggressive nationalism were lauded as democrats and received international recognition and support. Europe worked against itself in the Yugoslav crisis.

[DER SPIEGEL] Where did the Serbs profit from the war?

[Milosevic] The war was forced upon the Serbs living in Serbia. The Serbs in Bosnia, one of the three major ethnic groups in this republic, were to be turned into second-class citizens of some Islamic theocracy overnight, as it were. In Bosnia, the Serbs finally established their Serb Republic. As far as the war in the other areas is concerned, the territory of the present FRY was not affected.

[DER SPIEGEL] The Serb writer Dobrica Cosic considers the end of the war a disaster for the Serbs. The sacrifices were in vain, and Croatia is the winner. Is the old Cosic statement still valid—Serbia loses during peacetime what it won by force of arms?

[Milosevic] I do not share Cosic's view. Serbia would not have been able to avoid a single war that it waged. In every war, Serbia performed as well as it could by defending the interests and the freedom of its people. It is not right that Serbia has lost in peacetime what it gained during the war. For this reason, I am now also convinced of peace. It offers Serbia's interests and the Serbian people a fateful opportunity.

[DER SPIEGEL] The wounds that the peoples in the former Yugoslavia inflicted upon each other will not heal quickly. Is a return of the refugees, as stipulated in the Dayton agreement, at all realistic in view of all that hatred?

[Milosevic] There is no doubt that the wounds are very deep. But these are not the first wounds that the Yugoslav peoples have inflicted upon each other. In other places, too, many peoples who fought against each other became good neighbors and allies later....

[DER SPIEGEL] The French and the Germans, for example, but that takes generations.

[Milosevic] Not in our countries. Safeguarding peace is now the overall objective. Then many results of the bloody civil war will be modified. A normal situation must be restored. In Bosnia, there are approximately 30 percent of mixed marriages. Should the children be divided among the ethnic groups? The return of the refugees is possible because people want to go back

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to their own homes. With the help of the international community, we will continue to create the conditions for reintegration, which must be based on personal, legal, and property-related security.

[DER SPIEGEL] This may be your opinion. Yet is your view shared by the unyielding persons surrounding the leader of the Bosnian Serbs, Radovan Karadzic, in Pale?

[Milosevic] I do not know anybody in Pale who is against the implementation of the Dayton agreement.

[DER SPIEGEL] What about the chauvinist Biljana Plavsic, launched by Karadzic as the de facto president?

[Milosevic] Ms. Plavsic has just paid me a visit, and she assured me of her absolute readiness to implement the Dayton agreement.

[DER SPIEGEL] Yet the way the hardliners of Pale interpret the Dayton agreement does not provide for the integration of the Serb Republic into the state of Bosnia.

[Milosevic] Well, you know, politicians like to address their own audiences in a certain way. Muslim leader Alija Izetbegovic recently gave an inflammatory speech in Gorazde, as if the war had just started.

[DER SPIEGEL] Irritations of this kind occur constantly, and the civilian implementation of the Dayton agreement with the planned elections is threatening to fail.

[Milosevic] I see things in a completely different way. The significance of these elections is enormous. They must and will take place, because so long as no legal democratic institutions exist in Bosnia, the situation there will not normalize. These elections will be decisive for the future of the country. I am sure that there will be the parliament and government of the Serb Republic and the parliament and government of the Muslim-Croat federation, as well as joint bodies for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[DER SPIEGEL] And the new institutions will be occupied by the representatives of the old nationalist demon.

[Milosevic] No. The elections will lead to radical changes and positive results. I am convinced of that. The majority of the citizens want peace. In the offices, there will be new figures representing all three ethnic groups who are interested in more tolerance and cooperation, in trade and communication.

[DER SPIEGEL] We are talking to an optimist.

[Milosevic] The war is over, that is clear to everyone.

[DER SPIEGEL] Also to Karadzic and his aides in the Serb stronghold of Pale?

[Milosevic] Even if there should be problems with individual persons, this would have no impact on the peace itself. People want peace.

[DER SPIEGEL] Then according to your scenario, the withdrawal of the IFOR [Implementation Force] troops, planned for the end of the year, is not an illusion?

[Milosevic] The withdrawal plan continues to be realistic, unless somebody invents reasons to delay the elections planned for the second half of September. Above all, I am thinking of those forces that have political motives to disturb or to slow down the implementation of the Dayton agreement—with a view to the final phase of the U.S. presidential campaign, for instance.

In Bosnia itself, these are the same forces that want to prevent elections in Mostar.

[DER SPIEGEL] Should the Europeans organize their own peace force for Bosnia once the Americans withdraw?

[Milosevic] I believe that the Dayton agreement is being realized successfully, and, therefore, there will be no need for new troops. The process of normalizing relations between the FRY and Croatia is also important for the stabilization of the situation in this region. This would once and for all banish the danger of a conflict between Serbs and Croats. Neither the Serbian nor the Croatian side in Bosnia can ignore the categorical position of Belgrade and Zagreb. In addition, Belgrade and Zagreb are the best guarantors for the Muslim side that nobody will attack it. Thus, there is only the possibility of Muslims fighting against each other, which I do not believe, or of the Muslims alone waging a war against the Serbs and Croats, which would be suicidal.

[DER SPIEGEL] When will the millions of refugees, who are wandering about the former Yugoslavia and half of Europe, be able to return to their homes?

[Milosevic] We must remain realistic. On a larger scale, this will only be possible after the normalization of the situation in Bosnia. For this reason, the elections there are so incredibly important.

[DER SPIEGEL] Can the 230,000 Serbs who were driven out of the Croatian Krajina expect to go back?

[Milosevic] We hope so, and we expect a positive solution. The complete normalization of relations between Yugoslavia and Croatia would undoubtedly open the door for the return of the Serb refugees.

[DER SPIEGEL] The war crimes continue to be a burden for the future coexistence of the peoples in the Balkans. How is the Serbian Government cooperating with the war crime tribunal in The Hague?

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[Milosevic] In Serbia, the view prevails that all war criminals should account for their atrocities. Those who committed such crimes on Serb territory will be called to account. However, trials against war criminals from Serbia—if there are any—should not take place outside Serbia. By the way, war-crimes trials started in Serbia as early as two years ago, for which the death sentence can be applied. In the tradition of the Serbian people, the killing of prisoners of war and civilians, particularly of women and children, is considered the worst atrocity. You will not find anybody in Serbia who justifies such crimes, no matter who committed them.

[DER SPIEGEL] Do you believe that Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic will be punished for what happened in Bosnia? Or do you, like Mladic, view the Hague tribunal as stigmatizing the Serbs?

[Milosevic] I do not believe that this tribunal is an institution for slander. But, from the behavior that has been seen in public, it becomes very clear that this is a political and not a legal institution. In the civil war in Bosnia, in which three parties were involved, none of them was innocent. Only the weak ones who suffered most severely from the terror of the war, irrespective of their membership of an ethnic group, were innocent. Thus, justice can only be administered if the same yardstick is applied to everybody. From what has happened at the tribunal in The Hague so far, I see no basis for such an impression.

[DER SPIEGEL] The impression is growing in the West that the way the Serbs are behaving in this respect is a farce. It was possible for Gen. Mladic, against whom an arrest warrant has been issued, to attend the funeral of a military comrade in Belgrade.

[Milosevic] Well, you are familiar with the atmosphere and the rules of this region. Not only in Serbia, but particularly in Serbia, a funeral is a solemn occasion. Everybody can come and go as he pleases. Even if Mr. Izetbegovic had gone to that funeral, nothing would have happened to him.

[DER SPIEGEL] Does this mean that, next time, you will have Gen. Mladic arrested?

[Milosevic] I do not believe that these are the most important questions for your readers....

[DER SPIEGEL] ...but certainly for the future peace process in Bosnia.

[Milosevic] I hope you are aware that the peace process is being implemented very successfully in Bosnia. Not a single serious problem has occurred in the six months since the conclusion of the Dayton agreement. It is true that, in the civilian realization, we are lagging behind schedule somewhat, but EU Coordinator Carl Bildt has more or less attributed this to the lack of funds.

[DER SPIEGEL] And do you share this view?

[Milosevic] Yes, in objective terms, Bildt possesses too few resources to be able launch larger scale activities geared toward rebuilding Bosnia's economy.

[DER SPIEGEL] The situation of the Albanians in the Serbian province of Kosovo is one of the problems that remains unresolved in the Balkans. Is Belgrade prepared to grant the region greater democratic self-rule?

[Milosevic] I don't think that there is a national minority anywhere in the world that enjoys as many rights as the Albanian minority in Kosovo. The Albanians have their own school system, radio and television programs, and at least 20 newspapers and magazines. They are extremely critical. In some of them, I was even depicted as a dog in cartoon form, but not a single edition of these newspapers has ever been banned, ever. The Albanians living in our country are free, and they live in a free country.

[DER SPIEGEL] The Albanians are not a minority in Kosovo; they constitute the overwhelming majority of the population.

[Milosevic] There is no doubt about the fact that the Albanians are clearly a minority in Yugoslavia. If it were otherwise, well, then the Mexicans living in southern Texas could also demand to be incorporated into Mexico. No, this matter is our affair, and there will be no internationalization of the Kosovo issue. I was also very pleased to hear from Mr. Kinkel when he was here that the issue is our own internal affair, which we have to solve. Incidentally, that is also the position of the British and the Americans.

[DER SPIEGEL] With the visit paid by Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, Bonn and Belgrade have resumed dialogue after a five-year break. What expectations do you have of the Germans?

[Milosevic] Yugoslavia and Germany can cooperate very well in the economic, cultural, and political fields. Over the past few years, the German press has carried a lot of disinformation about developments on the territory of former Yugoslavia, and its assessments have been incorrect. Serbia came off worst and was placed in the dock as the party bearing the greatest responsibility for the war. However, that was not the way things were. Bosnia experienced a war waged by three peoples and each of these peoples had its ideologues backing war. Each of these ideologues drew his inspiration from outside Bosnia.

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Peace in Bosnia must also mean the reestablishment of links between the people's of former Yugoslavia. For Yugoslavia, Germany can be a valuable ally for the preservation of peace.

History, which weighs heavily on our two countries, must remain part of the past. There should be no repetition of it, neither for Serbia or for Germany. Our children should live in peace, get to know each other, and have reason to believe in a better future.

[DER SPIEGEL] You and Minister Kinkel agreed that by 1997 you will take back 120,000 asylum-seekers—most of whom are Albanians—whose applications for asylum have been turned down. Was nothing offered in return? Many of them are people who refused to serve in the military, and they can hardly return without an amnesty.

[Milosevic] A few months ago, all young people from the FRY who refused to serve in the military during the 1990's were amnestied. That is why they have need to worry about returning and need not fear any sanctions. To avoid any misunderstandings: This does indeed only apply to the citizens of the FRY and not to all manner of adventurers who believed that they would receive better treatment in Germany if they portrayed themselves as the victims of an alleged Serbian dictatorship. If you wasted money on them, then I can't feel sorry for you. No one had to flee Yugoslavia because of political pressure or terror. We don't have any political prisoners, unless you include among political prisoners those who shoot at the police or have had large quantities of weapons and explosives seized from them. I think that, in Germany too, such things are not considered "verbal offenses." Incidentally, I see no reason to offer anything in return to Germany. This country is the country of anyone who is a citizen of Yugoslavia just as much as it is my country. Any citizen has the right to come back whenever he wants to and to go wherever he wants to and whenever he wants to.

[DER SPIEGEL] Just three years ago, you considered the Germans, who allegedly wanted to see blood spilled in the Balkans, to be primarily responsible for the collapse of Yugoslavia. What is your view today?

[Milosevic] This is a broad subject, the experiences have been painful ones, and I don't think we should go into it now. I think that, for our two countries, the future lies in good cooperation. We have to live in the future, not the past. We are all Europeans, we're all on the same continent and in the same boat. Wealthier and stronger states may have a responsibility to help others, but without imposing their way of life on us.

[DER SPIEGEL] Mr. President, thank you for talking to us.

Serbia: Seselj Attacks Milosevic Policy on 'Serb Republic'

LD1006145896 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1401 GMT 10 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 10 Jun (SRNA)—"President of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic is constantly trying to bring his people to power in the Serb Republic (RS) in order to destroy it completely," Vojislav Seselj, president of the Serb Radical Party (SRS), told SRNA.

Commenting on the interview Milosevic gave to the German newspaper STERN, Seselj said that "those dirty intentions will bear no fruit, and a clear proof of this is the SRS rallies being held throughout the Serb Republic."

"The president of Serbia cannot bring back the lost trust, but we must be ready for all his surprises," Seselj said. He said Milosevic's "starting point" was his statement that "The Hague tribunal is a political, not a judicial institution."

"It is true he said this. However, when Holbrooke—or any other U.S. official—visits him again, Milosevic will have no problem in changing his opinion," Seselj said.

Serbia: Reasons Listed for Milosevic Not To Arrest Mladic

AU1106095996 Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 1 Jun 96 pp 18-19

[Commentary by Filip Svarm: "The Visit of a War Mate"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A team of top computer experts have been pretty busy. They have been creating a complicated computer game called "Trip to the Hague," which consists of an "adventure" and an action part. The objective of the game is to arrest and extradite Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic to the International Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The potential player must, first of all, in the "adventure" part, fight through a labyrinth of big and small politics, which includes: The requests of the Hague Tribunal, resolutions of the United Nations, elections in Russia and in the United States, media and public opinion, elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Dayton agreement, the mandate of IFOR [Implementation Force], the position and the role of Slobodan Milosevic, internal relationships in the leadership in Pale, Muslim-Croat relationships in

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Bosnia, and so on. The second action part of the game—the very act of arresting Karadzic and General Mladic—is a standard "skirmish" with helicopters, commandos, and so on.

Depending on how (and if at all) the player goes through the "adventure," i.e. how many points he has won, he carries out the arrest with one of three types of troops: Commandos of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (the worst variant), commandos of IFOR (medium variant), or special troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia (strongest variant). If Karadzic and Mladic decide to go to The Hague by themselves, the game stops—the computer wins.

The latest events related to the political and military leaders of the Bosnian Serbs fit perfectly into the mentioned game. The pressure of the international community on Milosevic to remove Karadzic from political life could be treated as the "adventure." The presence of Gen. Mladic at the funeral of Gen. Djordje Djukic on 21 May should have turned into the second part of the game, in its the strongest variant.

However, just as Karadzic has not really retreated, Mladic was not arrested. Obviously, the first part of the game has not been completed in a satisfactory way, and enough points have not been scored for the second. The president of Serbia has at least five good reasons not to arrest Mladic.

First, Gen. Mladic attended the funeral of a close war comrade. The death of Gen. Djukic followed after he was released, gravely ill, from Sevingen—the prison of the Hague Tribunal. He had previously been arrested by the authorities of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina under strange circumstances; he was then accused of war crimes and, finally, was the first to be extradited to the Hague Tribunal. A great number of people here believe that, in fact, Gen. Djukic was "killed by the Hague." It is hardly believable that Milosevic would get public support from anybody in Serbia for such an arrest. To the Western diplomats who protested because of the presence of Gen. Mladic in Belgrade he said that "funerals are a very important thing for Serbs." Even those in Serbia who are for the arrest of the commander of the Bosnian Serb Army would probably disapprove of an arrest at the funeral, and claim that he simply should not have been allowed to enter the country.

Second, the prime minister of Montenegro, Milo Djukanovic, explained the presence of Gen. Mladic in Belgrade as due to the "carelessness of the state organs," and stressed that "no capital conclusions about the attitude of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia towards the International Tribunal should be made on the basis of that." If Gen. Mladic slipped through the hands of IFOR troops deployed in Bosnia, why would the same not happen with the Serbian police? The state organs here, just like IFOR, can try to guess whether, while going through checkpoints, he would be wearing a wig or be dressed like a nun. Besides, Gen. Mladic makes telephone calls to NATO officers, sends faxes to them, he has regular telephone contacts with the commander of the land force of IFOR, General Michael Walker, he signs valid documents about the relations of the Army of the Serbian Republic (VRS) with international forces....

Third, it is a question of who in Serbia would arrest Gen. Mladic—the Ministry of Internal Affairs or the military police. The latter would hardly agree to it (it falls within the scope of their competencies), and they would probably not allow the former to do it, either. For many members of the Army of Yugoslavia (VJ) Gen. Mladic is not only a "war mate" but also a symbol of their dignity. And an unsatisfied army, however marginalized it may be in the political life, is by no means a good thing in an election year.

Fourth, talking about elections, according to results of a public opinion poll in the Serb Republic (RS), carried out by the U.S. International Policy Agency (USIA), 93 percent of the people questioned support Gen. Mladic, whereas 83 percent support Milosevic. If Milosevic arrests Mladic, the Serbian president would have nothing to do in the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which have been scheduled for September. Namely, there is no opposition party in the Serb Republic which would swallow that, including the Socialist Party. The former prime minister Rajko Kasagic, most cooperative towards western mediators, said that there was no nation which extradited its leader.

Fifth, the essence of Milosevic's policy is taking a chance and waiting for big events which will change the present balance of power.

These are the reasons that Milosevic did not arrest Gen. Mladic. The fact that in the Hague the latter could tell all the details about how and with what goals the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was conducted is a special, additional reason; some see it as the most important one. Regardless of all deals and agreements, it is hard to believe that the Hague Tribunal could avoid indicting the Serbian president.

The international community is requested to "kiss or leave," that is, if it believes that Gen. Mladic and Karadzic are the main obstacles to the elections, then its soldiers should arrest them. That variant exists in the game "Trip to the Hague" as well. Somalia and the case of General Aidid indicate why IFOR, at least for the time being, does not want to get itself into that.

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Serbia: Serb Unity Leader Calls E. Slavonia Part of Croatia

AU1006153296 Paris AFP in English 1523 GMT 10 Jun 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, June 10 (AFP)—The ultra-nationalist party of a notorious Serb paramilitary leader on Monday called for the normalisation of relations with Zagreb and said that the last Serb-held part of Croatia belonged to Croatia.

"The war is over. The Serbs have lost," Borislav Pelevic, the vice-president of the opposition Party of Serb Unity, told a press conference.

The party is led by the notorious militia leader Zeljko Raznjatovic, or "Arkan."

"I think that we must orient ourselves towards the normalisation of relations with Croatia," Pelevic said. "We are not happy to have Croats as neighbours ... but as things are we must cooperate with them."

Pelevic said that Serb-held Eastern Slavonia had been "lost" when the Croatian authorities signed an agreement with rebel Serbs in November.

"It is already part of Croatia," he said.

Eastern Slavonia backs onto Serbia and the Serb-held part covers about 4.4 percent of Croatia's territory. Under the agreement, the area was put under the temporary administration of the UN for a maximum of two years.

Pelevic said that all the Serbs in that area could hope for now was to obtain some kind of special status.

Arkan's militia and the former Yugoslav army helped secessionist Serbs in Croatia seize over one quarter of Croatia's territory in 1991, on which they declared their own republic, the Republic of Serb Krajina.

The Croatian army recaptured all Serb-held territory except Eastern Slavonia in two offensives last year.

Serbia: Serbian Unity Condemns Initiative To Divide Kosovo

LD1006201596 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1514 GMT 10 Jun 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 10 Jun (SRNA)—Borislav Pelevic, the vice president of the Party of Serb Unity [Stranka Srpskog Jedinstva], today voiced his deep disapproval of an initiative by the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts [SANU], which suggests the separation of Kosovo-Metohija from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

At a regular news conference in Belgrade, Pelevic said that the statement by SANU Director Aleksandar Despic was "anti-Serb and anti-Yugoslav" and was "grist to the mill of Albanian separatists, who have spoken favorably about this idea."

"We think that SANU should work on resolving the issue of Kosovo-Metohija, but not in this way. Kosovo must be viewed as part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia," Pelevic said and went on to praise those academicians who had abstained or spoke against Despic's initiative. [passage omitted]

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